Pierre Broue. The German Revolution, 1917-1923. Leiden: Brill, 2005. xxvii + 991 pp. $169.00, cloth, ISBN 978-90-04-13940-4. Reviewed by Jennifer Benner Published on H-German (October, 2005) Originally published as La revolution en Alle‐ detailed accounts of worker and popular actions, magne, 1917-1923 in 1971, this volume does bear internal and intra-party politics (both internation‐ some marks of its age. As Eric D. Weitz points out al and local), and disputes, many highly personal, in his cogent introduction, Broue treats the work‐ over theoretical and practical matters at all levels. ing and capitalist classes in the singular and virtu‐ Party factions, splits, and re-alliances (which only ally ignores women's activism, both approaches multiplied in the period under study), along with challenged in more recent historiography (pp. xiv, shifts in policy and tactics are thoroughly record‐ xv). However, The German Revolution remains a ed and analyzed by Broue. His descriptions of the remarkable account of these tumultuous years most intense revolutionary agitation in Germany both in the context of German history and in the and of the pivotal decisions made in international history of international communism. Broue's par‐ and private conferences often include develop‐ ticular strength is in restoring a sense of contin‐ ments by the hour. Broue devotes considerable at‐ gency to this historical moment, when Germany tention to relevant events in Germany, such as the was regarded as the center of the international sailors' mutinies of 1917 and the Kapp Putsch of communist movement and believed to be on the 1920, as well as abroad, like the 1921 split in Ital‐ verge of following the path of the 1917 Russian ian Socialism. Revolution. Broue begins by outlining the nineteenth-cen‐ To call The German Revolution a history of tury origins of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) the early German Communist Party (KPD) does in Germany. He then quickly moves onto the "Cri‐ not convey the scope of Broue's study adequately. sis of Social Democracy" during World War I, Broue assumes a solid knowledge of German his‐ which culminated in the frst split of German So‐ tory and familiarity with the history of interna‐ cial Democracy--the founding of the Independent tional communism, and such knowledge is essen‐ Social Democratic Party (USPD) in April, 1917. The tial for reading his work. The book offers densely split was precipitated by the decision of the SPD to H-Net Reviews support the German war effort by voting for war without adequate reflection by Liebknecht and credits. Yet even before 1917, the major fault line the majority of the revolutionary delegates" (p. of organized socialism in Germany was already 255). Yet while these problems persisted, exacer‐ visible in the struggle over that old question: "Re‐ bated by the presence of hard to control ultra-left form or Revolution?" The SPD had long since cho‐ elements, those within and outside of Germany sen the former (p. 19). As is clear throughout the continued to see the nation as ripe for revolution. book, Broue believes the SPD never had the ability In 1920, the KPD absorbed much of the left-wing or desire to lead a true socialist revolution. Indeed USPD membership, creating the VKPD (United Broue credits the SPD's commitment to the bour‐ Communist Party), and bringing total member‐ geois Weimar Republic, along with the strength of ship to half a million (p. 502). Despite the setbacks the German bourgeoisie, as two of the greatest ob‐ of the previous year, in 1920 German communists stacles to revolution, making the German situa‐ were optimistic, for, as Broue writes: "for the frst tion qualitatively different than the Russian one time since the Communist International was (p. 168). founded, a mass Communist Party existed in one The history of the brief "German Republic" of the most advanced countries of Europe, Ger‐ under Friedrich Ebert and the announcement of many, the country which revolutionaries always the "German Socialist Republic" by Karl regarded as the pivotal point of the world revolu‐ Liebknecht, culminating in the foundation of the tion" (p. 449). German Communist Party (KPD) and the murders Yet the projected revolutionary actions would of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg by Freikorps be frustrated repeatedly: in 1921 and again in on January 15, 1919 (p. 257) is well known. The 1923. The so-called "March Action" of 1921, in‐ new party faced many difficulties. Determining spired by Bela Kun, ended in defeat for the strik‐ the role of the KPD in German parliamentary gov‐ ing workers and the KPD, leading to the loss of ernment and its relationship to the Communist In‐ 200,000 members after striking miners were in‐ ternational (Comintern) were complicated and volved in violent altercations with police and the contentious issues. However, as Broue