Political Culture in East Germany – a Reaction to the Indignities of Unification Wolf Wagner I. Introduction “Four Green Fields” and similar songs expressing a longing for unification which are sung by many Irish and known to all did not exist in pre-unified Germany. Already during the seventies nearly everybody had given up the idea of a unified Germany in the foreseeable future – even those who claim today never to have done so. Still, Germany today is unified and Ireland is not. Maybe to an Irish readership Germany can serve as an example for what may go wrong in a political culture when such songs become true. If political culture is an indication of the legitimacy of a political system the data of East Germany show that the way unification was implemented in Germany has alienated a substantial part of the East German population from the present-day social, political and economic system and from politics in general. The question is: What are the possible reasons for this deterioration and are there lessons to be learned from it? This paper will first present the relevant data and then a model of cultural change as an attempt to explain them. Some preliminary remarks: 1. Due to separate development for more than 40 years, the inhabitants of the two former German states significantly differ in a variety of attitudes, opinions, perceptions and mentalities. which often leads to misunderstandings and tension in everyday life. 2. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that both groups belong to the same nation and therefore have a great lot in common. Simply put, East Germans are just as fond of football, beer, Sauerkraut and brass music as West Germans. 3. Since I will almost exclusively concentrate on dissimilarities, the difference between both populations might appear bigger than it actually is. 4. The experience of transformation from one political and social system to another is an individual process. However, individual differences will be averaged out in the results and conclusions presented here since they have been drawn from data stemming from extensive and representative opinion polls. 5. I will exclusively deal with negative effects of reunification and ignore all the positive aspects, such as improved social and economic conditions in Eastern Germany. II. The development of Political Culture in East Germany during the process of unification as experienced by a panel of young Saxonians In 1987 Peter Förster (2000), an East-German social scientist, was given the permission by the Politbureau to do a representative study of the political attitudes of the then 14 year old students. Because Peter Förster made this study the project of his life and set all his energies to find continued funding we now have reliable data about the development of political attitudes throughout the whole process of German unification. In 1992 35% of the young people expressed satisfaction with the new German political 1 system (3% of them were very satisfied). In 1998 satisfaction reached a low with only 21% (2% very satisfied). In 2000 satisfaction rose again to 28% (1% very satisfied). Asked whether they saw a difference in the morality of present-day politics to those of the GDR a growing percentage of the young members of the panel see no difference between then and now (the results are very similar for the question whether politics are more understandable today than during the GDR): [graph no.1] Graph no. 1: No difference in political morality today to that of the GDR 68 67 66 63 64 62 62 Percent 60 59 58 56 54 *1995 *1996 *1998 *2000 The disenchantment with the new political system is most strongly apparent in the answers to the question whether the young people were very strongly or strongly oriented to an active participation in politics. One would expect that political disenchantment becomes apparent during the final phase of the socialist regime and would then rise again when the break-down of the GDR allows free political activity. This does happen in 1990 but strangely enough even then the orientation towards an active participation in politics never reaches the level of the times during the GDR. The data for these years were collected under strict anonymity and can be taken as reliable and valid as those taken after unification. The fall after 1990 is a telling story of how the young people reacted to the process of unification. [Graph no. 2] Graph no 2: Very strong or strong orientation to active participation in politics 60 55 50 50 44 41 40 30 27 20 19 13 13 11 10 8 10 9 0 *1987 *1988 *1989 *1990 *1991 *1992 *1993 *1994 *1995 *1996 *1998 *2000 2 If one compares this to the development of answers to the statement: “I have a secure future in the GDR” until 1989 and “I have a secure future in East Germany” after 1989, it becomes obvious that the deterioration in the political culture in this group of young persons is a result of the perceived exclusion from social and economic opportunities [Graph no. 3] Understandably those of the young people who had strongly supported the socialist system during GDR-times are now significantly more critical of the new political system and those who were critical of the GDR and daily listened to Western media now significantly more often are supportive of the process of unification. But the growing disenchantment with the new political system cannot be explained by the influence of the GDR. The growing xenophobia has no correlation with any of the differences during GDR-times but it significantly correlates with the present social situation of the respondents: Those who feel existentially unsafe, have strong fear of Graph no. 3: % of those who see for themselves a secure future in the GDR or in East Germany 100 20 26 80 32 60 with limits 40 77 70 62 35 38 perfectly 20 20 16 15 8 6 0 5 4 4 *1987 *1988 *1989 *1992 *1993 *1996 *1998 *2000 unemployment and have little confidence in their professional future, and who strongly agree to the statement that “West-Germans treat East-Germans as second class Germans” significantly more often profess to be emotionally against foreigners. [Graph no 4.] 3 Graph no 4: Percentage of those who are emotionally against or strongly against foreigners 40 40 35 32 32 30 28 29 25 24 25 20 15 14 10 5 0 *1992 *1993 *1994 *1995 *1996 *1998 *2000 *1988/89 The most disquieting finding in the logitudinal study of Förster is that since 1996 he dared to ask the question: “Politicians expect that soon there will be social strife in East Germany. Do you agree?” Respondents could choose between “yes”, “no”, and “it is hard to say”. The results show a surprisingly high percentage of respondents who agree with the hypothetical statement of “politicians” – a statement I have never heard of in Germany during the past years. It would be alarming for any society if only a third and less of its young people did not clearly disagree with the expectation of social unrest and social strife on its territory. The results for 2000 look better, but still very obviously show the connection between the perception of ones own economic and social situation and the perception of social reality. [Table 1] Table1: “Politicians expect that soon there will be social strife in East Germany. Do you agree?” yes no it is hard to say 1996 48 16 36 1998 51 17 32 2000 40 33 27 have you experienced unemployment? results 2000 yes 47 26 27 no 30 42 28 are you afraid of life getting too expensive? results 2000 strongly 59 19 22 rather strongly 35 34 31 rather weakly/weakly 17 54 29 4 III. Comparison to other data A representative survey of the population of the East German state Thuringia in 2000 (Dicke et.al. 2000) shows the same results that the longitudinal study implies. Satisfaction with the performance of the new democratic system mainly depends on the perception of ones own economic situation and social security. Satisfaction with the party system and the political system correlates with the amount of education, income and age. Agreement to xenophobic and ethnocentric items correlate with dissatisfaction with ones own present economic situation and with dissatisfaction with the process of unification. Those who prefer to identify themselves as East-Germans or Thuringians instead of as Germans or Europeans also tend to answer significantly more positively to xenophobic and ethnocentric statements. Detlef Pollack has shown in a series of studies that the changes in political culture after unification are not a result of the formation that East Germans received during their formative years in the GDR but are a reaction to the indignities of the process of unification: Unification reduced production and the work-force in such a way that the only historical parallel can be found in the two lost wars. Now unemployment in East Germany is about double that of West Germany. 80% of all firms that survived unification are owned by West Germans. Much of the real estate is in West German hands. Still today the average income of East Germans is 18% less than that of West Germans. West-German members of the civil service still go home with more than 10% higher pay-checks than their East-German colleagues for the same work. I as vice-rector earn more than the rector of my university just because I had my education in West Germany. Consequently East Germans now value equality very highly while at the time of unification they prefered freedom over equality.