Implicit Social Cognition and Law Kristin A. Lane, 1,2 Jerry Kang,3 and Mahzarin R. Banaji2 1Department ofPsychology, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 12504; email: [email protected] 2Department ofPsychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] JSchool ofLaw, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, California 90095; email: [email protected] [TJo be as intelligent as we can is a moral when the data reveal unappealing reflections obligation-that intelligence is one of the ofhuman behavior, including our own. talents for the use ofwhich we shall be called to account-that if we haven't exhausted ev­ ery opportunity to know whether what we THE SCIENCE are doing is right, it will be no excuse for us Imagine sitting at a computer. Your job ap­ to say that we meant well. pears simple: As words such as happy and an­ gry appear sequentially on the screen, indicate John Erskine, American Character whether each is good (happy is good) or bad and Other Essays, 1915 (angry is bad) by pressing marked keys on a In the early years of the twentieth century, keyboard. But more than the words appear on John Erskine, American educator and author, the screen. In fact, each word to be judged as worried about a lack of faith in intelligence good or bad is preceded by a black or white as a virtue, and contrasted it specifically with face (i.e., individuals with origins in Africa or the elevated status accorded to goodness as Europe) that you see but do not respond to. a virtue. To be sure, Erskine was not us­ You merely ignore the face and respond to ing the term intelligence to mean a narrowly the words. First presented in a psychology lab specified mental faculty of the sort that nine­ over a dozen years ago, this task represents teenth, and even twentieth, century psychol­ the basic method of sequential or repetition ogists called intelligence. Rather he was refer­ priming, designed to measure indirectly less ring to a broad set ofcompetencies, skills, and conscious racial attitudes (Fazio et al. 1995). knowledge. The computer records the time taken to The research reviewed here is offered in offer the easy answer that happy represents a an Erskinian spirit because, more now than positive or good concept and that angry rep­ ever, the mind sciences suggest unappealing resents a negative or bad concept. To the psy­ truths about the nature ofthe brain and mind chologists who performed this study, the data that originate from its bounded rationality of interest were the speed to respond (with and largely unconscious operation. Despite some attention to accuracy of responses) to the commonly held belief that the opposite eachword. Datawere sorted into four separate is true (i.e., that humans are savage rational­ types: Trials in which good words like happy ists and that consciousness is the default men­ were preceded by (a) a white face, (b) a black tal state), we have incontrovertible evidence face; and trials in which bad words like angry that thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped were preceded by (c) a white face, (d) a black by factors residing largely outside conscious face. From the many studies that have used awareness, control, and intention (see Carney this procedure, we know that speed to judge & Banaji 2007). that happy is good is noticeably faster when Such evidence and their implications for that word is preceded by the mere flash of a human nature and human experience urge white (rather than a black) face. Likewise, it that we be newly intelligent about vari­ is mentally easier to respond that angry is bad ous matters of law. Experiments from social when it is preceded by the briefpresence of a cognition-afield concerned with the content black rather than white face. This differential and mechanisms of beliefs and preferences ease ofpairing white+good and black+bad is about oneself, other social beings, and social taken as an indirect measure of the strength groups-are this review's mainstay, with a fo­ of automatic relative preference for the two cus on ordinary beliefs and preferences that social groups. operate without conscious intention, aware­ If the interest is in knowing a person's ness, or control. We present the evidence racial attitude, why use such an odd mea­ first, urging readers to heed Erskine's message sure? Why not merely ask for reports of 428 Lane. Kong. Bona}; feelings toward black and white Americans? ofpatients (Green et al. 2007); and (d) despite The simple answer is that decades ofresearch their seemingly uncontrollable nature, are on the nature of perception, attention, mem­ malleable. ory, and decision making demonstrate that in­ Two concepts, attitude (or preference) and direct measures that bypass the mind's access stereotype (or belief), are central to the study to conscious cognition tell us something in­ of implicit social cognition and its applica­ teresting about mental states and the behav­ tion to the law. "Implicit attitudes are intro­ iors theyspawn. Specifically, thevirtue ofsuch spectively unidentified (or