Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2008 Toward an effective and humane counterinsurgency Adam Patrick Shilling Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Human Resources Management Commons Recommended Citation Shilling, Adam Patrick, "Toward an effective and humane counterinsurgency" (2008). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1049. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1049 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE AND HUMANE COUNTERINSURGENCY A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In The School of Human Resource Education and Workforce Development by Adam Patrick Shilling BSFS Georgetown University, 1989 MS Louisiana State University, 1996 MS Louisiana State University, 2001 December 2008 ©Copyright 2008 Adam P. Shilling All Rights Reserved ii Acknowledgements Writing a dissertation is challenging and sometimes difficult process. It helps to have a group of guides seeing one through the rough spots. My committee members served as guides for me. Dr. Krisanna Machtmes assumed leadership of the committee once it became apparent that a qualitative method was necessary to cope with the data that was available. She shared her expertise willingly and efficiently, always providing the right advice, in a timely manner, and without a great deal of preamble. I always appreciated her professionalism. Dr. Michael Burnett, who is the best living exemplar of a servant leader it has been my privilege to know, provided guidance and wisdom, always in a gentle, but no-nonsense fashion. Dr. Satish Verma, a consummate gentleman and scholar, listened quietly and spoke quietly, but it always benefitted me to listen. Dr. Curtis Friedel came along when I needed him and gave me the boost I needed to get over the last hurdle. I also want to thank Mr. Stephen Henthorne, who has been a mentor to me for several years, and who has helped me develop a humane view of the subject matter. He has never counted the cost to assist a friend, and I am better for knowing him. Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the contributions of key family members: My mother, Janis, who helped out with proofreading and table formatting; My father, Charles, who provided quiet support when I was frustrated; my son, Caleb, who picked up slack around the house so that I could focus; and my librarian friend, Sarah, who found articles for me, including some I did not have access to, but which were critical. Everyone was unstintingly supportive, and I could not have finished without them. iii Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………. iii ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………. vi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND JUSTIFICATION …………………............ 1 What Is Nation-building? ………………………………………… 1 Where Are We Going? ……………………………………………. 3 Why Nation-build? ……………………………………………… 4 How Prevalent Is Nation-building? ……………………………... 6 What Are the Military’s Roles in Nation-building? …………….. 7 How Is Counterinsurgency Related to Nation-building? ……….. 9 What Is Counterinsurgency? ……………………………………... 10 Why Do Americans Do Nation-building and Counterinsurgency So Badly? …………..…………… 11 Is There Hope? ……………………………………..…………….. 15 Why Is This Study Significant? ………………….………………. 16 What Are the Research Questions? ……………………………… 17 What Are the Research Objectives ………………………………. 17 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ………………………………………… 20 Diversity of Literature ……………………………………………. 20 The Knowledge Gap and the Evolution of American Military Thought …………………………… 23 The American Way of War ………………………………………. 29 Evolution of a Theory ……………………………………………. 34 Small Warriors, Partisans, and Revolutionaries …………. 34 Imperial Wars: Callwell ………………………………….. 36 Class Struggle: Lenin ……………………………………. 43 A Sense of Self: Lawrence and the Arab Revolt ………… 44 Advent of People’s War: Mao Zedong …………………... 48 Tying the Loose Ends: Galula …………………………… 55 State of the Art: Guidance from Multinational Corps- Iraq (MNC-I) ..……..……... 67 Challenge of the 21st Century ……………………………………. 69 Know the Enemy, Understand the Social Environment …. 69 Urbanization …………………………………………….... 73 Global Insurgency, Most Serious Threat …………………. 75 Current Debates and Contemporary Practice …………….. 79 Some Tentative Syntheses ………………………………………... 82 iv 3. METHODOLOGY …………………………………………………… 84 Introduction ………………………………………………………. 84 Meta-Synthesis ………………………………………………….... 86 Problems with Meta-Synthesis …………………………………… 87 Overview of Method …………………………………………...… 88 Reliability and Validity ………………………………………...… 89 Preliminary Research and Researcher Perspective …………..….. 91 Instrument Development …………………………………..…….. 93 Population ……………………………………………………….. 95 Sample …………………………………………………………… 97 Data Management ………………………………………………... 101 4. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ……………………………………….. 102 Stage 1: A Firm Foundation …………………………………….. 102 General Findings…………………………………………. 105 Examination of the Results by Principle ………………… 111 Stage 2: Update for the 21st Century: Understanding the Environment ………………………………………… 164 Changes in the Contemporary Environment ……………... 164 Changes in the Nature of Insurgency ……………………. 166 Implications of the Contemporary Environment for the Classical Principles ……………………… 170 A New Theoretical Insight? …………………………….. 179 Stage 3: Testing the Model Against Contemporary Experience… 187 5. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH …………………………………. 203 Summary ………………………………………………………… 203 Recommendations for Further Research ..……………………….. 205 REFERENCES..…………………………………………………………….……. 207 APPENDIX: CODING SHEET..………………………………………………… 217 VITA..……………………………………………………………………………. 218 v Abstract Preliminary research isolated a set of thirteen candidate principles that military officers need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency. A meta-synthesis of eight classical theorists of counterinsurgency sought support for and consensus on these principles and discovered considerable consensus on all of them. Therefore, this set could be considered a “classical” model of counterinsurgency for use in counterinsurgency campaign planning. The contemporary global political environment is very different from that the classical theorists faced. Therefore, additional research attempted to understand the changes in the environment and in the nature of insurgency to determine the changes necessary to update the classical model. The most important changes in the environment included the end of the Cold War and of superpower rivalry, the increase in the number and influence of important non-state actors, urbanization, and globalization of media and communications technologies. Corresponding changes in the nature of insurgency included the changed objectives of insurgent groups; the globalization of local national struggles; the formation of global terrorist groups that can be perceived as insurgencies; the advent of networked, rather than hierarchical, insurgent organizations; and increased emphasis on the use of media to generate support for insurgent causes and to spread fear. Nevertheless, analysis found the classical principles to be remarkably durable. While the tactics and techniques needed to put each principle into action might be very different from those of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles remain valid, and are still useful for campaign planning. vi Chapter 1 Introduction and Justification Nation-building is an activity that has been in the American news often since the intervention in Somalia in 1992, and it has engendered a good deal of debate over the appropriateness of U.S. involvement in nation-building efforts and over what means should be employed. Much debate centers on the commitment of military resources to the often-difficult and dangerous situations where opportunities for nation-building are found. Conspicuous failures, such as the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, depicted in the book, Blackhawk Down (Bowden, 1999), and the 2001 movie of the same name, have convinced many Americans that we should not intervene in failed states because the prospects for success are too small or because these activities are inappropriate uses of military capability (Von Hippel, 2000). On the other hand, many persons and organizations have criticized the U.S. for failure to intervene in Rwanda and for permitting the genocide there to continue (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2000). Bonner (1994) reports praise for French military peacekeepers that did intervene there. What Is Nation-building? Before beginning a lengthy discussion of nation-building, it is appropriate to seek a consensus on a definition of the term as it is used in professional and scholarly literature. Some have objected to the term, “nation-building” because it improperly uses the term “nation”— which refers to people and culture—when it really means “state”—the capacity of the government to govern. Fukuyama (2004a) put it this way: “What we are really talking about is state-building—that is, creating or strengthening such government institutions