Civil Wars & Global Disorder

Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Fall 2017 Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Threats & Opportunities Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner, guest editors with James D. Fearon Bruce D. Jones & Stephen John Stedman Stewart Patrick · Martha Crenshaw Paul H. Wise & Michele Barry Sarah Kenyon Lischer · Vanda Felbab-Brown Hendrik Spruyt · Stephen Biddle · William Reno Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez Barry R. Posen Civil War & the Current International System James D. Fearon Abstract: This essay sketches an explanation f o r the global spread of civil war up to the early 1990s and the partial recession since then, arguing that some of the decline is likely due to policy responses by major powers working principally through the United Nations. Un f o rtunately, the spread of civil war and state collapse to the Middle East and North A f r ica region in the last fifteen years has posed one set of problems that the current policy repertoire cannot address well– f o r several reasons, conflicts in this region are re- sistant to “treatment” by international peacekeeping operations–and has highlighted a second, deeper problem whose e f f e cts are gradually worsening and f o r which there does not appear to be any good solution within the constraints of the present UN system. That is, f o r many civil wa r – t orn or “postconflict” countries, third parties do not know how to help locals build a self-governing, self-financing state within UN -recognized borders or, in some cases, any borders. This essay provides an overview of the problem of civil war in the post-1945 international system. I first describe global patterns and trends over the whole period, and next sketch an explanation for the spread of civil war up to the early 1990s and the partial recession since then. There is reasonable evidence that United Nations and major-power policy responses since the end of the Cold War have contributed to the global decline in civil war since the early 1990s. How- ever, the spread of civil war and state collapse to the Middle East and North Africa (mena) region in the last fifteen years has posed one set of problems that the current policy repertoire cannot address well, and has highlighted a second, deeper problem whose effects are gradually worsening and for which there does not appear to be any good solution within the constraints of the present un system. JAMES D FEARON, a Fellow of the .American Academy since 2002, is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Human- ities and Sciences, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He has written for such journals as Foreign A f f a irs, American Political Sci- ence Review, and The Quarterly Journal of Economics. The first problem is that compared with conflicts in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, civil war and state collapse in the mena region more directly © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00456 18 affect the major powers, and possibly inter- sically the same trends if we consider the James D. Fearon national peace and security more broadly. share of independent countries with civil Third-party peacekeeping operations and wars (the dotted line and right axis in Fig- a panoply of associated aid programs have ure 1, calculated omitting microstates that been deployed to “treat” civil war–torn had populations smaller than half a million countries elsewhere, with a measure of suc- in the year 2000). It is also clear from these cess. In most cases, however, it will be im- data that “prevalence” is the right word. possible to apply this treatment model in Major civil conflict has affected roughly one the mena region due to higher costs and in six nonmicrostates each year since 2000 other obstacles related to nationalism, the and almost one in five today; at the peak in 1transnational jihadi movement, and the in- 1992, it was nearly one in three. tensity of conflict among the region’s biggest powers. Figure 2’s panels break down the trends by region. These mirror the global pattern The second problem is that third-par- for the two most conflict-prone regions, ty efforts to build effective, self-sustaining Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and also for states in countries where states have col- Latin America. The most striking exception lapsed due to civil war, misrule, or invasion is the menaregion, which roughly mirrors have mainly been failures. This is painfully the other high-conflict regions until around evident in the U.S. experiences in Afghani- 2003, but has seen a large increase from stan and Iraq. To some degree, it appears to three wars in 2002 to twelve ongoing wars 2generalize to the experience of postconflict in 2014. All other regions had major de- peacekeeping operations and foreign aid ef- clines in civil conflict after the early 1990s. forts in a number of low-income countries From the steady increase after 1945 shown outside of the mena region. Third par- in Figure 1, one might suppose that civil ties do not know how to bring about the wars were breaking out more frequently construction of self-governing states that over time. This is not so. Civil wars have be- can support themselves financially within gun over the whole period at a rate of about un-approved boundaries. 