Book Reviews 87 fully the hoped for results. Even so, from the summer of 1918 on, there was some improvement; and if the war had continued into 1919, the combined efforts of Baruch, March, and Goethals most probably would have contributed substantially to the combat effec- tiveness of the AEF. Nonetheless, the author believes-contrary to some historians’ opinions-that Goethals, with only limited author- ity, had at best limited success. Mired down fighting established interests, i.e., the army’s bureaus, in Washington, D.C., he “did not produce a managerial revolution in six months” (p. 151); and although he was not a complete failure, he left no lasting institu- tional results on the army’s supply system. Still, the army did learn much from the shortcomings of its efforts during World War I and from the mid-1920s on took steps to improve and restructure its procurement and logistic posture. This well-crafted monograph, based on research conducted at the Center for Military History in Washington, D.C., combines archival with printed and secondary sources in an exemplary fash- ion. The author exhibits a fine grasp of the main issues, and her clearly written book makes a valuable contribution to an often neglected topic on the American experience during World War I. GUNTHERE. ROTHENBERG,former editor of the Indiana Military History Journal, teaches European and American military history at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953. By Ludwell Lee Montague. (Uni- versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. Pp. xxviii, 308. Illustration, notes, figures, index. Clothbound, $45.00; paperbound, $14.95.) The Chief of Staffi The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith. By D. K. R. Crosswell. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Pp. xxii, 437. Maps, illustrations, charts, notes, bibliogra- phy, index. $59.95.) “Beetle” Smith played a major role in the US. victory in Europe in World War I1 and in the shaping of US. policy in the Cold War that followed, yet his enormous contributions were overshadowed by the towering historical figures that he so loyally served. These two books by D. K. R. Crosswell and Ludwell Lee Montague fill an important gap in detailing the significant contributions of this tal- ented military officer. As secretary of the general staff under Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall during 1941-1942 and as Gen- eral Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of staff from 1942 to 1945, Smith was what Eisenhower called the “general manager” of the Allied victory over Italy and Germany (Montague, p. 6). Lieutenant Gen- eral Smith served as ambassador to Moscow from 1946 to 1949, and 88 Indiana Magazine of History in September, 1950, President Harry S Truman personally selected Smith, now with four stars, to head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Smith concluded his government career as under secretary of state from 1953 to 1954. Smith was born in 1895 in Indianapolis. At age sixteen, while still a student at Manual High School, he joined the Indiana Na- tional Guard. With the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, he began reserve officers’ training at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Like many other so-called ninety-day wonders, Second Lieutenant Smith went to France as an infantry platoon leader. He was wound- ed and reassigned to the War Department General Staff in Wash- ington. When the war ended, he received a regular Army commission. Crosswell’s study chronicles Smith’s rise through the ranks and also traces the reforms in U.S. military staff structure during his career. Smith worked his way into Marshall’s inner circle. He became the indispensable manager of daily details and freed Mar- shall to concentrate on grand strategy. In 1942 Eisenhower con- vinced Marshall that he had to have Smith’s organizational skills in Europe. Eisenhower declared Smith a “Godsend” to the Allied effort (Montague, p. 6). Smith was at the peak of his public service, according to Crosswell, when he came home to a hero’s welcome in Indianapolis in June, 1945. Smith grew bitter, however, because he never became chief of staff as did his mentor, Marshall, who had also risen in the Army without starting at West Point. Montague confirms Smith’s personal frustration, but he argues that Smith’s twenty-eight months (Crosswell inexplicably says sev- enteen months) as head of the CIA shaped that agency for the next twenty years. Montague’s book is the second internal CIA history to be declassified and released. It characterizes the general as the first successful director of central intelligence (DCI). Smith invigo- rated the organization, made coordinated national intelligence a reality, and established the DCI as the president’s principal intelli- gence adviser. Montague provides virtually no information on sub- stantive issues during Smith’s tenure, such as the U.S. failure to anticipate China’s entrance into the Korean War and the CIA’S clandestine involvement in Iran. These topics may be covered in the pages deleted from the text during the declassification process. Smith’s manner was abrupt and authoritarian. He comple- mented the congenial Eisenhower, but Crosswell suggests that Eisenhower exploited Smith. Political scientist Fred Greenstein has pointed out that Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” leadership style was purposeful and effective. Crosswell contends that Eisenhower used Smith as his “hatchet man” (p. 266). Thus the supreme com- mander emerged as a popular hero, and Smith was stuck with the image of a martinet. Having worked closely with Smith at the CIA, Montague views Smith’s “irritable impatience” as a calculated Book Reviews 89 style, which was instinctive but also balanced by kindness, good humor, and diplomatic grace (p. 9). Together, these books present a sympathetic portrait of the man Winston Churchill called “the American bulldog” (Montague, p. 9). DAVIDL. ANDERSONis professor of history at the University of Indianapolis. His book, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (19911, received the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. His most recent book is Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (1993). Gilbert N. Haugen: Norwegian-American Farm Politician. By Peter T. Harstad and Bonnie Lindemann. (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1992. Pp. xi, 217. Notes, maps, illus- trations, appendixes, tables, index. $14.95.) The collaborative efforts of Peter T. Harstad and Bonnie Linde- mann have produced a superb (and long overdue) biography of a significant figure in agricultural history. Gilbert N. Haugen’s role in the McNary-Haugen movement is clearly portrayed in this well- researched and well-written biography of a dedicated farm politi- cian from Iowa. Haugen was proud of his Norwegian heritage, loved the land, and exemplified by his actions the work ethic to which he sub- scribed. Before he became a seventeen-term member of the United States House of Representatives (1899-19331, Haugen had been, variously, a farm laborer, horse trader, merchant, land agent, banker, and owner of many farms. His political apprenticeship included experience as GOP county chairman, justice of the peace, and Iowa state legislator. It was after his election to Congress that he dedicated himself to becoming a spokesman for the American farmer. Congressman Haugen was an admirer of President Theodore Roosevelt and gave his support to much of the Square Deal. While not committed ideologically to progressivism, Haugen did favor fed- eral intervention to foster the well-being of the rural sector. Where- as he was conservative relative to agrarian, small-town values, Haugen was realistic about adapting to change and foresaw the need for more positive government. His real crusade was McNary- Haugenism. As chairman of the House Agriculture Committee he joined with his counterpart in the Senate, Charles McNary of Ore- gon, to sponsor a bill that would involve federal intervention on behalf of commercial farmers. The proposal, twice vetoed by Presi- dent Calvin Coolidge, would have established a federal export cor- poration to implement a two-price system by dumping surplus agricultural commodities abroad. Farmers were to receive an equalization fee that would sustain farm income in the same man- ner that the tariff aided industry. In retrospect the plan was eco- .