Indochina Monographs Reflections on the Vietnam War General Cao Van Vien and Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen • r u.s. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY WASHINGTON, D.C . • . - Indochina Monographs - Reflections on the Vietnam War General Cao Van Vien and Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen - - - u.s. ARMY CENTER OF MlIJTARY msTORY WASlllNGTON, D.C. - Llhrary of Congrt"ss Cataloging in Publication Data Vien, Cao Van. Reflections on the Vietnam \'ar. (Indochina monographs) l. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-l975. I. Khuyen, Dong Van, joint author. 110 Title. III. Series. DS5560 5. V52 959.704' 3 79-607979 This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced in whole or in part without consulting the publisher First printing 1980 Indochina Monographs This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. They were written by officers who held - responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General - Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessa­ ry support under an Army contract with the Center of Military His­ tory. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the - views of their authors--not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write - definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in South­ east Asia. - Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: From Cease-Fire - !£ Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent of Documents. - Taken together these works should provide useful source materials for serious historians pending publication of the more de­ - finitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam. - JAMES L. COLLINS, JR. Brigadier General, USA - Chief of Military History - ,.- iii - Preface The Vietnam War was an unusual and complex experience. Directed - and sustained by Communist North Vietnam under the label of national liberation, it combined the elements of insurgency and conventional warfare. It began with guerrilla tactics but developed into and con­ cluded with open invasion. Basically, however, it remained an ideo­ - logical conflict whose ultimate outcome depended on popular partici­ pation and support. The requirements to fight this war were multiple and challenging. Counterinsurgency demanded that we mobilize our resources to strengthen the regime, protect the people and obtain their allegiance, root out the - enemy infrastructure, and extend our armed forces to maintain security over the national territory. All this had to be done in the midst of - mounting political dissent and social divisiveness. To meet the threat of large-scale conventional attacks, we had to contend with enemy sanc­ tuaries in neighboring countries, the inhospitable terrain of our exten­ sive borders, and uninterrupted infiltration. However, our efforts were - greatly restrained by limited forces and prevailing policies. To analyze critically the chain of events which shaped the final outcome of the war in order to learn from our failures and successes, - we have drawn primarily on our first hand knowledge of major events and our personal involvement in the conduct of war efforts. l,e hope that in - addressing the salient points raised in all previous monographs of this series with fresh insights, our work will be able to provide a critical, - comprehensive view of the war experience on the South Vietnam side. - v In the preparation of this monograph, we are indebted to several of our collegues for their valuable contributions. Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, Commander of I Corps, and Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Commander of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division have provided us with their critical view of tactical aspects of the war and the employment of forces. Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho and Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, Assistant Chiefs of Staff for J-3 and J-2, JGS respectively, have re­ freshed our memories concerning major events of the war "and contributed constructive suggestions. Finally, we are particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain in the Re­ public of Vietnam Armed Fo.ces and also a former member of the Vietna­ mese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the admin­ istrative preparation of our manuscript in final form. McLean, Virginia Cao Van Vien 20 December 1978 General, ARVN Dong Van Khuyen Lieutenant General, ARVN vi Contents Chapter> Page I. NATION-BUILDING AND INSURGENCY: 1954-1963 1 Concept of Defense • • • • • . 1 Or>ganization and Tr>aining . 3 Counter>insU:r>gency St:r>ategies and Tactics 16 Area Se()~ty ••••••• 24 Significant Lessons Lear>ned . 37 - II. AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR: 1964-1967 41 Str>engthening and Expanding the RVNAF 41 U.S. Par>tiaipation in the War> 49 Paaification and RU:r>al Development 59 Major> Oper>ations • • • • • • 68 Anti-Infiltr>ation ••••• 72 - Significant Lessons Lea:roned 77 III. VIETNAMIZATION: 1968-1972 •• 85 - The 1968 Tet Gener>al Offensive 85 Gene:r>al Mobilization •••••• . .. 