- 1 - The issue of majority in a federal system - the particular cases of constituent power and of amendment of the federal compact by Olivier Beaud Professor of public law at Université de Paris II (Panthéon-Assas) In this lecture, I would like to study the hypothesis which holds that the issue of majority is posed in a different way, at least partly so, depending on whether a Federation or a state is concerned. This assumption of a relatively singular nature of the federal case is completely in line with the more general thesis I have put forward in a recent book, in which I have tried to show the autonomy of the notion of Federation in relation to that of the state and the specificity of the public law of the Federation in comparison with the public law of the state1. However, it cannot be argued that the federal framework imposes a complete reversal in the way the issue of majority is tackled. Indeed, a framework homogeneous to the Federation and the state does exist, for there is a “right of the majority” or a “majority regime”2 which is common to all political entities. Indeed, the political and legal problem that the majoritarian decision poses is, most of the time, presented in the same terms: how and why is the decision which has been taken by a majority valid as the decision of all? More to the point, why does the minority, who has voted against the decision of the majority, have to abide by it all the same? Clearly, such an issue takes two forms, depending on whether we consider the majority to be a “technique” of decision-making or a “principle”, one of legitimacy3. As a technique of decision-making, the issue of majority is of paramount interest for jurists, for it is one of the central questions in the law of legal entities, in corporate law4. It concerns as much private law –law of partnership, of public limited companies– as public law, national as well as international law, and the great deal of thought given to the role of majority in international organizations is testimony to this5. As a principle, majority is more of interest to political philosophy, which studies its justification. Why does the minority have to obey a majority vote when modern democracy is based on the consent of those who are concerned by the decision6 ? - 2 - In the programme of this symposium on “majorities”, the issue of majority within a federal framework is tackled more from the angle of the technique of decision-making, for its specificity supposedly derives from the requirement of a “double majority”. Such an observation is not questionable, as we will see later on the question of the amendment of the constitution of the Federation (see infra, II). However interesting it may be though, the analysis of the majority as a technique of decision-making does not take into account the fact that, in a Federation, the acceptance of a majority decision is far from being obvious, contrary to what happens in a state. This is due to the particular political nature of the Federation. The political structure of a Federation is triangular. It includes the federation, the member states and the individuals, and the pivot of it all is the member state. Consequently, when the application of the majority rule in a Federation is referred to, the unity that is concerned by that rule is not so much the individual as the member state, which we will see later may be a “federating” state (it co-contitutes the Federation) or a “federate” state (it is a member state of an already existing Federation). Above all, it follows from the conventional genesis and from the ends of the Federation that unanimity must govern its foundation as well as its workings7. Each individual state, which becomes a member state, first expresses its sovereignty by “founding” a Federation – that is, by “co-founding” it– and aims at keeping its sovereignty after the federal entity has been formed by remaining free to take its own decisions. That is the reason why in a federal system all the member states must give their consent to the fundamental decisions that are taken by the federal authorities of which they are a part. The Federation requires unanimity insofar as the states which unite together to embark on the federal adventure “still want to keep their own particular existence and are all the more attached to it as each one of them is conscious of its own personality”8. As a consequence, a federate state does not want to have imposed on it a decision that has been taken within the federal authority by the majority of the other states. The jurisprudence of the French Constitutional Council on the issue of integration into Europe shows, in its own way, the difficulty represented by the change from the unanimity to the majority rule. Such a shift within, for example, the Council of Ministers of the European Union –in some fundamental matters– has been considered to be an unconstitutional assault “on the essential c onditions of exercise of national sovereignty”9. That is the reason why it was recently claimed that the “political and constitutional essence of a federation-based state is the assent of all the member states”10. It ensues that the principle of unanimity is to the Federation what the principle of majority is to the unitary state, that is, its - 3 - “aggregating principle”11. The specificity of the Federation comes sharply into focus here. It lies in the predominance of the unanimity principle. Or, to say it differently, the majority as a “principle” seems to be illegitimate, as a principle, in a federal body politic because of the very nature of that body. Such is the starting point of any analysis on the issue of majority within a federal framework, but it is only a starting point. For, in reality, all the federal systems are not entirely based on majority, be they what we usually call Confederacies of states or federal states12. More precisely, in the practical working of the Federation there is always some space left for the majority rule, beside that of unanimity. In this matter, the analogy with the workings of international organizations is striking13. In order to illustrate this thesis, I could have dealt with the question of the application of the majority rule within the “system of the federal Diet”, which is the constitutional model describing emerging or nascent Federations that are governed by a Diet, an assembly of representatives of the member states performing as a decision-making authority14. I could also have shown that, in modern federal states, which are largely state-controlled and only slightly federal, the bicameral type of legislature works on a majority basis. Such bicameralism is different from unitary bicameralism as one chamber represents the people and the other the states, according to the models of the American Senate or the German Bundesrat, which is not without having consequences on the general direction of the majority decisions. In some countries nowadays, in what may be called the community type of federalism (i.e. multiethnical federalism), there emerges the technique of the so-called “overqualified” majority. This is what the double majority required for the adoption of the “special laws” in institutional matters is called in Belgium. It implies that within a two- third majority –first majority requirement– there must be an absolute majority of the members of the two linguistic groups of the Chambers of Parliament –second majority requirement15. My lecture, however, will not focus here on the way the federal Diet works, or on the legislature in contemporary federal states, or on community federalism (i.e. multiethnical federalism). It will mainly focus on the exceptional case, which is even a borderline case, of the constituent power and on the slightly less exceptional case of the amendment of the constitution, being understood that, following the views put forward by other authors, I make a distinction between the original constituent power and the constitution-amending power16. What is meant by “constituent power”, is the sovereign prerogative of determining the form of a political entity by means of a constitution17, and not the power to amend the constitution. The - 4 - constituent power is the authority which, by establishing a constitution, expresses a “political will” which is enough in itself to validate the constitution18. That doctrine tries to explain the birth of a constitution by means of the “political will”, thereby reintroducing into the constitutional law a dimension of legitimacy that the primacy of legality forbids to take into account in the prevailing positivist doctrine19. Most of the time, the elaboration of a new constitution comes from a political process during which and at the end of which a people becomes conscious of its political existence and asserts itself by opposition. The constituent power expresses the intense historical moment(s) when a will to live together cristallizes. Such a founding moment has allowed some authors to make the judicious distinction between “constitutional politics” and “normal politics”20 , or “politicizing politics” and “politicized politics”21 and other authors to magnify that moment of “political foundation” of a “nation of citizens”22. Within the federal framework, the theory of the constituent power is particular in the case of a Federation insofar as the constitution is not that of a nation-state and its form is not the same. Here the federal constitution is viewed as a constitutional compact, as a federal compact23, that is, a convention between several states which decide to unite and set up a Federation together.