argues, the party leadership rescinded its March 24th call for KPD's biggest problem was its failure to win a crit‐ a general strike. In the wake of the March Action, ical mass of workers away from the SPD. The lack the Third Comintern Conference convened early, of committed workers spelled failure for the Ger‐ in May, 1921, remaining hopeful that revolution man Communists' attempt to force a "second revo‐ would triumph both within the workers' move‐ lution" in the weeks before the murders (pp. ment and in the German setting. Broue points out 224-225). According to Broue, Berlin workers were the difficulties in Germany however, where "the simply not ready "to engage in armed struggle" or simultaneous existence of two workers' parties, to participate in the "civil war" breaking out be‐ one reformist [SPD] and the other revolutionary tween the USPD and the KPD, "both of which [KPD] ... contributed to the prostration of the equally claimed to be socialist" (pp. 246, 248). In masses, and to the frustration of their strong de‐ addition to these unfavorable circumstances, sire for unity" (p. 560). In Fall, 1923, it appeared as Broue attributes this early failure to indecisive if the KPD, SPD left, and the trade unions might f‐ leadership and poor planning: "The leadership of nally produce the "united front" that would guar‐ the Communist Party had not been able to pre‐ antee the success of socialist revolution. vent the crushing of the movement which it had In one of the most detailed sections of the helped to unleash, and which it had done nothing work, Broue points to "an unprecedented pre-rev‐ to prevent or to check. ... it was to pay dearly for olutionary situation" (p. 709) before the "German the ultra-left action which had been undertaken 2 H-Net Reviews October" of 1923. The crisis in the Ruhr after the cession, marked the end of a period in its history. French occupation of 1922 had "declassed" the From now on, the policies of the KPD were to be country, with inflation and unemployment level‐ written almost entirely in Moscow, and in Rus‐ ing differences (p. 713). The German govern‐ sian" (p. 816). After 1923 the KPD became "a party ment's policy of "passive resistance" failed, send‐ of a new type, which was soon to be known as ing inflation out of control. When Chancellor Wil‐ Stalinist" (p. 835). helm Cuno's government fell on August 11, Broue In 1971, Broue was consciously writing writes, Communist leaders saw "the sign that the against the official histories of the Communist situation was riper than they had believed. The parties, especially the SED of the GDR. To this end bourgeoisie rushed to conclude a compromise he includes chapters reassessing the contributions which would free their hands on the international of Paul Levi and Karl Radek, who were written level for disposing of the threat of revolution" (p. out of official histories. Since 1923, the lost revolu‐ 753). When, in September, Communists joined the tion had warranted little discussion, though Broue SPD-led governments of Saxony and Thuringia (p. contends this discussion was badly needed if any‐ 794), the military responded by proclaiming a thing was to be learned from the failure (p. 899). state of siege in Saxony (p. 798). Communists be‐ Yet, as Broue points out, "[i]t would have been im‐ lieved that the threat of military action against prudent to recall that the Communist Internation‐ the SPD government in Saxony would mobilize al in Lenin's time had the world revolution as its workers throughout Germany, and calls for a gen‐ aim, not the construction of socialism in a single eral strike were issued by a workers' group at the country," and that the Bolsheviks, in attempting to suggestion of KPD chairman Heinrich Brandler. create a Germany party after their own image, Even the left Social Democrats ultimately refused had ignored the tradition of German proletarian to support the strike, however, and held out for "a democracy (p. 842). Further, Broue argues that deal with the Reich government to protect Sax‐ Western historians have essentially accepted the ony" (p. 807). The planned insurrection was in se‐ history sanctioned by Walter Ulbricht (p. 848). rious trouble, and, as Broue writes, "[i]t had to be The chapter "History and Politics" is one of recognized that Zeigner's government, despite the the book's best, perhaps because Broue is so up‐ presence of three Communist ministers, had done front about his own commitments and reasons for nothing to arm the workers" (p. 809). The Saxon writing. In his task of rescuing the history of the ministers were forcibly expelled, and a general German Revolution from its dismissal as a pseu‐ strike announced by the confederation of trade do-socialist revolution, Broue is especially con‐ unions "lost its momentum in 24 hours, and had cerned to situate it within the context of the petered out by the end of the third day" (p.