2.2 new conflicts per year on average, with at best a very slight trend downward. The 3Acommon misconception is that the con- reason for the impressive increase in prevtemporary prevalence of civil war is large- alence up to the early 1990s is that the rate ly a post–Cold War phenomenon. Figure 1 at which civil wars have ended has been con- shows that the number of civil wars in prog- sistently lower, averaging 1.77 per year. Sup- ress each year increased steadily throughout pose that each morning you pour a random the Cold War, already reaching levels in the amount of water into a tank and then re- 1980s greater than at present. There was a move a different random amount of water rapid increase around the time of the end in the afternoon, with the average amount of the Soviet Union, a spike that contribut- going in greater than the average amount ed to the perception that widespread civil coming out. The tank will gradually fill up. war was a new, post–Cold War international This same sort of dynamic is behind the problem. But after reaching a high point of gradual increase and the contemporary forty-eight ongoing wars in 1992, the preva- prevalence of civil war in the post-1945 in- lence of civil war has actually declined quite ternational system. <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">a bit, leveling out over the last fifteen years </li><li style="flex:1">A related implication is that the average </li></ul>between the high twenties and low thirties. duration of civil wars in progress has in- The un state system expanded a great creased over time. The international system deal over this whole period, but we see ba- has been accumulating long-running con- 146 (4) Fall 2017 19 Civil War & Figure 1 the Current International System Civil Wars by Year, 1945–2014 # Ongoing Wars/Country (Nonmicrostates) <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1950 </li><li style="flex:1">1960 </li><li style="flex:1">1970 </li><li style="flex:1">1980 </li></ul>Year <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1990 </li><li style="flex:1">2000 </li><li style="flex:1">2010 </li></ul>Source: Updated version of the civil war list described in James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (1) (February 2003): 75–90. Available at http:// fearonresearch.stanford.edu/. flicts. Figure 3 shows that the average du- in which rebels have aimed to capture the ration of civil wars in progress is currently central government, as opposed to winning greater than twenty years, reflecting some greater autonomy or regional secession, has very long-running, intractable conflicts in been fairly stable since the 1960s, varying Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Philippines, without clear trend between 50 and 60 per- India, Turkey, and Somalia, among others. cent. The proportion in which the combatEven median durations of wars in progress ants have been organized primarily along have climbed to remarkably high levels: it ethnic rather than ideological lines has in- was nineteen years in 2010 and fourteen creased somewhat over the whole period years in 2014 (the recent fall mainly reflect- since World War II, from around 60 per- ing the entry of a number of new conflicts cent in the early years to around 70 or 75 4<ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">in the wake of the Arab Spring). </li><li style="flex:1">percent since the end of the Cold War. A </li></ul>Three final observations concern types of much more striking change has been the re- civil conflicts. The proportion of civil wars markable increase in the share of conflicts 20 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences James D. Fearon # of Civil Wars Ongoing 10 # of Civil Wars Ongoing <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">10 </li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">15 </li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">15 </li></ul># of Civil Wars Ongoing 10 # of Civil Wars Ongoing <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">10 </li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">15 </li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">15 </li></ul># of Civil Wars Ongoing 10 15 # of Civil Wars Ongoing <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">10 </li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">0</li><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">15 </li></ul>146 (4) Fall 2017 21 Civil War & Figure 3 the Current International System Accumulation of Long-Running Conflicts, 1945–2014 Avg. Duration of Civil Wars Ongoing Median Duration of Wars Ongoing <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1950 </li><li style="flex:1">1960 </li><li style="flex:1">1970 </li><li style="flex:1">1980 </li></ul>Year <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1990 </li><li style="flex:1">2000 </li><li style="flex:1">2010 </li></ul><a