CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY By Brent E. Sasley* This article examines Jordanian foreign policy, and the changes it has undergone since the death of King Hussein in 1999. Traditionally understood as shaped primarily by external events and security threats, the policies pursued by the new King Abdullah have illustrated that personality factors are equally important as determinants of foreign policy. The article highlights the continuing trends in Amman’s regional policies, mainly in the form of drawing closer to the United States and maintaining ties with Israel, while also examining the recent changes, including the attempts at reconciliation with regional neighbors. Studies of Jordanian foreign policy have Jordan has always been viewed as not most often focused on that country’s small being strong enough to direct regional size and geographical location--and politics on its own. Susceptible to the wishes consequently external and material factors-- of its more powerful neighbors, Amman has as constraining and shaping Jordan’s foreign usually followed a conservative foreign policy. While this approach is certainly policy, including the reliance on valid, it has also led to neglect of the international allies, to maintain its domestic political, economic, or personal independence and avoid involvement in components of Jordanian foreign policy.(1) destructive wars and outright invasion.(2) In This article tries to redress the balance fact, its vulnerability has often been cited as regarding these often-forgotten factors. In the key to understanding its foreign policies. this context, it also analyzes whether or how These vulnerabilities can be found in both the change in leadership between the late internal and external sources. King Hussein and current King Abdallah II Pivotal to regional stability, because of its has affected these issues. location between Israel and Iraq, Saudi To this end, the article first examines Arabia and Syria,(3) Jordan is a small, poor Jordan’s historical and long-standing country geographically trapped between domestic concerns followed by a stronger and more aggressive neighbors. consideration of Amman’s traditional This factor is coupled with its internal security and foreign interests and policies demographic problem of having a large under King Hussein. The next section Palestinian population (about 60 percent by discusses the lines of regional policy some estimates) that does not see itself as followed by the new King Abdallah II in completely Jordanian. Together, these comparison to his father’s foreign policies. concerns--both domestic and external--and Finally, the conclusion offers some their political and economic corollaries have preliminary thoughts on the future of occupied the bulk of the attention of Jordanian foreign policy. Jordanian policymakers. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 36 Brent E. Sasley The foremost policymaker has always Palestinian nationalist ideas--might been the monarch, from the country’s first galvanize Palestinian opinion, already less emir, Abdallah, through Kings Hussein and supportive of the government, to revolt now Abdallah II. Because of this personal against the monarchy. The civil war of 1970 involvement in politics, and despite or was one example of this factor. Another case because of the aforementioned geostrategic was the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis during factors, Amman has traditionally felt it has which the Palestinian portion of the an important role to play in regional politics, populace expressed overtly pro-Iraqi particularly as they relate to the Arab-Israeli sentiments and demanding action in support relationships and the Muslim holy places.(4) of Iraq. King Hussein would have gambled Because of this, Jordan’s interests and on the kingdom’s political stability had he ambitions have tended to exceed its joined the anti-Iraq coalition.(6) resources, and this has contributed In addition, after the 1979 Iranian significantly to Jordanian foreign policy. Revolution, the regime feared that Islamist politics would influence its own subjects. TRADITIONAL DOMESTIC This had not been a problem earlier since the CONCERNS main Islamist group in Jordan, the Muslim Amman’s main goal has always been the Brotherhood, had been a legal political party survival of the monarchical regime. In recent since 1945 and enjoyed a generally warm years, strengthening the economy—a relationship with the monarchy for most of challenge clearly linked to that main that time. However, the government in the directive—has become increasingly more 1990s grew increasingly concerned with the important as well. These two points both Brotherhood’s policies and tried to limit its show how Amman’s external security effectiveness through repression. Again, the concerns emerge from a need to rely on concern is not only with radical Islamism other states for Jordan’s domestic stability itself but that such a movement could use and economic well-being. Islam to mobilize an already somewhat The lack of a cohesive ethnic or alienated Palestinian opinion against the communal base in Jordan creates its political monarchy. and, to some extent, economic problems. Aside from these identity issues, Jordan’s Although this is the norm rather than the economic problems have been a factor for exception in the Middle East, Jordan is concern. Particularly since the 1991 Gulf particularly vulnerable to having a War, the economy has faced severe segmented population, divided between problems. Largely empty of natural those who identify themselves principally as resources, Jordan has been forced to rely on Jordanians and those who identify outside assistance for sustenance. The oil themselves as Palestinians (primarily those price increases of the 1970s had been a good who fled to Jordan following the 1948 and thing for Jordan. They brought about a 1967 Arab-Israeli wars). This division is sudden, massive increase in oil-exporting manifested in all social, economic, and countries’ wealth, which for Jordan political arenas, and creates an underlying translated into much larger foreign aid. The tension between the two groups. The same boom attracted hundreds of thousands Palestinians have tended to dominate the of Jordanian workers to the Gulf region economy; the “East Bank” Jordanians whose remittances also proved of great help. control the government and army.(5) Yet by the early 1980s, when oil prices fell The regime fears that political after profits peaked in 1981, foreign aid instability—and historically leftist or declined, and demand for foreign workers in 37 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy the Gulf was reduced or workers faced wage of the Persian Gulf were the primary aid cuts. Government spending did not match providers. Trade with Iraq, which has certain the cutback in aid. Unemployment and a aspects of an aid arrangement, has now deepening recession hit hard in Jordan, and become an additional factor with political by 1988 Amman began to default on its overtones. international debts.(7) Then came the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait TRADITIONAL EXTERNAL and the subsequent war there. Due to the SECURITY INTERESTS domestic political considerations mentioned Shifting global power structures, regional above, King Hussein felt he had to support security threats, and strategic balances of Saddam Hussein’s actions. This brought him power are usually considered the prime the gratitude of hundreds of thousands of motivators behind Amman’s regional policy. Palestinians within Jordan, but earned him King Hussein, ruler of Jordan from 1952 to the wrath of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 1999, had been responsible for virtually all which cut off all aid; Saudi Arabia closed of Jordan’s foreign policy during this period. the border. Thousands of Jordanian and Therefore, the following section assumes Palestinian workers were expelled from that when speaking of Jordanian foreign Kuwait (about 350,000 settling in Jordan), policy, King Hussein’s hand, though not and the United States suspended its aid explicitly mentioned, was always in place, program. Virtually all of Jordan’s revenue guiding it. sources were lost or reduced. Traditionally considered a conservative Although this situation has eased Arab state, Jordan is usually aligned on the somewhat with King Hussein’s shift to the “moderate” side--which refers to its West and peace with Israel, the economy monarchical nature, pro-Western leanings, still faces many problems. Unemployment, and tendency to shun radical Arab politics corruption, and lack of foreign investment based on pan-Arabism nationalism or are among the most serious. As well, a Islamism. Yet geopolitical necessities have population’s unhappiness with its socio- forced Jordan to try and maintain good economic situation can easily be turned into relations with at least one of the radical hostility toward a government that has not states on its borders, namely Syria or Iraq. alleviated such conditions. This, in turn, Moreover, this is not to say that all moderate affects the regime’s core interest of survival. states share the same interests or policies; in As Laurie Brand argues, alliance decisions fact, they diverge from each other almost as are made at least partly to help “balance the often as they do from the radical states. budget or to insulate against future potential As Stephen Walt argues, in multipolar economic challenges from abroad,”(8) such