Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Natural Law Theory and the "Is"--"Ought" Problem: A Critique of Four Solutions Shalina Stilley Marquette University Recommended Citation Stilley, Shalina, "Natural Law Theory and the "Is"--"Ought" Problem: A Critique of Four Solutions" (2010). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 57. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/57 NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE IS—OUGHT PROBLEM: A CRITIQUE OF FOUR SOLUTIONS by Shalina Stilley, B.A., M.Th., M.A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2010 ABSTRACT NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE ―IS‖—―OUGHT‖ PROBLEM: A CRITIQUE OF FOUR SOLUTIONS Shalina Stilley, B.A., M.Th., M.A. Marquette University, 2010 This dissertation explores the ―Is‖—―Ought‖ problem (IOP) as it relates to natural law theory (NLT). It begins with a brief analysis of the type of ―ought‖ precepts upheld by traditional natural law theorists as well as a consideration of the precise nature of the IOP. Chapter two considers the attempts of Searle and Gewirth at establishing that it is possible validly to derive an ―ought‖ conclusion from ―is‖ premises and asks whether their attempts can be imitated successfully by those who wish to uphold the basic claims of NLT. Chapter three considers whether it is possible to bypass the IOP by beginning with premises concerning the de facto desires of human agents. Chapter four consists of an analysis of Geach, Veatch, McInerny, MacIntyre, and Lisska who put forth the solution of returning to the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the telos, function, or essence of the human person. In Chapter five the new natural law solution is analyzed; and in Chapter six an overall critique is offered. The overarching thesis of this dissertation is that—although each solution is in some way problematic—the solution of new natural law theorists is the least problematic if one wishes to implement an ―ought‖ that is moral, prescriptive, non- relativistic, determinate, and related to the common good. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Shalina Stilley, B.A., M.Th., M.A. First I would like to thank my family members who made it possible for me to begin and complete this work. I would especially like to thank my mom who, throughout my life, has always encouraged me to pursue my dreams—no matter how wild they might seem. Uncle Pete and Dad Kolbe are the ones who have stoked my intellectual curiosities and never let me give up on myself; I couldn‘t possibly thank them enough. I am also deeply grateful to my Grandmother who graciously allowed me to spend time living in the family vacation cabin in Sedona, Arizona while doing the bulk of my writing and research. There is no other place on this planet that would have been more preferable. It would be a daunting task to attempt to thank all my friends by name, and so I send out a big ―thank you‖ to all who assisted me (and put up with me) during the past two years. Thank you Friar, for putting the idea of graduate school in my head in the first place and continuously reminding me that, when it comes to dissertations, ―a live rat is better than a dead lion.‖ Thank you Katie Gesto, for assuring me that I am indeed crazy enough to get a doctorate. Thank you monks, faculty, staff, and students of Conception Seminary for your tremendous kindness to me as I completed this project; and thank you Starbucks and Mystic Monk coffee for the gift of consciousness. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my committee members— especially Dr. Starr without whose kindness and encouragement I probably would have never finished and to whom I shall be forever indebted. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………..………………………………….i CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………….………...1 A. Historical Origins ..………………………………………………………..….....2 B. Why Natural Law Seems to Fall Into the Is--Ought Problem ...…………………………………………………..………..4 1. The Essential Claims of Natural Law …….…………………….………5 2. The Nature of the Is—Ought Problem in Ethics ……………….……..10 3. Natural Law and the Is—Ought Problem ……………………….….....14 C. Four Solutions to the Is—Ought Problem ...…………….………….....………26 D. Status of the Problem ...……..………………………………………..….……31 E. Outline of the Dissertaion ..………………………………………….….…….33 II. COUNTEREXAMPLES, NATURAL LAW AND THE ‗IS‘—‗OUGHT‘ PROBLEM ………………………………………….…....35 A. Searle‘s Counterexample ...………………………………………....….….…..36 1. A Summary of Searle‘s Counter-Example …………………….….…...36 2. Searle‘s Theory Regarding the Derivation……………….……….…...39 3. Does It Pertain to the Real Is—Ought Problem? ...................................42 4. Searle‘s Derivation and Natural Law Theory ……………..….