UC Merced UC Merced Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Designing the Rules of the Game: Legislative Processes in Authoritarian Legislatures Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05k7d5jg Author Woo, Ae sil Publication Date 2020 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, MERCED Designing the Rules of the Game: Legislative Processes in Authoritarian Legislatures A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Ae sil Woo Committee in Charge: Professor Courtenay R. Conrad, Chair Professor Nathan W. Monroe Professor Haifeng Huang Professor Emily Hencken Ritter 2020 i © Copyright Ae sil Woo, 2020 All rights reserved ii The Dissertation of Ae sil Woo is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Emily Hencken Ritter Haifeng Huang Nathan W. Monroe Courtenay R. Conrad, Chair University of California, Merced 2020 iii Dedication To Ae sil Woo in 2018. Thank you for being courageous. iv Contents Acknowledgements . x Curriculum Vita . xi Abstract . xiii v Contents (Continued) 1 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships 1 1.1 Abstract…………………………………………………. 2 1.2 Introduction...……………………………………………. 3 1.3 Legislative Institutions in Dictatorships..……………….. 5 1.4 Mitigating Policy Loss via Legislative Process …...……. 7 1.4.1 Model: Actors and Preferences…………………… 8 1.4.1 Model Equilibria………………………………...… 9 1.5 Opposition Threat & Legislative Process………………. 14 1.6 Testing Hypotheses…………………………………...… 17 1.6.1 Operationalization …………………………….… 17 1.6.2 Empirical Analyses ……………………………… 21 1.7 Conclusion …………………………………………...… 27 1.8 References………………………………………………. 28 1.9 Appendix………………………………………………... 41 2 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies 54 2.1 Abstract…………………………………………………. 55 2.2 Introduction...……………………………………………. 56 2.3 Election Boycott in Autocracies…....………………….. 59 2.4 Legislative Rules in Autocracies..…...……………….... 61 2.5 Empirical Tests……..………………………………...… 66 2.5.1 Operationalization …………………………….… 66 2.5.2 Empirical Analysis ……………………………… 71 2.6 Conclusion …………………………………………...… 77 2.7 References………………………………………………. 79 2.8 Appendix………………………………………………... 92 3 Senates and Executive Term Limits in Dictatorships 93 3.1 Abstract…………………………………………………. 94 3.2 Introduction...……………………………………………. 95 3.3 Executive Term Limits in Dictatorships…....………….. 97 3.4 The Effect of a Senate on Term Limit Outcomes..….... 100 vi 3.5 Testing Hypothesis……..…………………………...… 106 3.5.1 Operationalization …………………………....… 106 3.5.2 Empirical Analysis ………………...…………… 109 3.6 Conclusion ………………………………………......… 114 3.7 References……………………………………………… 117 vii List of Figures 1 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Actors’ Ideal Policy Locations…………………………………………………………………...… 8 2 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Opposition’s role: Voting……………………………………………………………………….... 9 3 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Dictator’s Policy Loss...……………………………………………………………………….... 9 4 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Opposition’s role: Amendment ………………………………………………………………… 11 5 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Dictator’s Policy Loss…………………………………………………………………………. 11 6 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Opposition’s role: First Proposal…………………………………………………………………...… 12 7 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Dictator’s Policy Loss……………………………………………………………………….… 12 8 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Opposition’s role: Second Proposal…………………………………………………………..… 13 9 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships Dictator’s Policy Loss……………………………………………………………………….… 13 10 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Change in the Expected Probability with Low and High Urban Concentration…………..… 23 11 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Change in the Expected Probability with Low and High level of World Democracy………. 23 12 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Change in the Expected Probability with No Party or a Single Party and Multiple Parties in a Legislature………………………………………………………………...… 24 13 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Matching Frontier Results………………………………………………………………………. 26 14 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies: Distribution of Appointment Clauses……………………………………………………….. 68 15 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies: Distribution of Priority Clauses………………………………………………………………......….. 69 16 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies: Predicted Probability Distribution of Legislative Election Boycotts……………………………….. 