Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretationt SUR1T CHOUDHRY" I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM .............................. 820 I. THE MODES OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION INTRODUCED ................................ 827 A. The State of the Literatureand the Approach of this Study ..... 827 B. The Relevance of Comparative Legal Studies ................. 829 C. Legal Particularism,Legal Hegemony, and the Refusal to Use Comparative Jurisprudence ......................... 830 D. Three Modes of Comparative ConstitutionalInterpretation .... 833 1. Mode 1: Universalist Interpretation ....................... 833 2. Mode 2: Dialogical Interpretation ........................ 835 3. Mode 3: Genealogical Interpretation ...................... 838 E. Conclusion .............................................. 839 III. UNNVERALIST INTERPETATION .............................. 841 A. Introduction ............................................. 841 B. UniversalismAs Arguments of Principle: The Presumption of Innocence in Zuma and Coetzee .......................... 846 C. Complex Universalism: Makwanyane ....................... 851 IV. DLoGIcAL INTERPRETATION ................................ 855 A. Introduction ............................................. 855 B. Confronting and Clarifying ConstitutionalAssumptions ....... 859 1. Du Plessis: The Application of the Bill of Rights ........... 859 2. NationalEducation Policy Bill: Federal/Provincial Relations ............................................. 860 3. Solberg: Religious Freedom ............................. 862 C. Challengingand Rejecting Assumptions: Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and the Power of ConstitutionalAmendment ... 864 V. GENEALOGICAL INTERPRETATION .............................. 866 A. Introduction ............................................. 866 f 0 1999 Sujit Choudhy * Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School; Program in Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University. Special thanks to Frank Mlchelman, whose kind and patient advice saved me from many mistakes, and to Ira Parghi, whose questions and comments forced me to sharpen my arguments. I also thank David Dyzenhaus, Peter Hogg, Ross Kriel, Patrick Macklein, Ira Parghi, Deborah Perlstein, Amnon Reichman, Craig Scott, Robert WaL, a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa who wishes to remain anonymous, Bryan Babb, Jacqueline Carberry, and the editors at the IndianaLaw Journal,for extremely helpful comments and discussions. This paper was presented to audiences at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, and the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The usual disclaimer applies. I acknowledge the financial support ofHarvard University, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Harvard Program in Ethics and the Professions. INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74:819 B. GenealogicalArguments in the CanadianLaw ofAboriginalRights ...................................... 871 C. British Imperial Law and the Acquisition of TerritorialSovereignty .................................... 872 D. "Softening" British Imperial Law and the Doctrine of Discovery ............................................. 875 E. AboriginalRights As Creations of British Imperial Law ....... 876 1. St. Catherine'sM illing ................................. 876 2. Calder ............................................... 877 F.Aboriginal Rights Arisingfrom the Continuity ofAboriginal Law in Guerin ............................................ 880 G. AboriginalRights Arisingfrom PriorAboriginal Sovereignty in Van der Peet? .......................................... 882 VI. CONCLUSION: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT .................. 885 A. Introduction ............................................. 885 B. Scope .................................................. 886 C. ConstitutionalCulture .................................... 888 D. Legitimacy .............................................. 890 E. Conclusion: The Beginning of a ConstitutionalConversation ... 892 I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM Constitutional interpretation across the globe is taking on an increasingly cosmopolitan character, as comparative jurisprudence comes to assume a central place in constitutional adjudication. Indeed, American constitutional practice, still reflecting the view expressed by Justice Scalia that "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution,"' is out of step with the international mainstream. Extensive and detailed treatments of foreign materials have become familiar features of constitutional adjudication in many courts outside of the United States, most prominently the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Canada. Comparative case law, however, does not only figure prominently in judicial decisions; it also permeates constitutional argument and academic commentary. 1. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (dismissing the relevance of comparative constitutional experience to the question of whether federal law could command state and local officials to enforce a federal regulatory scheme). Justice Scalia went on to say that "our federalism is not Europes."Id Some rare examples where comparative constitutional experience has been referred to by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional cases are Justice Breyees dissent inPrintz,id. at 976-78 (referring to the structure of federalism in Switzerland, 'Germany, and the European Union as authority for the proposition that the federal power to command state officials to enforce a federal regulatory scheme is compatible with the democratic virtues of a federal system); Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority judgment in Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (discussing the constitutionality of prohibitions on assisted suicide in Canada and Colombia); and Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in New York v. UnitedStates, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946) (referring to the Argentinean, Australian, Brazilian, and Canadian Constitutions and to Brazilian constitutional jurisprudence). 1999] COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 821 The growth in the use of comparative jurisprudence is part of a larger 2 phenomenon: the globalization of the practice of modem constitutionalism. Globalization does not simply mean that the commitment to constitutionalism is now widespread. Rather, as Louis Henkin observes, globalization implies additionally that "the spread of constitutionalism owes much to particular sources and models."3 In other words, in this context, globalization has come to mean the reliance on comparative materials at all stages in the life cycle of modem constitutions. The use of comparative jurisprudence is but one example. Another is the use of foreign constitutions as models in the process of constitution-making. One prominent model has been the American Constitution, in particular its Bill of Rights;4 however, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 has, in recent years, become a leading alternative, and has influenced the drafting of the South 2. BruceAckerman has referred to this phenomenon as the "rise of world constitutionalism." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771 (1997); see also Heinz Klug, Introducing the Devil: An InstitutionalAnalysis of the Power of Constitutional Review, 13 S.AmR. J. HuM. RTs. 185, 186 (1997) (describing "a globalization of the notion that individual rights, inscribed in written constitutions, are an essential component of democratic governance'). AlthoughAckerman and Klug seem to regard this phenomenon as relatively recent, as long ago as 1979 a leading casebook proclaimed "a worldwide explosion" in judicial review. MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, CoMwARATVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MARLAis 12 (1979). 3. Louis Hekin,A NewBirth ofConstitutionalivn: GeneticInfluences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDozoL. RHv. 533,533 (1993); see also CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs CoNsvrrloN ABROAD (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter CoNsTnmoxALsMAND RIGHTS]. 4. See generally CONSTErmONASMAND RGHTS, supra note 3; Anthony Lester QC, The OverseasTrade in the American Bill ofRights, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 537 (1988). Although many new constitutions have incorporated bills of rights, I do not claim that such documents are part of the definition of a constitution. As Giovanni Sartori argues: Is a constitution without a bill of rights an incomplete constitution? I would agree with Madison and Hamilton that declarations of rights are not a necessary condition of constitutions.... [A] constitution without a declaration of rights still is a constitution, whereas a constitution whose core and centerpiece is not a frame of government is not a constitution. GIovANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CoNsTmmoNAL ENGNEERiNG 197-98 (1st ed. 1994). But cf Jon Elster, Constitutionalismin EasternEurope: An Introduction, 58 U. Cm. L. RFv. 447, 465 (1991) (stating that "[a] constitution, considered as a written document, serves three interrelated functions: [first] to define and protect the rights of the citizens'). 5. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [hereinafter Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]. INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74:819 African Bill of Rights,6 the Israeli Basic Laws,7 the New Zealand Bill of Rights,' and the