Capitalism and Slavery and the Civil War James Oakes The Graduate Center, City University of New York Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. 561 pp. $35.00. Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 2014. 528 pp. $35.00. Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 640 pp. $35.00. Calvin Schermerhorn, The Business of Slavery and the Rise of American Capitalism, 1815–1860. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. 352 pp. $65.00. They push in different directions, these two great debates. The first, on the rela- tionship between capitalism and slavery, invites us to consider how closely the two systems were connected, to the point where more and more scholars argue that slavery itself was a form of capitalism. The second, on the origins of the American Civil War, highlights the fundamental difference and growing divergence between the free labor system of the North and the slave society of the South, to the point where some scholars see an irreconcilable con- flict between the two. Can these competing tendencies be reconciled? Is it pos- sible to define southern slavery as essentially “capitalist” without losing sight of the crucial distinctions between free and enslaved labor? A number of recent books suggest that scholars have begun to recognize the problem but have not quite figured out how to solve it. There are actually two distinct debates about capitalism and slavery, one over whether the slave trade and the profits of plantation slavery played a sig- nificant role in the Industrial Revolution, and the other about whether planta- tion slavery itself was or was not capitalist. Most scholars agree that slavery played at least some role in spurring the Industrial Revolution, especially in Great Britain, particularly in the critical early decades of its development. The slave trade was a massive, highly sophis- ticated commercial enterprise that required, among other things, a secure finan- cial system that could extend credit and insurance to shippers and a physical infrastructure of docks, port facilities, a shipbuilding industry, and a transporta- tion network within Britain—all of which contributed to the Industrial Revolution. Nor is there much dispute that at crucial points in their early devel- opment the textile factories of England benefitted both directly and indirectly International Labor and Working-Class History No. 89, Spring 2016, pp. 195–220 # International Labor and Working-Class History, Inc., 2016 doi:10.1017/S0147547915000393 196 ILWCH, 89, Spring 2016 from the growth of slavery and the slave trade. “Slavery did not cause the Industrial Revolution,” Barbara Solow has explained, “but played an active role in its pattern and timing.” That much is clear.1 It is far less clear how much slavery contributed to industrialization and whether the contribution was indispensable. The Industrial Revolution had many causes, and it is no easy thing to parse out slavery’s specific contribution. Slavery alone was apparently not enough to cause an industrial revolution, for some of the European nations most deeply involved in slavery and the slave trade—notably Spain and Portugal—were conspicuously slow to industrialize. Viewed from a global perspective, slavery likewise appears as one of a number of factors explaining Europe’s “divergence” from other highly commer- cialized societies—China and India, in particular—in the early modern world. In his influential comparison of England and the Yangzi delta region of China, Kenneth Pomeranz isolates two critical English advantages—coal and colonies (in particular slave colonies)—to explain its ability to finally outpace China’s economic performance, though not until the late eighteenth and early nine- teenth centuries. Prasannan Parthasarathi, in a comparable study of Europe and India, questions the significance of coal for the industrialization of English textile production and instead emphasizes the mercantilist policies that sheltered English cotton manufacturers from competition with the superior printed cotton cloths produced in India.2 This shift from an “Atlantic” to a global perspective entails a corresponding shift away from the traditional focus on sugar plantations to the role of cotton in the development of capitalism, and this in turn raises new questions about the relationship between capitalism and slavery. But the global perspective has not resolved the older question of whether slavery was a necessary (if insufficient) cause of the Industrial Revolution, or whether it was necessary at all. Would Great Britain have indus- trialized without slavery, though perhaps at a slower pace of in a different way? On this there is still no agreement.3 Even if everyone did agree that slavery and the slave trade were indispens- able to the Industrial Revolution that would not resolve the question of whether slavery itself was “capitalist.” After all, human beings have enslaved one another in societies across the globe and spanning the millennia, yet we can hardly label all of those