Clientelism, Public Workfare and the Emergence of the Piqueteros in Argentina Lucas Ronconi and Ignacio Franceschelli Working Paper #10 Over the last ten years, Argentina has experienced a significant increase in the number of collective protests. This increase was not due to increased militancy by existing organizations. In fact, the average annual number of strikes organized by labor unions decreased from 509 in 1983-96 to only 219 in 1997-2004. Rather, the higher level of social conflict comes from non- institutionalized protesters and forms of protest. This chapter focuses on a new social movement, popularly known as Piqueteros (people who block roads or 'the picketers'), that has organized most of these non-traditional demonstrations. 1 The total number of road blockades between 1997 and 2004 was 7,135, implying an average of 892 per year, more than four times the number of strikes. Curiously, participants in the road blockades tend to be poor, unemployed people not linked together by any previous work 1 We categorize the Piqueteros as a social movement following McAdam and Snow's definition: 'A collectivity acting with sorne degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is a part' (1997, xviii). Recently, sorne Piqueteros leaders have become increasingly linked with institutional actors - such as the close relation between Luis D' Elia and President Néstor Kirchner - suggesting that sorne organizations are operating inside political institutions, and hence should be conceptually considered interest groups. The focus of this chapter, however, is on the emergence and growth of the movement. 1 experience. This population usually does not have the resources or the network ties to collectively organize. How is that they became the most salient protesters? Several authors have attempted to explain the origins and growth of the Piqueteros (Camarero, Pozzi and Schneider 1998; Conti and Schneider Mansilla 2003; Farinetti 1999; Galafassi 2003; Isman 2004; Kohan 2002; Laufer and Spiguel 1999; Oviedo 2001; Pozzi 2000; Scribano 1999; Svampa and Pereyra 2003). They argue that the movement emerged mainly as a response to poverty, unemployment, inequality and limited democracy. Structural conditions and a desire for social justice motivated people to create or join the Piqueteros organizations, according to this view. This opinion has sorne appeal, considering Argentina’s recent economic crisis. However, this view contains sorne weaknesses. While 'social movements are not a simple knee-jerk response to social conditions' (Wilson 1973, 90), we found that there is not an obvious relationship between grievances and demonstrations, either across time or across provinces in Argentina. This study focuses on the nature of the goods which participants in the Piquetero movement seek, and how these goods must be produced. The government's decision to implement temporary public works programs - workfare - in 1993 triggered the emergence of the Piqueteros and provided the resources for their growth. Participants in these temporary public works programs would receive a monthly wage in exchange for part-time community service. In particular, we emphasize how the government managed workfare and the intrinsic characteristics of this policy. First, only a small proportion of the eligible population (less than 10 per cent) actually participated in the workfare program. Most poor and unemployed individuals were aware that filling out an application form did not guarantee their access to benefits. Second, cronyism in the selection of recipients eroded the legitimacy of the government, further inducing individuals to search for altemative channels to obtain these benefits. Third, workfare fostered 2 networking among beneficiaries. Participants were organized into groups of approximately 50 individuals to perform public work. Once participation ended (generally after three to six months) ex-participants interested in another round had stronger networks among themselves, facilitating coordination. Fourth, workfare provided selective material incentives to overcome free riding. Since a workfare benefit (monthly wage) is an excludable good, the Piqueteros organizations had an effective tool to induce people to join them and participate in demonstrations: only members of the organization who actively participate in road blockades receive the workfare benefits which the Piqueteros distribute on behalf of the government. In game-theory terminology, workfare changed the collective action problem from a prisoner's dilemma into an assurance game, since workfare benefits are selective incentives which remove the temptation to free ride. Moreover, workfare also helped reduce coordination problems (the main barrier to collective action in assurance games) by fostering networking among unemployed people. Previous research has not ignored the linkage between the Piqueteros and workfare. But it views access to workfare benefits as a mere outcome of the road blockade (Colmegna 2003; Delamata 2004; Ferrara 2003; Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Demanding public goods such as social justice and democratization is, according to this view, the causal reason why aggrieved individuals collectively organize and participate in protests. More importantly, they exclusively see the implementation and expansion of workfare as the government's reaction to the emergence of the movement. While we agree that the government typically reacted to demonstrations by providing workfare funds to the Piqueteros, we stress the opposite causal sequence: road blockades were organized to obtain workfare benefits, and the government's attempt to silence the protests by distributing benefits among the Piqueteros meant more resources for these organizations and actually ended up fueling demonstrations. 3 We present empirical evidence about a topic which so far has been mainly discussed theoretically, and we assess the merits of the existing models of social movement to account for the Piqueteros' case. Neither system strain, the main explanation according to the classical model, nor cognitive liberation, a necessary condition according to McAdam's formulation of the political process model, are adequate explanations for the development of insurgency. All the evidence we find is consistent with the view that selective material incentives and access to external resources were fundamental for the emergence and growth of the Piqueteros. The emergence of the Piqueteros In bi’s study of the black protest movement in the United States, Doug McAdam categorizes theories of social movements into three groups: classical, resource mobilization and political processes. The classical model views social movements as a collective reaction to system strain. Such strain has psychological effects on individuals and, when severe enough, triggers social insurgency. The classical model, particularly when applied to an open and responsive political system, assumes that 'movement participants are not engaged in rational political action. Instead, the rewards they seek are primarily psychological in nature’ (1999, 17). According to the resource mobilization model, social movements 'are not forms of irrational behavior but rather a tactical response to the harsh realities of a closed and coercive political system' (20). A change in the amount of resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups is the key cause for the emergence of social movements. Finally, the political process model considers three sets of factors to be crucial in the generation of insurgency. First, shifts occur in the structure of political opportunities which promote insurgency 'only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations' (41). Second, the amount of resources of the aggrieved population changes, enabling them to 4 exploit the political opportunities. The third factor is cognitive liberation: 'Before collective protest can get under way, people must collectively define their situation as unjust and subject to change through group action' (51). All three factors are regarded as necessary, but not sufficient, causes of social insurgency. Previous research attempting to explain the emergence and growth of the Piqueteros generally fits into the classical model. 2 Scribano (1999), for example, argues that the geographical areas with more road blockades tend to be regions where unemployment and inequality are higher, where more privatizations have taken place and where electoral participation is lower. Oviedo (2001) argues that government corruption combined with deteriorating economic conditions explains the emergence of insurgency. The same view is presented by Delamata: 'These organizations [Piqueteros] emerged as a result of people struggling for jobs, on the one hand, and fighting against local Peronist bosses, on the other' (2004, 2). The idea is that the Piquetero movement emerged mainly as a response to social conditions, clientelistic practices and limited democracy. Structural conditions and a desire for social justice motivated people to create and join the Piqueteros organizations. There are two reasons why we find this view incomplete. First, it is not obvious that political restrictions and social deprivations were at their peak when the Piqueteros emerged. 3 Second, how is it that poor and unemployed people, not linked together by any previous work experience, were able to collectively organize