Report of the inquiry into the disturbance and fire at Yarl’s Wood Removal Centre Stephen Shaw CBE Prisons and Probation Ombudsman October 2004 Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 16th November 2004 for Report of the inquiry into the disturbance and fire at Yarl’s Wood Removal Centre Stephen Shaw CBE Prisons and Probation Ombudsman November 2004 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 16th November 2004 HC 1257 London: The Stationery Office £40.00 CONTENTS Page no. Foreword 4 Executive summary Overview 6 How we went about the inquiry 6 The events of 14/15 February 2002 7 How and why Yarl’s Wood was built 8 The question of sprinklers 9 The three months of operation 10 Moving goalposts? 11 After the fire 11 Conclusions 12 Part I: How we went about the inquiry Terms of reference 14 Evidence 15 Previous inquiries 17 Findings of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 23 Contributions to this inquiry 26 The GSL submission 36 Part II: The events of 14/15 February 2002 Overview 43 The prelude 44 The restraint of Ms E 48 What happened next 52 The authorities’ response 54 The summoning of aid 55 The height of the disturbance 59 Escapes 65 The first fire 67 The intervention plan 67 The non-participants 71 Police take-over 73 Identification process 77 Post incident contingency arrangements 79 The Fire Service’s report 80 Group 4’s internal inquiry 87 Group 4’s subsequent conclusions 92 Contingency plans for Yarl’s Wood 94 Primacy 99 Problems on the night 103 Numbers 106 Zoning and location issues 108 Failure to learn the lessons 109 Could the incident have been resolved earlier? 111 Staffing on the night 115 Regulatory issues 117 Part III: Why and how Yarl’s Wood was built Policy framework 120 1 The rise in asylum-seeking 121 Political climate 123 How the targets came about 125 Were the targets achievable? 131 Finding the sites 135 What sort of contract? 136 The competition 137 Assessing the GAIL bid 140 Contract 143 Business case 144 Design 146 Fit for purpose? 149 Size, safety and security 156 Physical fire safety 158 Anticipated occupant behaviour 161 How they built it 166 Planning permission 166 Consultation and communication 168 Access 170 What it cost 172 Work on site 172 The ‘nuclear option’ 179 Should the centre have opened when it did? 186 Part IV: The question of sprinklers Introduction 192 The chronology 193 Looking back: what the decision makers say now 208 Summary of the issues 213 Postscript 216 Part V: The three months of operation Preparation for opening 219 The population build-up 228 Whom did they send to Yarl’s Wood? 229 Local concerns 235 How was it for detainees? 237 Medical concerns 249 Recorded incidents in the run-up to 14 February 252 Protest meetings 264 Was there a rise in tension? 273 The operation of the centre 279 The Group 4/Immigration Service relationship 305 Relationship between centre manager and contract monitor 307 The Immigration Service 311 The Visiting Committee 312 Overall assessment of the three months of operation 313 Part VI: Moving goalposts? A single estate 316 Adjudications 318 Work 326 Transfer from prisons 331 Vetting detainees – the PNC issue and Data Protection 338 Re-labelling 340 2 24-hour association 344 Operation Aardvark 349 Partnership and trust 350 It could have been Harmondsworth 351 Part VII: After the fire The role of the Visiting Committee 356 Segregation and RFA paperwork 359 Allegations of wrongdoing 361 What the authorities say 365 Lost property 371 Support for detainees and staff 372 Transfer of risk 373 Part VIII: Conclusions Conclusions 377 Part IX: Recommendations Recommendations 382 Annexes Annex 1: Extracts from Yarl’s Wood inquiry: A review of progress to date, previously unpublished 390 Annex 2: Impressions of the detention estate 392 Annex 3: List of evidence 401 Annex 4: List of interviewees 408 Annex 5: Lessons from Campsfield House 410 Annex 6: Escapees 416 Annex 7: Review of Yarl’s Wood contract by Mr David Kent of the Office of Contracts and Competition, HM Prison Service 417 Annex 8: Review of the planned and actual operation of Yarl’s Wood by Mr Peter Siddons, Professional Standards Unit, HM Prison Service 419 Annex 9: The centre manager’s comments on allegations of neglect by those held in segregation following the fire 423 Annex 10: Construction timeline 425 Annex 11: Policy timeline 426 Annex 12: Incident timeline 427 3 Foreword The disturbance and fire at Yarl’s Wood on the night of 14/15 February 2002 were hugely traumatic events. Traumatic for those detainees, including families with young children, who played no part in the disturbance but who were terrified by it. Traumatic for those staff at Yarl’s Wood and in the emergency services who attempted to restore order. And traumatic for those