Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 19 | Number 3 Article 12 1992 A Case Study In Fiscal Federalism: New York City And New York State Carol O'Cleireacain New York City Department of Finance Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Carol O'Cleireacain, A Case Study In Fiscal Federalism: New York City And New York State, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 727 (1992). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol19/iss3/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A CASE STUDY IN FISCAL FEDERALISM: NEW YORK CITY AND NEW YORK STATE Carol O'Cldireadin* Introduction America's cities are in trouble. It is hard to find any that have not raised taxes and cut spending in order to balance their budgets in the past several years.' In part, of course, this crisis has resulted from a powerful national recession. Nonetheless, the American system of state and local government finance is seriously flawed and in need of repair. And in no place is that more obvious than New York City, which has a permanent structural imbalance between revenues and expenditures. This essay argues that much of that imbalance has been imposed on New York City by other levels of government, and that only these forces can permanently repair the damage. New York State and New York City are currently groping toward such a solution with a radical proposal for a state takeover of Medicaid spending. The first section of this essay discusses the fiscal relationship among America's levels of government and outlines the concept of "Fiscal Federalism." The second section presents the recent experience of America's cities, and particularly New York City, with Fiscal Feder- alism. The third section examines the issues involved in changing the fiscal relationship between New York State and New York City. Fi- nally, the essay analyzes Governor Cuomo's proposal for a phased-in takeover of Medicaid spending and asserts that much more needs to be done to assist our nation's troubled cities in these times of federal retrenchment. I. The American Federal Structure Today The United States Constitution created a federal system of govern- ment where responsibilities not expressly designated to the central government belonged to the states. 2 The states subsequently de- * B.A., M.A., University of Michigan; Ph.D., London School of Economics. The author is Commissioner of the New York City Department of Finance. 1. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 1991 (July 1991). According to the National League of Cities, 85% of all U.S. cities either raised existing taxes or imposed new taxes in 1991. The percentage was even higher for Northeastern cities - 98%. Id. at iv. 2. U.S. CONST. amend. X. FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIX volved, through "home rule" arrangements, responsibilities to local governments, such as counties, cities and school districts. As greater flows of goods, services, people and money have tied the national economy together, the fiscal arrangements among these levels of gov- ernment have become both more complicated and less sensible. For example, the growth of huge urban areas, which everywhere cross county lines, and in the northeast, where they cross state lines, mocks rational political and economic decision making. The princi- pal mechanism for county or city-suburban cooperation is state gov- ernment, an entity disinterested, at worst, and slow, at best. Currently, the cities' and counties' power to tax is dependent upon the states' authority. The only significant tax within the full authority of local government is the property tax, and even that is levied under state constitutional limitations and statutory controls, and is often subject to taxpayer referenda. Originally, local governments were charged with the responsibility of providing basic services, such as police, fire, streets and water to their resident population. Their focus was not to redistribute income or wealth, nor to compensate for the deficiencies in health care, schooling and training on a global or rural level. Yet, America's cities have evolved as providers of services to areas well beyond their bor- ders, and they continue to play a role in the national economy as we approach the next century. This was no more evident than in 1989, when the ten largest United States cities welcomed more than half of America's immigrants. 3 Cities also play a pivotal role in the nation's private economy, where they provide work for millions (a large number of whom live elsewhere), are the home to major employers and serve as the port of entry for foreign goods and capital, as well as ports of exit for Ameri- can services and tourists. That role is not reflected in either the distri- bution of political power or the distribution of resources and responsibilities of the public economy. This concentration is particu- larly striking in light of the fact that fully one-third of Americans live in cities.4 Through the years, ad hoc measures have evolved to recognize the strains that urbanization has generated for the political institutions created by a predominantly agrarian Constitutional convention in the 3. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIZATION SERVICE, 1989 STATIS- TICAL YEARBOOK OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIZATION SERVICE 32-36 (1989). 4. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS PROFILE No. 3 (Sept. 1991). 1992] FISCAL FEDERALISM 18th century. Within the confines of the Tenth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause,5 the federal government has, in this cen- tury, instituted a number of innovations which sought to better bal- ance the fiscal flows with actual economic and political responsibilities. One such measure was the introduction of a federal income tax to provide a basic mechanism for redistributing income from rich to poor. Both the tax's progressivity and the responsiveness of its reve- nues to economic growth demonstrated, through time, that the fed- eral government had a powerful tool, not only to repair some of the inequality of the private economy, but also to redistribute revenues within the public sector from the highest level of government to the lowest. Economic theory supports the practical view that, with the broadest and most responsive tax base and an enforcement span from coast to coast, the national government is in the best position to tax and to provide public services.6 Despite this leverage on the part of the federal government, local taxes alone provide purely local serv- ices. Yet, with a highly mobile population, "purely local" is a shrink- ing concept. Beyond fire, sanitation and parks, it is not easy to find services which ultimately do not have "spillover" effects onto non- residents. The fact that Presidential candidates debate education pol- icy, which is not a federally provided service, demonstrates that most Americans feel at risk if any locality is not properly educating its children. While the political consensus may be to provide services at the local level, the economic consensus is that resources are raised most effi- ciently at the national level. By the early 1970s this arrangement of responsibility had become known as "Fiscal Federalism." Accepting constitutionally designated political boundaries, economists set about rechanneling revenues in order to reach areas where problems were the most prevalent.7 In the late 1960s, new federal spending created a range of specific local programs through specific grants. These grants ranged across several spectrums, including criminal justice, legal services, housing, community health and education. Nonetheless, this federal funding came with restrictions and tight controls. By contrast, during the 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 6. RICHARD MUSGRAVE & PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 235 (1989). 7. See generally WALLACE OATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDER- ALISM (1977). 730 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIX Nixon and Ford Administrations, "Fiscal Federalism" became more general and less categorical in the form of major programs such as General Revenue Sharing 8 (which had a special short-term anti-reces- sion component during the mid-seventies) and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act ("CETA").9 Most of the money from these programs was used to maintain city services, or, ultimately, to substitute for local revenues.'" Ronald Reagan heralded his "New Federalism," which was sup- posed to consolidate federal grants and free other levels of govern- ment from federally imposed constraints. II This "New Federalism" virtually eliminated "Fiscal Federalism." CETA was extinguished in 1982, although the actual death blow to this program was dealt dur- ing the Carter Administration. General Revenue Sharing finally died in 1987, after a long strangulation. While the hallmark of the "New Federalism" was the shift of enforcement responsibility to the states, the result has been simply fewer dollars without any alternative relief. Because Reagan's "New Federalism" came at the same time as a mas- sive cut in personal and business income taxes and a subsequent cur- tailing of their progressivity, the "revenue" in "revenue sharing" no longer existed. In effect, the substitution of the "New Federalism" for "Fiscal Federalism" moved state and local governments from revenue sharing to deficit sharing. II. The Impact of Changing "Fiscal Federalism" on America's Cities According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, federal aid to state and local governments fell by $34 billion in real terms during the 1980s.