Social Education 73(7), pp 321–324 ©2009 National Council for the Social Studies Looking at the Law Mexico: Democracy and the Future Kathleen Bruhn exico has been moving slowly toward full democratic development. In this article, reprinted from the ABA’s magazine for secondary teachers, Insights on Law & Society, Spring 2009, political scientist Kathleen Bruhn analyzes the transi- Mtion from historic one-party rule in Mexico to the current day, where three political parties—spanning the ideological spectrum—vie for the presidency and seats in the congress. During most of the twentieth century, Mexico was governed by one of the A protester throws a bag of red paint towards police during a march against President Felipe Calderón in Mexico City, December 1, 2006. Calderón took power that day as longest-ruling authoritarian parties in Mexico’s president despite claims from the left that he stole July’s election. the contemporary world. Even as most REUTERS/Daniel Aguilar (MEXICO) Latin American countries democra- tized in the 1980s, Mexico remained under the control of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI. It was not until the 2000 presidential election that a two-party system emerged, culminating in the victory of conservative National Action Party (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox, followed in 2006 by the election of Felipe Calderón, also of the PAN. Today, Mexico is a democracy. Yet many of the legacies of its authoritarian government remain, making Mexican democracy both less complete and less stable than established democracies. In this article, I examine the transformation of Mexican politics, the characteristics of the politi- cal system, and some challenges that democracy faces. The PRI System The PRI regime traces its roots to the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917). The revolution began when wealthy north- erner Francisco Madero called for a popular uprising against President had been executed or assassinated. In Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) proposed Porfirio Díaz, who had governed Mexico 1929, President Plutarco Elias Calles to demobilize them by distributing land for over 30 years. Madero only meant called for a different way to transfer and bringing the peasants into the ruling to call for elections, but he got a social power. His solution was a ruling party party. In the system he devised, known revolution, mobilizing peasants around that would share power among the revolu- as corporatism, affiliated organizations demands for land. tionary factions. This party would avoid got state support, monopolies, benefits, During the next seven years, a vicious destructive rivalries by dispensing with and representation in congress. In return, power struggle pitted members of the competitive elections. they gave the PRI electoral support and “revolutionary family” against each other. The revolution also left behind a politi- accepted government-controlled selec- By 1929, most of the revolution’s leaders cally mobilized peasantry. President tion of their leadership. In time, these November / December 2009 321 leaders became more loyal to the presi- the size of the working class grew, so Rising Levels of Education and dent than to their own members. did the costs of subsidizing them. The Wealth Finally, the ruling party devised an industries remained inefficient, which By the 1980s, Mexican sociey had electoral system that permitted other constrained their ability to export prod- changed dramatically from 1929. A parties to compete but gave the PRI the ucts. When they reached the limits of mostly poor, agricultural, illiterate soci- power to determine the results. Allowing domestic demand, the economy began ety became an urban, industrial, and opposition parties—and beating them by to slow. Public and private debt began increasingly educated society. The first 80 to 90 percent—gave the PRI a façade to expand dramatically. signs of this shift emerged in 1968, when of democratic legitimacy without endan- The crash came in 1982, when a col- a powerful student movement led by high gering its control. Opposition parties lapse in world oil prices triggered a major school and university students demanded were given just enough representation debt crisis for oil-exporting Mexico. The more political freedom. Although this to keep them playing the game. government declared imminent default movement was crushed by the Mexican For 60 years, this system operated on its debt and asked for emergency military, it was instructive that pressure effectively. The PRI never lost a gover- loans from the International Monetary for democracy began among the most norship or a senate race and never won Fund (IMF). Mexico had to accept dras- educated segment of society. less than two-thirds of the Mexican tic conditions, including budget cuts, Democratic theory tells us that societies Congress. Because he also controlled higher interest rates, and caps on wages, with wealthy, educated populations are who could become PRI candidates, which triggered a severe recession. more likely to support stable democracy. the president of Mexico had extraor- This