88 Moder>nization and Impr>ovement of the RVNAF 91 Cr>oss-Bor>der> Oper>ations • • • • 97 The 1972 Easter> Offensive 103 Peace Initiative and Negotiations 110 Significant I£ssons Lea:roned 112 IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: 1973-1975 116 - Tne Par>is Ag:roeeT'/ent • • • • • • 116 Cease-Fipe and Vio lations •• • • • 118 South Vietnam's Str>ategic Alte:ronatives 122 The Final Collapse •••• 127 Significant Lessons Lea:roned 131 V. CONCLUSIONS . 136 - GLOSSARY • • . • • • • . • • . • • • • . • . • . • 164 vii CHAPTER I Nation-Building and Insurgency: 1954-1963 The Geneva Agreements of 1954, which put an end to the French­ Viet Minh War in Indochina, split Vietnam into two parts along the Ben Hai River at the 17th parallel, intended as a temporary demarcation line. Close to one million North Vietnamese inhabitants chose to migrate south where, together with the southern-born people and the National Army of Vietnam, they expected to build a new nation. With the direct support provided by the United States, South Vietnam was to become a free republic devoted to the anti-Communist cause. Soon after its regrouping from above the 17th parallel, the French Expeditionary Corps began to leave South Vietnam, and French authorities also turned over full sovereignty to the nationalist government led by Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem. The French Military ~lission, which advised the Viet­ namese National Army, was replaced by a joint U.S.-French training mission (TRIM) until 28 April 1956 when the French High Command in Indochina was disbanded, marking the end of French involvement in South Vietnam. From that day onwards, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (XAAG-V) took over the mission of training, reorganizing, and advising South Vietnam's armed forces. concept of Defense The U.S. military strategy in Southeast Asia at that juncture was no doubt heavily influenced by the U.S. war experience in Korea during 1951-1953. In helping South Vietnam reorganize its national defense, MAAG-V therefore propounded the concept of deploying conventional infantry forces in depth from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) southward to face the 1 eventuality of overt aggression from the North. As conceived by MAAG-V, the primary mission of the Vietnamese National Army in this defense posture was to fight a delaying action in case of invasion pending a direct intervention by SEATO forces. South Vietnam's military authorities fully concurred with this defense concept. However, they did not regard it as the only strategic approach to meeting the Communist threat. Based on their experience during the early period of the Resistance war and the subsequent fight against the Viet Minh alongside French forces, South Vietnamese military leaders also advanced the concept of territorial or area defense as a complement to conventional force deployment. This concept envisaged the division of the RVN territory into areas of defense, each to be placed under the control of a territorial command whose responsibility was to coordinate all military activities designed to maintain security within its area of responsibility. To fulfill this mission, each territorial command was given control authority over all military, para-military, and pol~ce forces assigned, to include mobile intervention units attached to it by the regular army. MAAG-V authorities concurred in part with this territorial defense concept when they initially approved the RVNAF force structure to be composed of two elements: strike units (field divisions) and area defense units (light divisions and separate territorial regiments). In time, however, they rejected this concept altogether. MAAG-V therefore devoted its advisory efforts and all military assistance resources to organizing, training, and equipping the RVNAF as a conventional, anti-invasion military force. The conventional war of aggression that }MAG-V strategists had assumed and for which they had helped South Vietnam build its defense did not materialize when the first signs of Communist aggression were detected. North Vietnam must have learned a lesson from the Korean War. It had seen how an overt act of aggression had failed in the face of determined and concerted reaction by the Free World under U.S. leadership. Taking advantage of its strong point which had proved successful against the French, North Viet~am began to wage people's or insurgency warfare 2 with the purpose of seizing control in the South. Toward that end, Hanoi had reactivated the local Viet Minh infrastructure and guerrilla elements which had remained behind in 1954 and at the same time reinfiltrated the southern-born Viet Minh cadres and troops who had regrouped to the North and received insurgency training there.