4. The Velvet Revolution: the causes and process 84 of the decline of communist power Signs of the approaching collapse of communist rule could be observed from the mid-1980s onwards. In July 1985, a large Catholic pilgrimage was organised in Velehrad, a place linked with the beginnings of Czech and Moravians Christianity. Although the communist establishment sought to prevent the pilgrimage or at least impose severe restrictions on it, they found they no longer had enough power and authority. The pilgrimage became the largest anti-regime gathering of the communist era, with nearly 200,000 people participating, almost two-thirds of them young. The presence of young people was particularly painful for the regime, as it flew in the face of communist descriptions of the Catholic Church as a concern only of a few old people (Cuhra 2001: 168-174, Halas 2004: 625-626). Less than a year later, in April 1986, the dysfunction of the channels of power and information was made evident in the regime’s inadequate response to the disaster at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. For ideological reasons, the KSČ absurdly refused to inform the public about the possible dangers, as by doing so it would admit that Soviet nuclear technology was imperfect. The party preferred to put Czechoslovak citizens at risk. At the same time in the Soviet Union, the perestroika reform movement, linked with the elevation of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the post of general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, was becoming increasingly vocal. Among other changes, perestroika reduced the pressure exerted on dissident circles. As a consequence, expressions of opposition, first cultural and later civic, became more common. The transformation of the communist bloc that was linked with the phenomena of perestroika and glasnost complicated rather than eased things for the KSČ. At its 17th Congress in March 1986 the party mostly ignored perestroika and sought to preserve the status quo. The KSČ leadership found itself in a blind alley. The party was led by many of the same people who had initiated the ‘normalisation’ nearly two decades before and for whom unconditional obedience to Moscow was the main component of their identity. To carry out perestroika and glasnost now (following the Moscow model) would mean renouncing their own policies (for the discussions and developments in the highest echelons of the KSČ, see Štefek 2014: 71-142). Thus, the 1985-1989 period was marked by careful manoeuvring – in effect, a show of disrespect towards Moscow, even though obeisance to the Moscow line had hitherto been the very essence of Czech communism. Within the structures of the KSČ, this 84 Parts of this chapter are revised from Balík 2015 and Balík, Holzer and Kopeček 2008. 81 widened the gap between the leadership (the ‘old guard’), who felt threatened by the reform vision, and the younger, technocratic generation of party officials whose interest was in finding a way forward that would allow them to preserve their individual positions, even if the party as a whole were to lose its monopoly on power. Until November 1989, the latent conflict within the party between a pragmatic wing willing to admit some reform (for instance in the economy) and an ideologically orthodox wing that rejected such an option as it might unleash processes that could gradually dismantle the KSČ’s monopoly, did not develop into an open clash. Some of the steps taken, such as the replacement of Gustáv Husák in the post of general secretary of the ÚV KSČ with Milouš Jakeš, the resignation of the ideologist Vasiľ Bilak from the ÚV KSČ, and the amendment of the act on elections to the Federal Assembly that allowed multiple candidates to contest a seat, cannot be described as an adequate response to the evolving situation. Rather, they indicate that the majority of the party elite lagged behind developments and desperately sought to preserve at least some power. Thus, in the second half of the 1980s the party showed numerous signs of decay. As their patron, the Soviet Union, ceased to exercise strict oversight over them, the KSČ leaders found themselves in a new, historically unprecedented situation. The waning of the KSČ’s political monopoly in the late 1980s was accompanied by deep disillusion within the party and a merciless reality check for its leaders. What emerged in Czechoslovakia was the situation often seen at the end of a totalitarian regime: the party-state was divided into two wings – a reform wing and a conservative wing – and an unofficial opposition including both dissident circles (Palouš 1993) and wider strata of society, which was becoming more active. Czechoslovakia nonetheless differed from most Eastern European countries in that the reform communist wing was of insufficient strength and, more importantly, lacked distinct personalities in its leadership (Vykoukal, Litera and Tejchman 2000: 592-593). Furthermore, unlike in Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovak opposition was insignificant – though increasingly active, its numbers were very low. The broader public had only a faint knowledge of the opposition leaders, including Václav Havel. As far as the relationship between society and politics was concerned, the social contract (see Chapter 3) was being eroded during the late 1980s, primarily due to the inappropriate structure of the country’s economy. The regime ceased to be able to satisfy the growing consumerist expectations of its population. These expectations – which the regime had been able to fulfil sufficiently throughout the 1970s – were raised by the visibly improving standards of living in Western Europe, and Czechoslovak citizens were 82 particularly sensitive to the comparisons they were inevitably making with their neighbours, Austria and West Germany.85 From 1988 onwards, the nature of the opposition movements and their strategies gradually changed. New organisations were created, mostly by the young generation. In comparison with their predecessors, they preserved the emphasis on the defence of human and civic rights, but for the first time political arguments sensu stricto appeared with regime change as their aim. Petitions became a symbol of the last years of communist rule. In the largest petition ever, supported by more than half a million people in late 1987, the Moravian Catholic Augustin Navrátil demanded religious freedom. In June 1989 the petition ‘A Few Sentences’ (Několik vět), written by Charter 77, demanded that political prisoners be released and independent movements, trade unions, and associations be allowed (it was signed by about 40,000 people, but this was still marginal support; see Balík and Hanuš 2007: 60; Otáhal 1999). Despite all this, until November 1989 the growing expressions of opposition lacked a common organisational and political platform and a coherent strategy (Měchýř 1999: 60-63; Suk 1997a: 9-11). The course of events and change of atmosphere in society were ultimately precipitated by events abroad: the quick disintegration of communist regimes in Poland (Dudek 2002: 32-80), Hungary and the German Democratic Republic (Vykoukal, Litera and Tejchman 2000: 706-708). Crucial was the massive wave of East Germans who fled into West Germany, which affected Czechoslovakia when they headed for the West German embassy in Prague (Tůma 1999: 163).86 4.1. The events of November 1989 Within Central Europe, Czechoslovakia is distinctive in that the two phases of transition to democracy – liberalisation and democratisation – occurred concurrently.87 In other words, regime change was not preceded by a period of 85 This can be supported by contemporary opinion polls. According to one, more than half of KSČ members and officials mistrusted the leadership of the party and state (Vaněk 1994: 22-24). 86 For the disintegration of the communist bloc, see Durman 1998; for the realities of Czechoslovak power, see Suk 2004: 22-27 and Vaněk 2006: 324-327. 87 Liberalisation is the initial stage of transition, consisting of such processes as opening, reformulation, or perestroika, which open the hitherto closed political space to reform. Instability is a significant side-effect of liberalisation. Successful liberalisation is followed by the second stage of transition, democratisation, during which democratic institutions are constructed and democratic rules of the game established. See Przeworski 1992, Dvořáková and Kunc 1994: 90. 83 intentional liberalisation. Rather, the parallel unfolding of the twin processes was a sign of the old regime losing its strength. Czechoslovakia nonetheless did successfully transition to a democracy with guarantees. How did the whole process evolve? Very broadly speaking, it was sudden and quick. Whereas in mid- November 1989 Czechoslovakia was an isolated, unreformed, communist oasis in Central Europe, within a few weeks its domestic communist regime collapsed and relinquished power. The swiftness of its capitulation and the speed with which society emancipated itself, was redolent of falling dominoes. The trigger was provided by the police suppression of an authorised student demonstration in Prague on 17 November 1989, held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of the student Jan Opletal, a victim of Nazi persecution. It was not the first time the police had taken such harsh measures against demonstrators: it beat many of them in August 1988 and in January 1989. Perhaps the crucial difference that led to the mass mobilisation of the public was the rumour that a student had been killed. Although disproved by the regime two days later, the psychological impact of the accusation was nevertheless extraordinary.88 Outraged by the police action, students called a protest strike and were soon joined by actors from Prague’s theatres. Riding the wave of spontaneous mass protest, the Civic Forum (OF) emerged on 19 November 1989, with Václav Havel as a central figure. Existing opposition initiatives along with many people outside the circles of dissent quickly joined the Forum.