href="/goto?url=http://fearonresearch.stanford.edu/" target="_blank">Source: Author’s coding, available at http://fearonresearch.stanford.edu/. </a>that involve avowedly jihadist rebel groups, forms of armed conflict can be highly ro- from around 5 percent in 1990 to more than bust, so that civil wars are hard to end mil- <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">40 percent in 2014 (see Figure 4). </li><li style="flex:1">itarily. And they are also hard to end polit- </li></ul>ically because stable power-sharing agree- The spread and prevalence of civil war in ments between armed groups are extremely the post-1945 un system is related to the difficult to arrange within states. persistent gap between the rates at which On June 26, 1945, when the un Charter civil wars have broken out and ended. But was signed, there were sixty-four indepen- why have civil wars been easier to start than dent states, fifty of which joined that day. to end? This section sketches a two-part an- As a result of successive waves of decolo- swer. First, decolonization produced an in- nization and the breakups of the Soviet ternational system in which most states are Union and Yugoslavia, the un system has former colonies with weak state structures tripled to 193 member states at present. We and good conditions for guerrilla warfare have an international system composed of or competing local militias. Second, these many relatively small and administratively, 22 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Figure 4 James D. Fearon Growth in Wars with a Significant Jihadi Presence, 1945–2014 # of Civil Wars # with Islamist Aspect % with Islamist Aspect <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1950 </li><li style="flex:1">1960 </li><li style="flex:1">1970 </li><li style="flex:1">1980 </li></ul>Year <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1990 </li><li style="flex:1">2000 </li><li style="flex:1">2010 </li></ul><a href="/goto?url=http://fearonresearch.stanford.edu/" target="_blank">Source: Author’s coding, available at http://fearonresearch.stanford.edu/. </a>financially, and politically weak states. The itate cash crop and natural resource ex- median un member today has a popula- traction via a capital city, a few roads, and tion of about 8.1 million, a bit smaller than a port where possible. Administration of- New Jersey’s and more than one million ten barely extended to rural peripheries. fewer than that of the Chicago metropol- With the backstop of imperial militaries itan area. Considering the 167 nonmicro- removed by decolonization, the option to states, the median country has a population try to use force to capture political control of 10.7 million; (approximate) examples in- either at the center of a new state or in a re- clude Somalia, Bolivia, and Haiti. Half of gion became more attractive for ambitious all un member states are former colonies or abused would-be rebel groups. Postinde- that gained independence since 1960, and pendence leaders have–most of the time more than two-thirds gained independence successfully–used state revenues and of- after 1945. fices to buy supporting coalitions, reduc- The colonial powers built state appara- ing the risk of coup attempts and rebellions. tuses in their colonies primarily to facil- But positive shocks to the relative strength 146 (4) Fall 2017 23 Civil War & of potential rebels versus a central govern- effectively disarmed and exposed losing the Current ment sometimes occur. These shocks cre- side. For example, the heart of the prob- International ate windows of opportunity to try to seize lem in the Syrian war has been that Assad power or at least get an armed organization and his supporters realistically fear that di- over a threshold of military viability against luting their control of the Syrian military in System what are often chronically weak govern- any power-sharing deal would create an un- 5ment forces. acceptable risk of genocide against them: For example, the collapse of the Gaddafi even relatively moderate Sunni opposition regime in Libya in 2011 led to a flow of arms figures cannot credibly commit that great- and fighters to northern Mali, providing a er opposition power would not uninten- positive shock to insurgent capabilities that, tionally head in the direction of control by in combination with postcoup weakness of more extreme factions. Likewise, if opposi- the government in Bamako, made for civ- tion forces were to agree to a deal with Asil war onset. In Iraq, the U.S. invasion and sad that gave them no real hold in the state’s destruction of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist military, Assad could not credibly commit regime created a power vacuum and moti- not to use the military to punish and secure vating principle for multiple armed groups himself against future trouble from current to form and seek local or, looking to the lon- opposition forces. ger run, national control. In Syria, the mass Power-sharing deals as means to end au- demonstrations sparked by the Arab Spring tonomy-seeking civil wars are more fea- created a window of opportunity for the sible because powers can be divided