Policy Brief N° 02 April 2021 EUROPE’S PARTY POLITICS: LIBERAL, ILLIBERAL, OR QUASI-LIBERAL? For a time, post-war European politics was dominated by the liberal type of party. These broadly liberal parties were who originally envisaged the idea of a united Europe and subse- quently carried the torch for the advancement of open society in a progressively integrated Europe under rule of law. 1/5 Takis S. Pappas PhD, full-time researcher and writer, Introduction University of Helsinki, Finland Over many decades, Europe’s party systems op- split along many, often crosscutting, divisions that erated as liberal political cartels in which the ma- generate conflict. Liberal parties’ second common jor parties competed for power against each other, characteristic is their understanding of the need largely unchallenged by other party types. Fast for- to behave moderately, seek consensus, and prefer ward to the present day, and the talk around town positive-sum outcomes. This need is best met via is about the decline of the formerly established lib- liberal parties’ third characteristic, which is their eral parties, the proliferation of new populist ones, adherence to safeguards for minority rights and and, ominously enough, the rise of various other the rule of law, as expressed primarily in written so-called anti-system parties – leading to democrat- constitutions. In addition to these three core char- ic backsliding and, potentially, the disintegration of acteristics, the vast majority of Europe’s post-war the European Union. Which part of this narrative liberal parties have been in favour of an “ever clos- corresponds to empirical reality, and which is just er union,” which included the abolition of tariff hype and headlines? More to the point: What is the barriers in Europe, the adoption of a common current picture of Europe’s party politics? And what currency, the easing of border controls under the is the outlook for the future at EU level? When the Schengen Agreement, and above all, the accession subject is today’s political parties, it makes sense to of several formerly communist states into the EU. tell their stories in retrospect. A good starting point By 1990, liberal parties held sway in most of is the year 1990, when the mood in Europe was jubi- Europe. Whether in their centre-right Christian lant. The Berlin Wall had already been pulled down Democratic variant or the centre-left Social Dem- and Francis Fukuyama declared the “unabashed vic- ocratic one, and whether singlehandedly, in coali- tory of economic and political liberalism”; he even tion with smaller centrist parties, or even forming dared proclaim “the universalization of Western lib- “grand coalitions” between them, liberal parties eral democracy as the final form of human govern- ruled Europe nearly unchallenged. In Greece, a ment”. Soon, the Soviet Union would also fall apart, strong populist party had emerged and won office and Europe’s liberals seemed confident that their back in 1981, but Greece was too far removed from ideas were unassailable. where the liberal heart of Europe beat and too Liberal parties share three interrelated char- small to cause general concern. Two other chal- acteristics. The first is their acknowledgement lengers of the established liberal order received that any open democratic society is unavoidably more attention. The first was France’s National www.liberalforum.eu Policy Brief Europe's party politics: liberal, illiberal, or quasi-liberal? N° 02 • April 2021 Front (FN) which, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen in a total of nine years, thus becoming the longest the 1988 presidential election, won an unprece- serving prime minister in post-war Italy. By then, dented 14.4% of the vote and thus consolidated its however, liberalism was not the only game in town, position in French politics. The second challenger and populism began spreading out from the South was the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) which, to Europe’s formerly communist nations. In 2010, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, received a right-wing populist Viktor Orbán rose to power in hefty 16.6% of the vote in the 1990 national elec- Hungary and, in 2015, rightist Lech Kaczyński and tions. The electoral successes of the FN and FPÖ his populist party also emerged as the dominant did in fact ruffle the feathers of the old liberal force in Poland. During the same tumultuous era, parties but, again, weren’t those two merely iso- populism made a new appearance in crisis-rid- lated cases serving to simply emphasize liberal den southern European nations. In Greece, left 2/5 predominance? populist SYRIZA won a majority of votes in the That was a widespread but mistaken assump- general election of 2015 and promptly formed a tion. Meanwhile, three types of challenger parties coalition government with the right populist party were already on the rise