THO FACTSHEET April 16, 2018 Understanding the Conflict in Northern Syria David Hutchins – Communications and Editorial Assistant, THO Brief Contextual Overview On January 20, 2018, Turkish forces supported by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) launched Operation Olive Branch, a military campaign against the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria’s Afrin region.[1] This conflict has set up a potential collision course between two NATO allies, the U.S. and Turkey. With the fall of Afrin, Turkey threatens to continue this operation eastward to Manbij, where the YPG are directly supported by U.S. troops.[2] Since October of 2015, the U.S. has allied itself in Syria with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), believing this YGP-led force to be the best chance of removing ISIS from Syria.[3] The decision by the U.S. to train and equip the SDF has seriously strained relations with Turkey, a critical ally in the region, given that the YPG forces within the SDF have strong links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[4] The PKK is identified as a terrorist organization by both the U.S. and Turkey.[5] As such, the U.S. is work- ing directly with what Turkey views as a terrorist group, a viewpoint that the U.S. does not share. Turkey wishes to prevent the creation of an autonomous Kurdish statelet on its border that could serve as a training ground for YPG/PKK fighters planning to carry out attacks in Turkey. Syria’s Assad regime, supported by Iran and Russia, further complicates this already crowded geopolitical conflict, most recently by deploying pro-Syrian government militias to assist the YPG defense in Afrin against Turkish forces.[6] This factsheet aims to illuminate the different actors in this conflict and the history of their relations, while explaining how the U.S. and Turkey have reached this potential collision point. The Conflict in Northern Syria NATO ALLIES TURKEY IN CONFLICT YPG SUPPORTS USA SUPPORTS OPPOSES FSA IN CONFLICT RUSSIA IN CONFLICT IRAN PRO-SYRIAN OCCASIONALLY COOPERATES GOV’T FORCES SUPPORTS 1 Who is Involved and Why? Breakdown of Factions in Northern Syria The YPG and Its Affiliates Although it is often said that Kurds make up the largest group of stateless people in the world, there is much that divides the Kurdish community in the Middle East. This ethnic group is split largely between Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Although the majority are Sunni Muslims, Kurds themselves are a diverse group spanning different tribes, dialects, religions, and political affiliations.[7] Kurds make up roughly 7-10% of Syria’s population (2016 estimate), with the majority living in northern Syria near the borders with Turkey and Iraq.[8] Syrian Kurdistan, often referred to as Western Kurdistan or Rojava, is also home to sizeable ethnic Arab, Syriac, and Turkmen populations.[9] Although historically an impoverished and marginalized minority denied legal status by the Syrian government, Kurdish communities have been able to achieve varying levels of de facto autonomy across substantial territory in northern Syria throughout the Syrian civil war. The most prominent example is administration by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is teaching Kurdish in schools and setting up local administrations.[10] The movement to establish autono- mous Kurdish rule manifests itself within different groups across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Both the PKK in Turkey and the PYD in Syria fall under a larger umbrel- la organization known as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) that seeks to impose the ideals of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan.[11] The YPG, the militant wing of the PYD, is only one segment of this larger movement. It is the YPG’s deep ties to the PKK that has Turkey on high alert. Many YPG leaders speak openly of their history with the PKK, and fighters from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have joined the movement in Syria.[12] The PKK is considered to be a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the U.S. for its violent separatist movement inside Turkey.[13] In addition, Turkey has accused the YPG of preventing Arabs from returning to the land the group now controls, along with creating a fabricated democracy that is controlled by the PKK.[14] Part of the latter view is rooted in examples of other Kurdish political parties, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (PDK-S), facing intimidation and violence under PYD rule.[15] However, proponents of the PYD say they do not seek to divide Syria but rather to lead a long-term social revolution that will ensure gender and minority rights along with Kurdish autonomy.[16] The Turkish Response Since 1984, conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has killed more than 45,000 people in Turkey.