inaccurately iden­ methods is that they tell us something differ­ tified) traces of past experience that mediate ent from self-reported survey-type responses. favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or Moreover, they may potentiallypredictmean­ action toward social objects" (Greenwald & ingful behaviors ofthe sort that are central to Banaji 1995, p. 8). For example, an object any system oflaw, e.g., behaviors that help and is likely to be preferred as a result of prior harm. For instance, the strength ofblack+bad exposure to it, even without awareness that and white+good associations in white sub­ such exposure causes the increase in prefer­ jects predicted the quality oftheir interaction ence (Zajonc 1980). Likewise, "Implicit stereo­ with black experimenters (Fazio et al. 1995). types are the introspectively unidentified (or Participants with stronger antiblack bias on inaccurately identified) traces of past experi­ the computerized test were less likely to be ence that mediate attributions of qualities to friendly toward the black experimenter than members ofa social category" (Greenwald & those with more positive scores. Moreover, Banaji 1995, p. 15). An implicit stereotype such participants were more likely to report would be the (mistaken) identification that thatblacks, compared withwhites, had greater Dave Sebastian is famous, but Diane Sebas­ responsibility for the civil unrest, riots, and vi­ tian is not (Banaji & Greenwald 1995), based olence in Los Angeles following the 1992 ac­ on the belief(a correct belief, in this case) that quittal ofpolice officers in the case involving men are more likelyto be famous thanwomen. Rodney King. Such preferences (attitudes) as well as the Interestingly, the same participants' self­ ascription of specific qualities (stereotypes) reported attitudes toward the groups on a tra­ are jointly referred to here as implicit so­ ditional survey were uncorrelated with their cial cognitions (ISCs), and the biases observed friendliness; in other words, these tradition­ in studying them are referred to as implicit ally measured expressions ofattitude were not biases. as predictive ofbehavior. This experiment set As an example of how the science of im­ the stage for the subsequent explosion ofwork plicit social cognition provides an alternate on implicit social cognition-the main results lens for viewing human behavior, consider two ofFazio and colleagues (1995) would be repli­ police shootings inthe outer boroughs ofNew cated many times with differing measures of York City. Both Amadou Diallo (in 1999) and implicit attitudes and stereotypes. This body Michael Bell (in 2006) were unarmed black of research captured the essence of a new men, mistakenly shot and killed by police of­ generation of discoveries about automatic, ficers. Of central relevance is the probabil­ nonconscious, or implicit preferences and ity of the occurrence of such a response had beliefs, primarily that they (a) are both per­ the victims been white rather than black. In vasive (large numbers ofindividuals show ev­ the earlier case, officers reported mistaking idence of them) and large, statistically speak­ Diallo's reach into his pocket as an attempt to ing; (b) diverge from the consciously reported get a gun. During the opening statements in preferences and beliefs of the same individ­ the criminal trial ofthe four police officers­ ual; (c) appear to predict behavior, even con­ who were all acquitted-the prosecution ar­ sequential behavior such as doctors' treatment gued that "when they got out of the car in www.annualreviews.org • Implicit Social Cognition and Law 429 front of Amadou Diallo's home in the early decisions and does so without conscious morning of February 4, they made the con­ awareness. scious decision to shoot him." Among the criticisms ofsuch studies is that Dataand theoryfrom implicitsocial cogni­ they reflect a reality far from that ofthe pro­ tion provide a different interpretation ofthese fessionals who rely on their gut to make the incidents, namely that the officers acted with­ right decisions in their real jobs-college stu­ out conscious racial animus but were still in­ dents, after all, don't spend their hours in tar­ fluenced by the victims' race. No satisfactory get practice. To test a different group ofpro­ understanding of the role of implicit bias in fessionals, those who take an oath to serve the the police officers' behavior can be obtained sick whether rich or poor, we studied the be­ by analyzing single lethal events, for we can­ havior of physicians making assessments of notknowwhether the same officers in an iden­ patients. Green and colleagues (2007) mea­ tical universe but for the victim's race would sured implicit bias among emergency room have acted differently. The laboratory offers physicians. Physicians recommended treat­ a way to replicate the essential conditions of ment based on vignettes that depicted pa­ such situations and to examine patterns ofbe­ tients with myocardial infarction who differed havior that arise in systematic ways.