BICAMERALISM Factors in the Evolution of Second Chambers in Four Federations GERARD WLBUR HORGAN A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies in confonnity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Queen's University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September, 3000 copyright O Gerard Wi lbur Horgan, 2000 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bi bliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. me Weilhgîm Onawa ON KIA ON4 OaawaON K1A (N4 Canada CaMda The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aiiowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT Bicameralism is a ubiquitous feature of both unitary States and the central govemments of federations. First chambers are normal 1y consti tuted on principles of rnajon tarian democracy; second chambers are usually constituted on some variant of a non- majoritarian principle. In federal systems, the non-majoritarïan principle is customarily related to the role of the second charnber in representing temtorially-based constituent units in the fedenl legislative institutions. Even arnong federal systems, however. there exists a wide variation in the degree to which non-majoritarianism is reflected in the make-up of, and roles played by, second chambers. Second charnbers fulfill a number of roles in the four federal systems studied: the United States, Canada, Australia. and Germany. Of particular importance are: legislative review; representation of group interests. especially regional groups; and intergovemmental coordination. Both non- territorial and territorial non-majoritarianism were incorporated in the initial design of t hese second chambers. However, differences in the contemporary poli tical circumstances produced variations in the degree to which non-majoritarian roles were institutionalised. Three categories of factors are identified as having been important in the specific design of each of these second chambers. These include: path dependency, historical learning, and external influences. Three institutional factors are identified as having been important in the development of these second chambers. These include: the method of selection of the members of the second chamber, the form of the executive, and the division of powers. Three general categories of social factors are identified to have affected the development of these second chambers. These include structural, demographic, and ideological factors. Al1 four second chambers continue to insert some Ievel of non-territorial non-majoritarianism into their govemmental systems via their legislative review role. The scope of these chambers' ability to continue to act as the institutional instantiation of territorial non-majontarianism is closely related to their method of selection. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As a mature student, one finds that any comprehensive list of those to whom one is intellectually, spintualty, or emotionally indebted would be as long as the thesis itself. Therefore, one must of course attempt to restrict oneself to naming only those who have had a direct impact on the current project; this still leaves a list a few pages long! So, one selects a manageable few, and expresses regrets and general thanks to the many. In this case the few are: Professor Emeritus Ronald L. Watts; Professor Peter M. Leslie; Associate Professor Margaret J. Little; my office-mates, Jane Nicholas, Drew Green, and KelIie Templeton: my mother, B.J. Horgan: and my wife, Marlene, whose love makes anything seem possible. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 The Senate of the United States .................... .. ...................................... 25 The Canadian Senate ..................................................................................... 51 The Australian Senate ................................................................................... 81 The Geman Bundesrat .................................................................................. Ill Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 139 Bibliography .................................................................................................. 156 CHAPTER ONlZ INTRODUCTION rNTRODUCTION We are living in a period of institutional ferment associated with major shifts in power relationships around the globe- Among the notable features of institutional change is a pronounced devolution or decentralisation within state structures, accompanied by the redesign of the upper houses of bicameral legislatures. Examples abound. The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 left a number of countnes, including Russia itself, searching for the appropriate institutional structure to support their chanpd political circumstances; the design of the second chamber of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, remains a rnatter of dispute today. In South Afnca, the end of apartheid led to a re-design of governrnental institutions in the 1990s. including re-introduction of a second chamber as part of a move to a quasi-federal political system: a National Council of the Provinces was established in 1997. In 1993 Belgium took another step in its constitutional evolution when, having already undergone several phases of evolution within a formally unitary structure, it declared itseIf a federation: as part of this stage of change, the Belgian Senate was modified to make it a more 'federal' institution. In the United Kingdom, under the Blair government, an open- ended program of 'rolling devotution' has been initiated, and in February, 2000, a Royal Commission recommended that, as part of the ongoing process of reform of the House of Lords, sorne of the members of the Lords should be directly elected regional representatives. Events such as these make it important that we understand the range of factors affecting the design and evoiution of second chambers, and thus their rofe in oovernmental systems. Such an understanding can only be gained via comparisons. I However, none of the extant recent literature on second chambers focuses specifically on 1 the factors affecting institutional design and evolution from a comparative perspective. This study will attempt to begin to address this deficiency by investigating the causes of institutional evolution of second charnbers in regard to their role as the institutional expressions of territonal non-majoritarianism in federal systems. CONTEXT Bicarneralism is a ubiquitous feature of both unitary states and the central governments of federations. In both types of system, the second chamber is commonly used to cornplement the first chamber. First chambers are normalty constituted on principles of majoritarian democracy; second chambers are usually constituted on some variant of a non-majoritarian principle. In federal systems. the non-majoritarian principle is customarily related to the role of the second chamber in representing tenitonally-based constituent units in the federal legislative institutions. Even among federal systerns, however, there exists 2 wide variation in the degree to which non-majoritarianism is reflected in the make-up of, and roles played by, second chambers. In federal systems, the majoritarian principle would in essence prescribe that the federation-wide majority should rule. Regional minorities, whether in the form of Iess- populous constituent units, or minority ethnocultural groups, would be subject to the will of the national majority. In federations, this principle is embodied in first chambers, in which the primary unit to be represented is the individuül, and representation is proportional to population. The non-majoritarian principle has at its base the idea that individuals are not interchangeable, that a critical part of individual identity is group membership. This principle therefore prescribes that minonty groups should have some mechanism with which to prevent their interests from king ovemdden by a federation-wide majority. In federations, territorial groups are privi ieged; that is, it is regional i y concentrated minorities whose interests are usually defended via distinctive representation in the second chamber of the central legislature. In some federations it is the interests of less- 2 populous constituent units that are at issue; in others it is the interests of regionally concentrated minority ethnocultural groups; in still others, it is both. Lijphart has used the majoritarian versus non-majoritarian distinction to differentiate two models of democracy: the majoritarian, or Westminster, model; and the non-majoritarian. or consensual, model.' One of the dimensions which distinguishes the two models