University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Penn Humanities Forum Undergraduate Research Undergraduate Humanities Forum 2018-2019: Stuff Fellows 5-2019 Pragmatism and Effective Altruism: An Essay on Epistemology and Practical Ethics John Aggrey Odera University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2019 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Odera, John Aggrey, "Pragmatism and Effective Altruism: An Essay on Epistemology and Practical Ethics" (2019). Undergraduate Humanities Forum 2018-2019: Stuff. 2. https://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2019/2 This paper was part of the 2018-2019 Penn Humanities Forum on Stuff. Find out more at http://wolfhumanities.upenn.edu/annual-topics/stuff. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2019/2 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Pragmatism and Effective Altruism: An Essay on Epistemology and Practical Ethics Abstract This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism philosophy and movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from one of its founding principles, and extends to practical aspects of the movement. The utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’ an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal currency for misery” for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate exactly the value of each moral decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and, apparently, objectively come to a conclusion about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving children in famine-ridden areas. What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is “unfair” to those one could have helped more, thus immoral. This paper provides, first a pragmatist conception of epistemology (or lack of it), in contrast to the Sidgwickian one held by the utilitarian effective altruists, and then explores how holding either epistemological position affects our ethical viewpoints and actions. It argues that the utilitarian conception is the wrong place, and way, from which to view all ethical action. It contends that Effective Altruism, in seeking to reorder society to meet its abstractly conceived teleological utilitarian moral ideal (as measured by QALYs- a measure settled upon by the movement’s leaders), is undemocratic, and ultimately misses much of the complexity and messiness provided by contingencies, personal and cultural, that is present in, and important to, human life. Altruism done this way is atomizing and thoughtless; and it depicts to a high degree what William James referred to as a “certain blindness in human beings” - the lack of recognition that different things matter to different people, and that it is impossible to aggregate these claims relative to a moral standard that exists outside their particular individual and societal experiences. The ap per then provides a pragmatist reading of meliorism, as found in the works of John Dewey, William James, Richard Rorty and Jane Addams; a view of meliorism that hearkens towards solidarity and not objectivity; one that is not only democratic, cognizant of contingencies and focused on habit, but also, by its insistence on viewing ourselves as members of communities and societies, saves us from the moral atomization of Effective Altruism and its insistence on individual moral responsibility and action in line with “objective truths”, as opposed to collective and political action to address contingent issues. Disciplines Arts and Humanities Comments This paper was part of the 2018-2019 Penn Humanities Forum on Stuff. Find out more at http://wolfhumanities.upenn.edu/annual-topics/stuff. This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2019/2 PRAGMATISM AND EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICAL ETHICS John Aggrey Odera 2018-2019 Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellow A Thesis submitted to The Department of Philosophy, At The University of Pennsylvania In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honors) March 2019 Supervisor: Karen Detlefsen. TABLE OF CONTENTS 000. Title Page 001. Table of Contents 004. Acknowledgements 005. Dedication 007. Abstract 009. Introduction 012. Part One: Objectivity, Contingency, Solidarity 031. Part Two: Shall We Leave it to the Experts? 070. Part Three: Democratic Vistas 108. Conclusion May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am thankful to The Wolf Center for the Humanities, to the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program, and to the Center for Undergraduate Research and Fellowships (CURF) at the University of Pennsylvania, for the financial help that allowed me to complete this project. I’m grateful to Luke and Jane Odera, who provided me with food and a room of my own; who allowed me time, tolerance and space to question and to broaden my imagination. Many, many thanks also to my fellow students and professors at both the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Oxford, for the discussions that enriched me and challenged me at every turn. I am indebted to the following people for their wonderful ideas and criticisms, whether active or in conversation: To Loren Goldman - a true Doc Suave - ​ ​ thank you for introducing me to the Pragmatists; to Arwed Buchholtz, Ria Mazumdar, Haonan Li, Bruce Kucklick; to Sofia Rosenfeld - many thanks for your gracious and illuminating comments during the first presentation; to Carlin Romano, Audrey Jaquiss, Derek J. Willie, Pranav Reddy, Roma Dziembaj, Shadrack Lilan, Miranda Sklaroff, Kok Chor Tan, Carl-Emmanuel Fulghieri, Naomi Elegant, Sam Clarke, Justin H. Humphreys, Ayako Kano, Rosemary DuBrin; To Tom Fry - a God among men, and Kristjan Tomasson - ever the contrarian; to Guy Kahane and Jeff McMahan -the tutorials and lectures on practical ethics that both of you gave were my first sustained exploration of Effective altruism, I thank you; to Matthias Scherr, Halima Said, and Amleset Girmay; to the members of the Philomathean Society, and to the Undergraduate Humanities Fellows - who listened with May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 2 charity and questioned with skepticism. Most of all, to Karen Detlefsen, who guided me kindly and patiently throughout it all. ‘ To John Dewey, whom I have found waiting at the end of many philosophical roads I have traversed. May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 3 Pragmatists hope to make anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language. Richard Rorty May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 4 ABSTRACT This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism philosophy and movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from one of its founding principles, and extends to practical aspects of the movement. The utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’ an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal currency for misery”1 for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate exactly the value of each moral decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and, apparently, objectively come to a conclusion about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving children in famine-ridden areas2. What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is “unfair”3 to those one could have helped more, thus immoral. 1 Srinivasan, Amia. (2015). “Stop the Robot Apocalypse”. Review of “Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism can Help you help Others, Do work that Matters, and Make Smarter Choices about Giving Back” by William MacAskill. London Review of Books. 2 MacAskill speaking about his visit to Hamlin Fistula Hospital in Ethiopia: “When I’d visited Ethiopia ​ several years before, I’d visited this hospital. I’d hugged the women who suffered from this condition, ​ and they’d thanked me for visiting them. It had been an important experience for me: a vivid first-hand demonstration of the severity of the problems in the world. This was a cause I had a personal connection with. Should I have donated to the Fistula Foundation, even knowing I could do more to help people if I donated elsewhere? I do not think so. If I were to give to the Fistula Foundation rather than to charities I thought were more effective, I would be privileging the needs of some people over others for emotional rather than moral reasons. That would be unfair to those I could have helped more. If I’d visited some other shelter