U N I D I R A F i s s i l e M a A mandate to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material t e r i for nuclear weapons has been under discussion in the Conference of a l Disarmament (CD) in Geneva since 1994. On 29 May 2009 the Conference C u on Disarmament agreed a mandate to begin those negotiations. Shortly t - o afterwards, UNIDIR, with the support of the Government of Switzerland, f f T launched a project to support this process. r e a t This publication is a compilation of various products of the project, y : that hopefully will help to illuminate the critical issues that will need to U n be addressed in the negotiation of a treaty that stands to make a vital d e r contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. s t a n d i n g t h e C r i t i c a l I s s u e s UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH U A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty N I T E D Understanding the Critical Issues N A Designed and printed by the Publishing Service, United Nations, Geneva T I GE.10-00850 – April 2010 – 2,400 O N UNIDIR/2010/4 S UNIDIR/2010/4 A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Understanding the Critical Issues UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland New York and Geneva, 2010 Cover image courtesy of the Offi ce of Environmental Management, US Department of Energy. NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily refl ect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. UNIDIR/2010/4 Copyright © United Nations, 2010 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and confl icts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government offi cials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. The Institute’s web site can be found at: www.unidir.org CONTENTS Foreword ...................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ........................................................................ xi About the contributors .................................................................. xiii Fissile material negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament ....................................... 1 Background ............................................................................. 1 A mandate to negotiate in the CD a ban on the production of fi ssile material ............................... 1 The Shannon Mandate ....................................................... 2 Disagreement over the CD’s annual programme of work .... 4 Dealing with linkages among items on the programme of work ............................................ 4 Negotiation versus discussion .............................................. 5 Coordinators instead of Working Groups ............................ 6 Outcomes: treaties or lesser instruments? ............................ 7 Breakthrough ...................................................................... 8 Return to the Shannon Mandate ......................................... 9 Objectives, elements and characteristics of an FMT .................. 9 Possible objectives .............................................................. 9 Elements of a treaty: questions of scope .............................. 10 Defi nitions ......................................................................... 15 Verifi cation ......................................................................... 17 Entry into force ................................................................... 21 Review ............................................................................... 22 Compliance ........................................................................ 22 Amendment ....................................................................... 23 Possible negotiating scenarios ................................................... 23 Other approaches to the negotiations ................................. 25 Conclusion .............................................................................. 27 v vi Verifi ed cut-off of fi ssile material production for weapons ......... 29 International Panel on Fissile Materials An incomplete moratorium ...................................................... 29 Verifi cation of a ban on production of fi ssile material for weapons ............................................. 30 Shutdown production facilities ........................................... 31 Operating reprocessing and enrichment plants ................... 32 Non-weapon use of fi ssile materials .................................... 35 Clandestine production ...................................................... 36 A verifi ed ban on fi ssile material production .............................. 39 Andreas Persbo The present state of affairs ....................................................... 39 The main prohibition ............................................................... 41 Non-compliance scenarios ....................................................... 42 Challenge inspections .............................................................. 44 Diminishing returns of verifi cation ........................................... 44 Concluding thoughts ................................................................ 45 A treaty on fi ssile materials—just cut-off or more? ..................... 47 Annette Schaper Why a treaty is important—four goals ...................................... 47 Goal I: Irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and implementation of Article VI of the NPT ................. 47 Goal II: Reducing the discrimination of the NPT ................. 48 Goal III: Drawing in states outside the NPT ......................... 49 Goal IV: Reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and promoting a culture of “international responsibility” ...... 49 The topic of the negotiations: “fi ssile materials” ....................... 49 Plutonium .......................................................................... 50 Uranium ............................................................................. 51 Other isotopes and other mixtures ...................................... 52 Variations of scope ................................................................... 53 No regulations at all ............................................................ 54 Comprehensive disarmament ............................................. 54 vii Irreversibility by a ban on redesignation to explosive needs ......................................................... 55 Declarations of excess fi ssile material .................................. 55 Safeguards on declared excess fi ssile materials .................... 56 A ban on production of HEU for submarines and naval vessels ........................................................... 57 Prospects ................................................................................. 58 Treatment of pre-existing fi ssile material stocks in an FM(C)T ... 61 Harold A. Feiveson Focusing on FMCT verifi cation .................................................... 69 Bruno Pellaud Shifting focus: from the IAEA to an FMCT ................................ 70 Focused verifi cation scope ....................................................... 72 Broad verifi cation scope .......................................................... 73 Comprehensive scope ............................................................. 73 Costs: three levels of verifi cation .............................................. 73 Bottom line: costs versus assurances ........................................ 75 Afterthoughts ........................................................................... 75 On the negotiating approaches and FMCT treaty contents ............................................. 75 On the verifi cation agency under the FMCT ....................... 76 IAEA safeguards and verifi cation activities .................................. 77 International Atomic Energy Agency Introduction ............................................................................ 77 Types of IAEA safeguards agreements ....................................... 79 Safeguards for NNWS .............................................................. 80 Safeguards strengthening measures in CSA states ................ 81 Safeguards for non-NPT states .................................................. 83 Safeguards for NWS ................................................................. 83 Other relevant IAEA verifi cation activities ................................. 84 The Trilateral Initiative