74 viii List of Tables 1 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Variation in Legislative Process………………………………………………………….. 15 2 Opposition Threat and Legislative Process in Dictatorships: Relationship between Opposition Threat and Legislative Process………………………………….. 22 3 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies: Relationship between Legislative Rules and Legislative Election Boycott……………………….… 73 4 Legislative Rules and Opposition Boycott in Autocracies: Relationship between Legislative Rules and Presidential Election Boycott………………………... 76 5 Senates and Executive Term Limits in Dictatorships: Senates, Personalist Regimes, and Term Limit Outcomes…………………………………………………. 112 ix Acknowledgements I thank everyone who has enriched my doctoral program experience and helped me make choices that led to this huge accomplishment. Courtenay Conrad, my advisor, has provided unconditional guidance for the past five years. The fact that someone stayed very close to me during my academic journey for such a long time without giving up on me instilled patience and generosity in me, and I am ready to apply those qualities not only to my students but also to my loved ones. When I thought I should give up because of multiple barriers, she reminded me that these barriers are not a reason to give up but a reason to work smarter in a more systematic way. I am grateful to be guided by her broad set of perspectives, consistency, and willingness to allocate her precious time to help me move forward at every critical moment. I am very fortunate to form my dissertation committee with brilliant scholars who have seen my strengths and weaknesses from the beginning of the graduate program. Thanks to Nate Monroe for encouraging me to be imaginative and sharing his wisdom about how to turn findings into knowledge. His guidance was especially appreciated in the process of healing my mind that was paralyzed with self-imposed pressure and fear of failure. Thanks to Haifeng Huang for his willingness to be resourceful and his enthusiasm for the studies of authoritarian states. Thanks to Emily Hencken Ritter for her lessons of critical thinking and a kind note she left on the copy of my game theory final exam. I also want to thank Jessica Trounstine who saw my struggle as a sign of hard work instead of a reason to withdraw. The Department of Political Science at the University of California, Merced has provided countless resources for me to expand my horizon in a multitude of ways – conferences, external summer programs, research fellowships, and networking opportunities. This place has been my second home and has introduced me to a large group of supportive friends. Thanks to Stephanie Nail who has inspired me with her persistence and has also been a great colleague to entertain intellectual (and also silly) discussions with. This is also true for Melissa Baker and Peter Carey who became a big part of my academic growth by being friends with whom I can turn to for numerous activities—mock interview, presentation practice, writing, etc. Thanks to Josh Franco and Kau Vue who treated a naïve first-year student as a peer and helped me get adjusted into a graduate program. Thanks to JunHyeok Jang who played multiple roles by being a colleague, a friend, a housemate, and even a brother. It is also a blessing to have smart junior cohorts. Thanks to all graduate students in the political science department for being awesome and supportive. My academic achievement and inner growth were also possible because of the nurturing nature of my personal relationships. Thanks to Hyo Cheol Woo and Kyung Soon Jeong who provided me with opportunities to explore the world and taught me that we always find a way to achieve our goal. Thanks to Young sil Woo who tolerates this intolerable big sister. Thanks to Seong sil Woo who has been a partner in crime ever since she was born. Thanks to Eunji Yoo who taught me how to travel the world. Thanks to GunJung Cho who held me tight during the very last year of the graduate program. x Ae sil Woo Department of Political Science, University of California, Merced 5200 North Lake Road, Merced, California 95343 http://www.aesilwoo.com – [email protected] EDUCATION Ph.D. in Political Science. Expected 2020. University of California, Merced. M.A. in Political Science. 2017. University of California, Merced. B.A. in Economics and Mathematics. 2012. Ithaca College. RESEARCH INTERESTS Comparative Politics, International Relations, Authoritarian Politics, Legislative Process, Conflict, Political Violence, Methodology, and Formal Theory. PUBLICATIONS Who Gets Bought Off? The Differential