Two years after Khobar Towers, the armed forces have made great strides in force protection measures. To Protect the Force pair of terrorist bombs that By Otto Kreisher A shattered US embassies in Ken ya and Tanzania were bloody remind- ers to American armed forces of the dangers facing them around the world every day. Although only three service members were among the 12 Americans killed in the truck bomb attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the 250,000 US military personnel deployed overseas represent a large and tempting target of terror. “These bombings,” said Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, “are a stark reminder of the threat to US personnel posed by terrorists whose only means of attacking America is through such cowardly acts.” Despite efforts to improve secu- rity, Cohen said, the bombings show that Washington will never be able to eliminate all the risks that US troops and diplomats face when they serve in foreign nations. Even so, A1C Cliff Minor (left) and SrA. Chad the Pentagon, made painfully aware Scyoc, from the 52d Security Forces of that vulnerability by a number of Squadron, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, deadly incidents in recent years, is guard an entry control point at Tuzla making force protection one of its AB, Bosnia. Such force protection mea- top priorities. sures have increased since the Khobar Towers bombing. “We now feel pretty confident that when we send our troops into harmful situations ... the commander himself focuses on the force protection is- sue,” said Adm. Harold W. Gehman 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1998 To Protect USAF photo by SMSgt. Rose Reynolds S. AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1998 31 ported the former commander in chief of US Special Operations Com- mand. Although there were disturb- ing similarities between that report and the findings of the commission that studied the Beirut bombing, the Pen tagon’s response to Down- ing—unlike in 1983—was swift and ex tensive. Perry ordered immediate imple- mentation of many of its major rec- ommendations, declaring that, when planning to deploy forces overseas, commanders “will place the threat of terrorism front and center.” One of the first actions to improve security after Khobar was the relo- cation of essential personnel in the Persian Gulf area to quarters that were easier to defend. Although many new security measures had been implemented at the Khobar Tow- ers high rise, it was not enough to deal with a truck bomb that detonated with the Within months, all Southern Watch equivalent of 20,000 pounds of explosives. operations and assigned personnel had been moved from Dhahran to Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia, a desolate Jr., whose US Atlantic Command is the nearest building, turning window outpost in the desert south of Riyadh. a force provider to the other unified glass and concrete walls into deadly Whereas the old facility had a secu- theater commanders. shrapnel. rity perimeter that was within mere That focus on force protection has Bloody though it was, Khobar yards of critical structures, the new been sharpened considerably since a was neither the first nor the worst base allowed miles of empty space massive truck bomb devastated the terrorist attack on US military per- between the first security posts and Khobar Towers housing complex in sonnel. In 1983, a truck bomb caused the occupied facilities. Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, killing the collapse of a building housing 19 Air Force personnel and injuring Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, killing Elaborate Protection about 500 Americans. 241 American servicemen—most of Those Americans working with them Marines. the Saudi National Guard and the Oasis No More The repercussions of the Khobar Army Patriot missile crews had to The bloody attack on the Dhahran blast were felt intensely in Washing- stay in Riyadh, but most of their facility, which housed about 3,000 US ton, stimulating a sweeping change in quarters and offices were moved into personnel and several hundred Al- the way the services look at force pro- Eskan Village, a walled compound lied forces conducting the Operation tection. “Khobar Towers was a point guarded by an elaborate set of sen- Southern Watch missions over Iraq, in Air Force history that refocused us sors called the Tactical Automated was all the more shocking because it ... on protection of the force,” said Security System. occurred in a country then–Defense Brig. Gen. Richard A. Coleman Jr., “I defy you to find a better protected Secretary William J. Perry noted had chief of Air Force Security Forces. base anywhere,” Coleman said. long been seen as “an oasis of calm He went on to say, “Force protection Air Force personnel who were de- and safety” in the tumultuous Middle is an inherent part of the mission, ployed to Kuwait and the United Arab East region. now. That’s the culture the Air Force Emirates also were moved from their There had been a warning that has