crisis had two major effects on Democracy requires a people capable dinary power. A docile congress would the PRI. First, it no longer had enough of reading and interpreting information pass whatever legislation he proposed. resources to pay off supporters. Without about candidates and policies. Moreover, Governors resigned if he asked. His a steady stream of rewards, the politi- educated people commonly feel that they only limitation was that he could serve cal coalition began to unravel. Labor have the capacity and the right to make a single six-year term—no re-election. unions and peasant organizations did such choices. Finally, as incomes rise, To ensure that the transition would not not challenge the PRI; indeed, these people have more time and energy to unleash dangerous competition, he had groups often cooperated with draconian devote to political activity. the power to name his own successor. policies to freeze wages because their This also protected his position after leadership had long ago been captured The Growth of Civil Society he left office. by the PRI and maintained in power In fact, political activity did increase. By through undemocratic internal practices. the 1990s, a growing number and variety Democratization Nevertheless, workers and peasants of popular organizations operated inde- The PRI system always had critics, but increasingly failed to obey labor leader pendently of the PRI. Cities grew so rap- until the 1980s, these challenges had demands that they continue their tra- idly during Mexico’s development that limited effects. What changed? Three ditional electoral support for the PRI. there were enormous backlogs in public factors stand out: Business also began to back opposition services. Shantytowns created from sal- parties, particularly the PAN, after vaged materials sprang up on marginal The Economic Crisis of the 1980s President José López Portillo’s national- land. They lacked electricity, plumbing, From the 1930s to the 1980s, Mexico ization of the banks in 1982 convinced or clean running water. Neighborhoods adopted a development policy that them that they could not trust the PRI to organized to pressure the government for relied heavily on state intervention in protect their property. Finally, Mexico’s these services. Feminist organizations, the economy. Mexican businesses were shift to a free-market model meant that environmental organizations, and human privately owned but worked in partner- state protection was no longer available, rights organizations were also created by ship with the state, receiving subsidies of further reducing incentives to support middle-class residents. key inputs like electricity and enjoying the government. In 1988, many of these organiza- protection from foreign competition. Second, the PRI’s popularity dete- tions came together in support of the The state also provided benefits to work- riorated. A decade of high inflation and presidential candidacy of Cuauhtémoc ers, including health care. The economy stagnant economic growth wiped out the Cárdenas, a PRI insider and only son of grew rapidly, which satisfied most other gains of two decades of development. President Lázaro Cárdenas. He broke sectors of the economy. As a result, the Poverty increased; middle-class pro- with the PRI over market reforms and PRI enjoyed ample popular support. fessionals and workers lost their jobs, the party’s refusal to allow him to com- There were, however, problems. As and everyone blamed the PRI. pete for its presidential candidacy. His the number of protected industries and campaign relied heavily on networks of Social Education 322 popular organizations. In the end, the change the institutional framework of countries with pure proportional PRI resorted to massive electoral fraud to of Mexican politics. The Mexican representation. There are three major deny him victory, leaving another major Constitution is loosely modeled on the parties that together win over 90 percent stain on its legitimacy. U.S. Constitution. It is a presidential of the seats. The parties are relatively The 1988 campaign also marked the system, with a Senate and a Chamber stable, disciplined, and ideologically foundation of Mexico’s main left party, of Deputies, and an independent judi- distinct from one another—the PRD the Party of the Democratic Revolution, cial branch. Formally, it is a federal on the left, the PAN on the right, and or PRD. Over the next 12 years, the PRD system, which means that state and the PRI in the center. Despite its recent worked tirelessly for electoral reform national governments share power and setbacks, the PRI continues to operate and democratic change. Although the are separately elected. It has 31 states in all Mexican states and in fact governs PRD did not benefit directly (the con- and a Federal District (Mexico City). more states than any other party. It often servative PAN won the 2000 presidential The Mexican president is only slightly acts as a partner to the PAN in passing election that ended the PRI’s rule), its more powerful vis-à-vis the legislature legislation but sometimes takes the side contributions to Mexico’s democratic than the U.S.