………..50 B. Gewirth‘s Counterexample ...………………………………………….............59 1. A Synopsis of Gewirth‘s Derivation………….………………...….…..59 2. The Characteristics of the Ought Derived…………………………………………….…..……………….64 3. Gewirth‘s Derivation and Natural Law Theory ……............................66 . III. THE DERIVATION OF AN OUGHT FROM THE DESIRES OF THE AGENT ……………………………………………..…….…72 A. The Method Used …………………………………………………...…….…..73 B. The Type of Ought Derived Via This Method …….………….......…………..79 1. Is the Ought Moral? ................................................................................79 2. Is the Ought Prescriptive? ......................................................................80 3. Is the Ought Determinate? .....................................................................83 4. Is the Ought Egalitarian? ........................................................................90 5. Is the Egalitarian Ought Also Categorical and Determinate?.................................................................................93 IV. STARTING FROM THE NOTION OF THE FUNCTION OR TELOS OF THE HUMAN PERSON…………….……..……100 A. The Teleological-Functional Method……………………………….…...…..102 1. Geach…………………….………………………………….…..……102 2. McInerny………………………………………………….…...…......104 3. MacIntyre……………………………………………….……............106 4. Lisska…………………………………………………….…..……….109 5. Strong and Weak Versions….…………………………….…...……..113 B. Does This Approach Bypass All Aspects of the IOP?.....................................117 1. Is the Ought Moral?..............................................................................119 2. Is the Ought Prescriptive?.....................................................................125 3. Is the Ought Categorical?.....................................................................127 4. Is the Ought Determinate?....................................................................133 5. Is the Ought Egalitarian?......................................................................136 6. Conclusion……………………………………………..……………..140 V. NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE UNDERIVED OUGHT….….……..141 A. The New Natural Law Solution……………………………..……….….……142 1. Finnis and Grisez……………………………………...……….…..…142 2. Is This Really a Version of Natural Law Theory?...............................149 B. A Critique of the New Natural Law Solution………………………….….….161 1. Is the Ought Moral?..............................................................................162 2. Is the Ought Prescriptive?.....................................................................164 3. Is the Ought Determinate?....................................................................167 4. Is the Moral Ought Determinate?.........................................................170 5. Is the Ought Categorical?.....................................................................172 6. Is the Ought Egalitarian?......................................................................173 7. Is the Ought Simultaneously Moral, Prescriptive, Egalitarian, Determinate, and Categorical……………..…………….175 VI. CONCLUSION………………………….…………………………………………..179 A. Counterarguments and Natural Law Theory……….................……….….…179 B. Beginning with De Facto Desires………………..…………….….……........183 C. Returning to the Aristotlelian-Thomistic Tradition………………..…......…..185 D. ―Self-evident‖ Goods and Natural Law Theory..………..………...……….194 E. Conclusion……………………………………….……..………….……….196 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.……………….…………………………………...……….199 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The dilemma is simply this: one must either produce the means by which to proceed from facts to norms, or discontinue the 1 attempt to espouse natural-law philosophy. Henry Veatch One of the most fundamental concepts in ethics is the concept of obligation. Like time, it is a concept which seems simple until one is asked to explicate it. Much of this difficulty is undoubtedly due to the fact that the term Ought is used differently in different contexts and has many different meanings.2 Even when we try to narrow down the concept of obligation to moral obligation, the difficulty does not subside and an often time even worsens. It seems safe to assume that at the core of every major ethical debate, whether it pertains to applied ethics or the theory of ethics, is a debate about what 3 constitutes the moral Ought. 1 Henry Veatch, ―Natural Law and the ‗Is‘—‗Ought‘ Question‖ in Catholic Lawyer 26 (1980- 1981), 253. 2 Rather than put the terms ―ought‖ and ―is‖ in quotation marks when appropriate, I will instead capitalize the terms. 3 For example, in ethical theory, hedonic utilitarians base the Ought on the notion of pleasure and pain, Kantian deontologists base