Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 21, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov 95-1013 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier and numerous earlier periods of unrest in Bahrain, began a political crisis that appears to defy resolution. The ongoing unrest demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts instituted during 1999-2010, or by any reform measures announced since the uprising began. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but the Sunni minority believes the Shiites want nothing less than outright rule. In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the crisis. The government asserts it has implemented many of the BICI recommendations—an assertion largely corroborated on March 20, 2012, by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation—and says it will institute the remainder. However, stalemate on more substantial political reforms has stoked continued demonstrations and dashed hopes that a solution is in sight. A proposed closer union with Saudi Arabia, announced May 14, 2012, would strengthen the Saudi ability to limit any Bahrain government compromise with Bahrain’s Shiites. The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime and has to some extent concurred with the Bahrain government view that Iran might take advantage of the Bahrain unrest, but the Administration has criticized the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further political reform. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to secure the Persian Gulf. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the naval facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of sales to Bahrain of arms that it can use to protect itself against Iran and support U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy. Congressional Research Service Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1 Some Separation of Powers Established by King Hamad......................................................... 2 Post-Charter Elections and Political Groups ............................................................................. 3 2002 Elections..................................................................................................................... 3 2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”.......................... 4 The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising................. 4 2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 6 Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands .................................................... 7 The Saudi-led Intervention and Crackdown........................................................................ 8 Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency ............................................ 9 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) Formed, National Dialogue Held.................................................................................................................................. 9 BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation........................... 12 U.S. Posture on the Uprising............................................................................................. 15 Other Human Rights Issues..................................................................................................... 17 Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 18 Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 18 Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 18 Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 19 Executions and Torture...................................................................................................... 19 U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations..................................................................... 19 U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain ........................................................................................ 20 Defense Pact and Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan....................... 21 Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation ........................................................... 21 U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid..................................................................................... 22 Purchases With National Funds......................................................................................... 23 September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale.......................................................................... 24 Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 25 Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran.......................................................................... 26 Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties....................................... 27 Other Foreign Policy Issues.....................................................................................................28 Qatar Territorial Disputes.................................................................................................. 29 Arab-Israeli Issues.............................................................................................................29 Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 30 Figures Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 32 Tables Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 6 Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain..................................................................................... 31 Congressional Research Service Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain............................................................................................... 31 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32 Congressional Research Service Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1 The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The family’s arrival from the Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers. The Al Khalifa subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant power in the Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain

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