be- formation of armed rebel groups, spurred tween territorially distinct central and on by the aggressive repression of an As- regional institutions. Even so, central gov- sad regime that saw no prospects for sta ble and safe power-sharing with a moder- escalate autonomy demands from their ate opposition. stronger position and institutional base -ernment fears that regional rebels would Once an armed rebel group gets over can make autonomy-seeking civil wars the threshold of military viability in a de- difficult to end via negotiated settlement. veloping country with good conditions These considerations help to explain a for insurgency, civil war can be extreme- depressing regularity: A large majority of ly difficult to end. Civil wars end either by center-seeking civil wars since 1945, and military victory or with a power-sharing about half of the autonomy-seeking con- agreement. The latter may take the form flicts, have ended by military victory rath- of greater regional autonomy provisions in er than with significant negotiated power- the case of autonomy-seeking rebel groups, sharing deals.7 Further, military victories, or the sharing of political and military po- the alternative to power-sharing deals, are sitions by explicit agreement, or an elector- usually hard to come by when the mode al process in the case of wars fought over a of fighting is either guerrilla warfare or <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">central government. </li><li style="flex:1">conflict among urban and semiurban mi- </li></ul>In civil wars fought over a central govern- litias in the context of largely collapsed ment, stable power-sharing deals are hard central governments. Some of the stronto reach and implement in the absence of gest and most competent militaries in the long-term, credible third-party commit- world have struggled with guerrilla con- ments to enforce them.6 Each side has good flicts without much success. It is not sur- reason to fear that the other would try to prising that less well-financed militaries grab full control any chance it got and then with much worse command-and-control use the full power of state forces against an problems would struggle even more and 24 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences cause even more killing of noncomba- batants. In some cases, peacekeeping opera- James D. Fearon tants, which can in turn help insurgents tions began as or morphed into military op- <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">with their recruitment efforts. </li><li style="flex:1">erations against rebel groups, on behalf of </li></ul>a flimsy peace agreement or an extremely How have other states and nonstate ac- weak formal state (for example in Cambo- tors responded to the spread of civil war dia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Mali). and the concomitant weakening of formal The international regime for civil war state structures? There was hardly any col- goes well beyond pkos, however. They are lective response until the end of the Cold supported and supplemented by the work War “unfroze” the unSecurity Council. In and money of a host of intergovernmental, the 1990s, the Security Council rapidly as- regional, and nongovernmental organiza- sumed the role of the main international in- tions, aid agencies, donor conferences, and stitution for coordinating major power and election monitoring and human rights or- international community responses to the ganizations–all with programming and newly discovered–or newly actionable– intervention theories developed for civil problem of civil war. war–torn and “postconflict” countries. In- Figure 5 plots the number of un peace- ternational norm entrepreneurs have also keeping operations (pkos) in the field each been active and somewhat successful in year. It shows a rapid increase from an aver- this area, as illustrated by the un Gener- age of less than four per year before 1989– al Assembly’s vote to accept the responsithe year of the Namibian pko untag, bility to protect doctrine in 2005, and the which began an era of cooperation among development of a system of international the five permanent members of the Se- criminal tribunals and courts focused on curity Council on pkos–to an apparent human rights abuses and crimes commit- steady state of around seventeen missions ted mainly in or around civil wars. per year since 1993. Most of the pkos be- The pko-based international regime fore 1989 were deployed to facilitate cease- for the “treatment” of civil wars has been fires or other agreements ending interstate roundly criticized for (what are argued to wars, whereas since then, almost all pko be) a number of high-profile and disastrous mandates have addressed peacekeeping or failures. Notably, in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwan -“peacemaking” in civil war–torn countries. da, and Eastern Congo there have been mas- Peacekeeping operations can be under- sacres, even genocide, under the noses of stood as a central part of an “international inadequately manned or mandated pko

Civil Wars & Global Disorder

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