societies “capitalist.” But just as surely, something changed in the early modern era when Europeans carried millions of African slaves across the Atlantic and built their plantations in the New World. Not for nothing have various scholars discerned a new “capitalist” form of slavery in the Americas, a form in which slave labor was rationally organized on a large scale for the systematic production of commodities bound for an increas- ingly global market. Despite the fact that slave-based sugar plantations originat- ed in the eastern Mediterranean and spread westward to various Atlantic islands off the African coast, a strong case can be made that new world planta- tions involved a historically novel, if not categorically distinct, form of slavery. The question here is whether calling this new form of slavery “capitalist” risks Capitalism and Slavery and the Civil War 197 obscuring the fundamental differences between economies based on enslaved rather than free labor. When Eric Williams opened the modern debate he more or less equated capitalism with the Industrial Revolution. By that standard it would be hard to call slavery “capitalist,” because slave-based plantation economies throw down major obstacles to industrialization. A master could certainly put a slave to work in a factory, but plantation slavery was—almost by definition—in- compatible with urban and industrial development. So we are back to the orig- inal question: Is there some other way of examining the connection between capitalism and slavery while maintaining the distinction between the two? Here the so-called “transition” debates remain a useful starting point. At almost the same time Williams published his groundbreaking study of Capitalism and Slavery, Maurice Dobb published his influential Studies in the Development of Capitalism. In the exchanges prompted by Dobb’s book, as well as a subsequent debate spurred by Robert Brenner, a significant number of scholars agreed that the transition from feudalism to capitalism happened first in the countryside. An “agricultural revolution” created a new form of society based on free labor. Liberated from feudal restraints—or perhaps we should say, stripped of feudal protections—farmers began responding to unprec- edented pressures to increase their productivity and then selling their growing surpluses to an exploding population of wage laborers in nearby cities.4 These new workers were not only producers. “As the peasants became landless,” R. H. Hilton explained, “they not only became labourers. They became consumers.”5 The agricultural revolution thus cleared the path for a “consumer revolution,” rendering England unusually receptive to the cheap, newly available commodities—coffee, tea, cocoa, and, above all, sugar—pro- duced by slaves on New World plantations. But, as Jan De Vries noted, the stim- ulus worked only “where the domestic economy was responsive to the new opportunities thus created.”6 In this scenario, the capitalist transformation pre- ceded—and was the necessary precondition for—both slavery in the New World and the Industrial Revolution in England.7 Eric Hobsbawm was one of the first scholars to highlight the problems raised by the simultaneous development of slavery and free labor in the early modern world. It was one thing to trace the “progressive replacement of feudal- ism by capitalism” within Western Europe, Hobsbawm argued, but the effects of the transition were very different outside capitalist development’s ‘heartland’: In fact, large parts of the Americas were turned into slave economies to serve the needs of European capitalism, and large parts of Africa were pushed back eco- nomically through the slave-trade; large areas of eastern Europe were turned into neo-feudal economies for similar reasons …. The net effect of the rise of European capitalism was therefore to intensify uneven development, and to divide the world ever more sharply into two sectors; the ‘developed’ and the ‘under-developed’ countries, in other words the exploiting and the exploited. 198 ILWCH, 89, Spring 2016 The triumph of capitalism at the end of the 18th century put the seal on this development.8 Where Williams made capitalist development dependent on slavery, Hobsbawm reversed the power relationship and argued that slave plantations came into ex- istence “to serve the needs” of capitalism. This is especially clear in the case of cotton. For at least a century before the Industrial Revolution, Indian peasants, laborers, and weavers dominated the extensive global market in cotton. In an effort to compete with the highly desirable Indian printed cloth, English manu- facturers began mechanizing cotton spinning and weaving decades before the first southern slaves produced their first cotton bolls. On the face of it, it looks as though southern cotton plantations arose in response to the Industrial Revolution, not the other way around. Furthermore, the market the British were trying to capture was largely domestic, meaning that a robust consumer base already existed in England.