or about to emerge across of Independent Greeks (or ANEL). Their popu- Europe in the coming years and decades: populist, list tandem would enjoy a four-year-long ride in nativist, and nationalist ones. government. In Spain, too, leftist populist party Populist parties have been a novelty for lib- Podemos rose mainly due to the economic crisis eral Europe since they first entered the political and social disenchantment of the early 2010s. Un- picture only a few decades ago. They combine like its Greek counterpart, though, Podemos did allegiance to electoral democracy with disregard not win in elections. It did, however, succeed in for modern liberal institutions. Populism can be entering a liberal party dominated coalition gov- conceptualized neatly and defined minimally as ernment as a junior partner. democratic illiberalism – a kind of rebuttal to con- The second challenger to establishment post- temporary liberal democracy.1 In sharp contrast war liberalism, which rose during the 1990s and to their liberal opponents, populist parties view with renewed vigour over the course of the 2000s, Europe's party politics: liberal,Europe's illiberal, or quasi-liberal? society as being divided between only two social is a class of parties that, for lack of a better term, groups: an organic majority of ordinary people on are known as nativist parties. They have grown one side and, on the opposing side, one or more strongest in Europe’s wealthiest and most socially elite groups. Such parties, accordingly, generate diverse but also culturally homogenous and politi- – and thrive on – political polarization, which in cally liberal nations. Unlike populists, nativists do turn justifies their pursuit of majoritarianism at not take issue with established liberal constitutions; the expense of liberal institutionalism. their core consists of strong social xenophobia In the early 1990s, Italy’s party system collapsed and, relatedly, economic chauvinism.2 Nativist with a bang. Out went the established liberal, yet parties typically advocate policies of protecting badly tarnished, Christian Democratic and Socialist the interests of native-born citizens against alien parties. In came a new populist force, Forza Italy, populations in addition to their general opposi- led by media magnate Silvio Berlusconi. After first tion to further European integration. And they winning power in the 1994 general elections, he are chauvinistic when it comes to protecting their formed successive governments and ruled Italy for nations’ welfare regimes from being drained by 1 For the original definition of populism as “democratic illiberalism,” see Takis S. Pappas, “Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist Hungary,” Government and Opposition 49(1), January 2014: 1–23, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-op- position/article/populist-democracies-postauthoritarian-greece-and-postcommunist-hungary/C25A68B6B8AD01966AD8C3E6488E7BC7 (published online 19 July 2013). 2 On the distinction between populists and nativists, see Takis S. Pappas, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s Challengers,” Journal of Democracy 27(4), October 2016: 22–36, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-specter-haunting-europe-dis- tinguishing-liberal-democracys-challengers/. For a recent policy report with a detailed analysis of Europe’s nativist parties that have participated in coalition governments, see Takis S. Pappas and Dimitris Skleparis, “Populism and Nativism in Modern-Day Europe: An Assessment with Policy Recommendations”, Populism and Civic Engagement (PaCE) website, 31 January 2021, http://popandce.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/PaCE_ D1.2_Populism-and-nativism-in-modern-day-Europe.pdf. www.liberalforum.eu Policy Brief Europe's party politics: liberal, illiberal, or quasi-liberal? N° 02 • April 2021 A Typology of Parties in Contemporary Europe, COUNTRY AUS ypology of Parties UK TR 1990-2020 IA UKIP ARTY by LibDem P Takis S. Pappas SNP Labour N SPÖ DE Cons ÖVP E FPÖ DU W SD T CH S KD Grüne - B S NEOS VLD P E C EA L K G ope, 1990-2020 IN IU M CD&V G M IN OFFICE sp.a S/SAP Groen PODEMOS F N-VA R IN VB E A VOX N P C H S - MR S Cs P E A PP cdH K IN PS G PSOE L PCP Ecolo A V G D U PPD-PSD E T A N R 3/5 M O CDS-PP A P B R PS C K PiS SF D N PO DF A L O SLD SDP P PSL KESK F I N L SV KOK A N FrP VIHR D N O Sp PS R W AP PS A Y RN V H LR E LREM C N PVV A R F LFI N CDA E CDU/CSUSPD T H D66 E R L VVD A FDP N Grüne D PvdA S Die Linke ADR AfD Y N Greng A PASOK M R L DP SYRIZA ND U E X G E CSV M A Typology of Parties in Contemporary Europe, 1990-2020 Europe, in Contemporary of Parties A Typology B LSAP KDNP KKE O FIDESZ U M5S GD R Jobbik MSZP G PD FI Lega DK E In office Green Party C Fine Gael E Fianna Fáil E Labour Sinn Féin Sinn R ITA G LY Solo Parties with two colors indicates IR GARY ELAND HUN change from one party type to Coalition partner another.