Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), pp. 351-78 DOI: 10.1355/cs30-3a © 2008 ISEAS ISSN 0219-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative? JÜRGEN HAACKE ASEAN states have favoured diplomacy and peer pressure in order to sway Myanmar's military regime to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees and to promote national reconciliation. So far, ASEAN's combined efforts have not been very successful, although the generals are moving Myanmar beyond extra- constitutional rule. This paper asks whether, in the aftermath of the September 2007 protests, the constitutional referendum and Cyclone Nargis, there is much scope for a new regional effort to promote reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar that is additional to the support ASEAN offers for the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General. The paper sets out different positions held within ASEAN on promoting political change in Myanmar. It also examines the prospects for putting into practice recent ideas to address Myanmar's political situation in new regional settings. The paper concludes that: (1) significant difference characterize the Myanmar policy of individual ASEAN countries in line with varying interests and pressures, and dissimilar views on what — if anything — should be done to help Myanmar democratize; (2) Indonesia is the only ASEAN country to have conceptualized a possible regional diplomatic initiative, but its full implementation and success are far from certain. Keywords: Myanmar, ASEAN, national reconciliation, Jakarta Initiative on Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis, AIPMC. JÜRGEN HAACKE is a Senior Lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. 351 352 Jürgen Haacke On 9 February 2008, Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) announced that a referendum on the final draft of the country's new constitution would be organized in May. It also indicated that there would be multi-party elections in 2010. Reacting to calls to include Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in a belated broadening of the country's political process before the referendum, the military regime, headed hy Senior General Than Shwe, made clear that it would pursue its roadmap to a "disciplined" democracy as planned.^ Nevertheless, the regime's information minister stated that those who failed to participate in the National Convention (NC), which had worked out most of the new constitution's substance, would have the possibility of participating in the referendum and subsequent election.^ A week before the referendum. Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, causing massive devastation and loss of life, particularly in the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) delta.' Ignoring widespread international disbelief and criticism, the ruling junta nevertheless proceeded with the referendum in those areas not affected by the cyclone. In other areas the referendum was briefly postponed until 24 May. According to the SPDC, 98.12 per cent of eligible voters cast their votes in the referendum, with 92.48 per cent supporting the draft constitution.^ Few observers helieve that this outcome was not manipulated. While the constitution, which will effectively leave political power in the hands of the military commander-in-chief, was ratified and promulgated, Suu Kyi's house arrest was extended to May 2009. Member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which Myanmar joined in 1997, have for years heen obliged to deal with the regional and international implications of the Myanmar ruling junta's refusal to accede to the demands hoth for political reconciliation and change as put forward by the international community and the grouping itself At their recent 41st annual meeting, ASEAN foreign ministers expressed their "deep disappointment" over the extension of Suu Kyi's renewed house arrest, repeated the call hy ASEAN leaders to release her and other political detainees, and reiterated the view that the Myanmar Government should engage in a meaningful dialogue with all groups, and work towards a peaceful transition to democracy in the near future.^ ASEAN foreign ministers also encouraged Naypyidaw to work closely with the UN Secretary General and his Special Advisor on Myanmar, Ihrahim Gamhari.** Interestingly, ASEAN's collective position in 2008 appears to differ only in degree from the joint stance articulated after the Depanyin incident in May 2003 that marked ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar 353 the beginning of Suu Kyi's latest spell of detention. Then, foreign ministers urged Myanmar to resume its efforts towards national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy, welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken following the incident were temporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Suu Kyi and NLD members, and also reaffirmed their continued support for the efforts of the UNSG Special Representative Tan Sri Razali Ismail.' The limited change in diplomatic rhetoric is notable given intervening developments, including the repeated failure by ASEAN Chairs to influence Myanmar's military leadership on political reconciliation and the September 2007 protests. Although Myanmar can influence the statements of the grouping, the continuity of public diplomacy could suggest not only that ASEAN's position on Myanmar has remained effectively unchanged, but also that ASEAN states do not necessarily see a role for the Association and/or individual members to go the extra mile to promote political change in Myanmar. Alternatively, the similarities in ASEAN's public pronouncements on Myanmar may primarily reflect ASEAN discord on how to deal with Myanmar, the agreed position towards Naypyidaw notwithstanding. This paper thus asks three questions: (1) Has ASEAN's position on Myanmar really been more or less frozen over the past five years? (2) What is the balance of opinion within ASEAN on the political situation in Myanmar? (3) What prospects are there for the grouping or individual members to promote a regional approach in order to influence the SPDC leadership to do what ASEAN has been asking Naypyidaw to do, not least in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis? To address these questions this article is divided into three parts. The first highlights major developments in ASEAN's declaratory position on Myanmar to put the output of the 2008 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) into perspective. The second sketches in broad terms the individual national positions on Myanmar. The third focuses on recent ideas and efforts to promote Myanmar's political transition. The article concludes that despite the frustration widely felt within the region over the SPDC's recalcitrance, and Naypyidaw's tendency to embarrass other members, including its repeated refusal to allow ASEAN a constructive role in its political transition, the scope for a collective approach is limited given the considerable diversity in perspective on Myanmar within the grouping. Secondly, the Indonesian Government seems to remain 354 Jürgen Haacke keen to develop ideas for a new minilateral diplomatic process that would perhaps allow some regional states to influence the military junta. Its implementation, let alone success, cannot be taken for granted, however. ASEAN's Tough Talk on Myanmar Notwithstanding the apparent similarities in ASEAN rhetoric on Myanmar as expressed in the joint communiqués of 2003 and 2008, Southeast Asian foreign ministers and leaders have been prepared to publicly articulate trenchant criticisms of Myanmar for international and domestic consumption. Statements issued in relation to two recent events are illustrative of this phenomenon. One was formulated in response to the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar in September 2007;" the trigger for the second was the late refusal by the SPDC leadership to allow a briefing by UNSG Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari to the leaders of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2007.^ The military's decision to crack down on peaceful monk-led protests in September 2007 led to the sharpest rebuke of Myanmar ever sanctioned by ASEAN governments. In a statement issued by Singapore as ASEAN Chair on the sidelines of the UNGA plenary, foreign ministers expressed their "revulsion" over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar were being suppressed by violent force and that there had been a number of fatalities." Expressing full support for the good offices role of Ibrahim Gambari, ministers moreover urged the Myanmar Government to grant him full access to all parties and to cooperate fully and work with him. The statement was issued because ASEAN countries felt that they had no option but to clarify their collective position on developments in Myanmar and the significant regional and international outrage the latter caused. In November 2007, Singapore, again as Ghair, released another robust statement on Myanmar, which made clear that the military regime in Naypyidaw was henceforth expected to fend for itself in dealing with the UN and the wider international community, until the military leadership again wanted ASEAN to be of assistance. Read out by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and ostensibly supported by eight fellow ASEAN leaders following Myanmar's refusal to allow a briefing by Ibrahim Gambari at the 2007 EAS, the ASEAN statement outlined members' joint expectation that Myanmar work