policymakers and officials whose flagship removal centre was destroyed less than three months after opening. Since taking charge of this inquiry just over a year ago, I have spoken to many of those involved. I have been struck by the extent to which they have wanted to volunteer their thoughts and reflections on what occurred. As a consequence, many of my interviews have been far longer than scheduled. This suggests that the shock both to the system and to individuals has thus far gone largely unacknowledged and unaddressed. Also unacknowledged has been the bravery shown by individual members of the Prison Service and Group 4 staff, and by members of the emergency services. Bravery too on the part of those detainees who rescued staff who were trapped. Like so many riots in prisons and elsewhere, the disturbance at Yarl’s Wood was triggered by a commonplace and trivial incident. I think that incident was poorly handled, but even had it been dealt with in exemplary fashion, that might just have postponed the inevitable. As they were designed and constructed neither Yarl’s Wood nor its sister removal centre, Harmondsworth, were fit for purpose. In the pages that follow, I have attempted to tell the stories of what happened at Yarl’s Wood as well as to place the events in a wider policy context. I have drawn extensively upon the testimony of those most directly involved. Like most things in life, this approach has both advantages and disadvantages. Some of what is reported is subjective opinion. However, the great merit is to allow the story to unfold in the voices of those most intimately engaged at the time. Many different themes run through this report. Perhaps that of the widest consequence is the extent to which a contract for services between the public and private sectors can result in a genuine transfer of risk. But whether read as an essay on risk-transfer, or simply as an examination of a discrete area of public policy, this report makes uncomfortable reading. If there is consolation to be found, it is in the fact that – despite speculation to the contrary – nobody lost their life at Yarl’s Wood. Unhappily, a serious sexual assault almost certainly occurred during the disturbance, but physical injuries were otherwise few and minor. Had the disturbance been managed in a different way, there can be no certainty that this would have been the outcome. Alistair Burt, Member of Parliament for North East Bedfordshire, rightly described the events as: “A hair’s breadth from a tragedy.” The Yarl’s Wood disturbance has also had a cathartic effect upon thinking about security and order within the immigration detention estate. Those held in removal centres are not criminals, and are absolutely entitled to be treated in a manner that reflects that non-criminal status. But that fact does not alter the necessarily coercive nature of detention and removal. Both Yarl’s Wood and Harmondsworth have benefited from millions of pounds-worth of remedial investment, and the new removal centre at Colnbrook has been built to a far more robust (concrete) specification. Appreciating that enforced removal of liberty before enforced removal from the country has ineluctable consequences for institutional design is only part of the 4 equation. Safe and ordered removal centres must be active places, with good staff- detainee relationships, leading to a high level of dynamic security. They also need to have legitimacy in the eyes of those detained, which is why so many of my witnesses have put such emphasis upon procedural fairness in respect both of the decision to detain and of their treatment once people are detained. I have been grateful for the assistance I have received from the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) of the Home Office, from the Bedfordshire Police, the Bedfordshire & Luton Fire and Rescue Service, and from the contractor Group 4 Global Solutions Limited. I am also grateful to the many witnesses, and to those who provided documentary evidence. Finally, I thank my colleagues from the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s office – Miss Ali McMurray and Ms Penuel Burchall – for their assistance throughout this inquiry. STEPHEN SHAW CBE PRISONS AND PROBATION OMBUDSMAN FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 5 Executive summary Overview This is the report of the ‘overarching’ inquiry into the disturbance and fire that took place at Yarl’s Wood Removal Centre on 14/15 February 2002. Yarl’s Wood Removal Centre was intended to house 900 immigration detainees. These were to include failed asylum seekers and illegal migrants, those whose identity had not yet been established, and those whom it was deemed unsafe to allow to remain at large while their claim for asylum was considered.