adopted.” urban quarters to nearby air bases. conditions had changed seven months The road map for the force protec- Security was enhanced around the earlier when a car bomb exploded tion efforts since Khobar is the report three relatively remote compounds in Riyadh, killing five Americans from the commission Perry appointed holding Army pre-positioned equip- assigned to the security assistance to investigate the bombing. The panel, ment in the Gulf. Nearly all of the team working with the Saudi Arabian led by retired Army Gen. Wayne A. US dependents in the Gulf were sent National Guard. Downing, described a security struc- home as most of the assignments in Though security at Khobar Towers ture at Khobar and elsewhere in the the region were converted to unac- was improved following that blast, Persian Gulf that had been hobbled companied tours. Technically, the it was not enough to deal with the by fractured chains of command, Navy usually has the most personnel unprecedentedly large bomb packed confused security standards, poor in the Gulf region, but most of them into a fuel truck that stopped against intelligence, shortage of properly are aboard ships that spend much of the concrete barriers around the trained and equipped security person- the time under way, reducing their high-rise complex. As Air Force nel, and a general lack of emphasis vulnerability to the usual terrorist security personnel tried to react, on force protection. attacks. the force of about 20,000 pounds “A comprehensive approach to Downing had high praise for the of explosives destroyed the front of force protection is required,” re- Marine Fleet Anti-terrorism Security 32 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1998 Team that protects Navy facilities in Bahrain. In addition to sending the FAST platoon to Bahrain after Kho- bar, the Navy nearly doubled the size of its compound to hold more of its shore-based personnel and to expand the security perimeter. Most of the urgent security im- provements after Khobar were un- DoD photo by Sgt. Jean–Marc Schaible S. dertaken in the US Central Command area. However, force protection ef- forts increased markedly elsewhere. The Air Force, for example, moved quickly to tighten the security for two radar stations established in the jungles of South America as part of the American counterdrug operation. A sophisticated system of night vision equipment and remote sensors and improved weapons greatly extended the reach of the security personnel At Bright Star ’98 in Egypt, SrA. Clint A. Reynold (left), A1C Thomas Heinz, and their military working dogs from the 341st Security Forces Squadron, Malm strom AFB, protecting the isolated bases in the Mont., were part of a more comprehensive approach to force protection. violence-torn region. Force protection also has been a primary—perhaps dominant—con- of Downing’s 81 recommendations of unit and individual measures to cern for the Army commanders of were acted on within a year, with “the reduce the risks, Conway said. the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. strong assistance” of the commander The first level of training focuses That focus on security, which includes of Central Command, who had much on individual service personnel and a ban on alcohol and mingling with of the action. dependents who are about to be de- the local population, has created The JCS group clarified who had ployed. The second concerns NCOs some morale problems but has paid the force protection authority for and junior officers who will teach off in zero casualties stemming from deployed forces and dependents in force protection in their services. hostile action. each region, publishing doctrine and The others are for unit commanders Another immediate response was standards to guide local commanders and senior commanders and staff the creation of a new office in the and acting as a catalyst for finding officers who will implement these Joint Chiefs of Staff organization to or developing technology to enhance new security provisions. be the focal point for force protec- force protection, Conway said. tion throughout the services. Marine Another key step was setting up a Tapping Into Intelligence Brig. Gen. James T. Conway, the first four-tier system of training for the Conway’s office also has worked director of the new office, said all terrorist threat and for development to implement Downing’s call for more intelligence focus on terrorism and better distribution of essential information. After Khobar, the De- fense Intelligence Agency created the Office of Counterterrorism Anal ysis to study terrorist organizations. In addition, the JCS asked the FBI to provide better warnings of terrorist threats. Finally, more unit com- manders gained access to a secure USAF photo TSgt.by James Mossman D. intelligence data network. Because of the improved flow of intelligence, Conway said, the JCS has stopped asking if theater com- manders have the latest information and now ask, “What are they doing about it?” The JCS office also established five vulnerability assessment teams.