[17] This conflict has included direct clashes between the Turkish state and PKK combatants, as well as hundreds of PKK terror attacks throughout Turkey.[18] Throughout the conflict, Turkey and the PKK have alternat- ed between periods of peace and violence. Following several failed attempts at peace, the latest of which ended in 2015, the Turkish government views a military operation as the best course of action for preventing further attacks by the PKK. The PKK’s connection with the PYD and YPG is Turkey’s stated reasoning behind conducting Operation Olive Branch, as Turkey believes Syria to be a platform through which PKK fighters are equipped and trained.[19] This belief originates from the fact that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan headquartered the PKK in Syria for nearly 20 years prior to his capture. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that perpetrators of multiple bombings in Ankara and Bursa in 2016 had spent time in YPG military training camps within northern Syria.[20] To combat the YPG, Turkey has allied with the FSA, a collection of Syrian rebel groups opposed to the Assad regime and its allies.[21] The U.S. considers ISIS to be the main threat in Syria instead of Assad, leading Washington to back the YPG rather than the FSA.[22] Turkey has previously warned the U.S. of the dangers of arming the YPG to fight ISIS. However, the U.S. has sought to differentiate between the Kurds it supports in Manbij and those who fought against Turkey in Afrin, whom it does not support – a distinction that YPG fighters themselves do not recognize.[23] Thus far, the American promises of refusing support for YPG forces west of the Euphrates river, and the retraction of American weapons from the YPG after the defeat of ISIS, have not yet been actualized.[24] This continued U.S.-YPG relationship has Ankara worried that U.S. weapons will end up in the hands of the PKK. Assad’s Involvement On February 20, 2018, pro-Syrian government forces entered Afrin in northern Syria, joining the YPG in their fight against Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch.[25] In July of 2012, Syrian government forces had withdrawn from northern Syria in response to anti-Assad uprisings elsewhere in the country, leaving a vacuum for the YPG to occupy. The oscillating relationship between the YPG and Syrian government forces is best represented by the transition from direct hostile engagement in February of 2013 to joint cooperation against Syrian rebels in February of 2016, with both events occurring in the Syrian city of Aleppo.[26] Despite representing seemingly opposing political systems, Syrian government forces and the YPG have created a realpolitik alliance to contest common enemies such as ISIS, Turkey, and the FSA. However, in the case of Afrin, this partnership was unable to prevent Turkish forces and the FSA from taking the district. Overall, this alliance appears unstable, as Assad has vowed to take back all YPG-held territory and has described Kurdish governing bodies as temporary structures.[27] Assad and his Syrian government forces have been supported throughout the conflict by their long-standing allies Russia and Iran, who have much to gain from Assad remaining in power. Russia has blocked UN Security Council resolutions critical of President Assad with the goal of maintaining its oldest ally in the region as well as its naval facility in Tartus and air base in Latakia.[28] The consensus in Washington is that Russia also seeks to drive a wedge in NATO between the U.S. and Turkey. Furthermore, Iran is providing Assad with military advisers, weapons, and oil transfers in order to maintain Syria as a corridor through which to transit Iranian weapons to Shia militias like Hezbollah in Lebanon.[29] Brief Contextual Overview On January 20, 2018, Turkish forces supported by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) launched Operation Olive Branch, a military campaign against the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria’s Afrin region.[1] This conflict has set up a potential collision course between two NATO allies, the U.S. and Turkey. With the fall of Afrin, Turkey threatens to continue this operation eastward to Manbij, where the YPG are directly supported by U.S. troops.[2] Since October of 2015, the U.S. has allied itself in Syria with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), believing this YGP-led force to be the best chance of removing ISIS from Syria.[3] The decision by the U.S. to train and equip the SDF has seriously strained relations with Turkey, a critical ally in the region, given that the YPG forces within the SDF have strong links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[4] The PKK is identified as a terrorist organization by both the U.S. and Turkey.[5] As such, the U.S. is work- ing directly with what Turkey views as a terrorist group, a viewpoint that the U.S.