Aus dem Institut für Agrarökonomie der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel Voter Behavior and Government Performance: Theory and Empirical Application in Sub-Saharan Africa Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel vorgelegt von M.Sc. Laura Seide aus Braunschweig Kiel, 2014 Dekan: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Rainer Horn 1. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Dr. Christian Henning 2. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Franz Urban Pappi Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 12. November 2014 Gedruckt mit Genehmigung der Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel Diese Dissertation kann als elektronisches Medium über den Internetauftritt der Universitätsbibliothek Kiel (www.ub.uni-kiel.de; eldiss.uni-kiel.de) aus dem Internet geladen werden. Danksagung Die vorliegende Arbeit wäre ohne die Unterstützung der folgenden Personen nicht möglich gewesen. Mein besonderer Dank gilt daher meinem Doktorvater Prof. Dr. Dr. Christian H.C.A. Henning für die Möglichkeit der Promotion an seinem Lehrstuhl und die intensive und engagierte Betreuung meiner Arbeit. Die internationale Aus- richtung des Lehrstuhls und die damit verbundenen Reisen und Forschungsaufent- halte haben mich nicht nur wissenschaftlich sondern auch persönlich sehr geprägt. Des Weiteren möchte ich mich bei Prof. Dr. Franz Urban Pappi für die Übernahme des Zweitgutachtens bedanken. Meine Arbeit ist Teil eines internationalen Projektes gewesen, welches gemeinsam mit dem IFPRI und lokalen Partnern in Ghana, Senegal und Uganda durchgeführt wurde. Daher gilt mein Dank allen Projektpartnern, die mich bei meiner Disser- tation unterstützt haben und mir die Möglichkeit gegeben haben neue Länder und Kulturen kennen zu lernen. Ganz besonders dazu beigetragen hat meine Kollegin Eva Krampe, mit der ich nicht nur lange ein Büro geteilt sondern auch viele meiner Forschungsreisen gemeinsam unternommen habe. Auch allen anderen Kollegen am Lehrstuhl für Agrarpolitik gebührt mein herz- lichster Dank. Die gemeinsamen Mittagessen und Kaffeepausen haben sehr dazu beigetragen, dass mir meine Promotionszeit viel Spass gemacht hat. Besonders er- wähnen möchte ich an dieser Stelle Ernst Albrecht, mit dem ich in den letzten Jahren viele hundert Kilometer gelaufenen bin und dabei sowohl fachliche als auch private Diskussionen geführt habe. Diese Gespräche haben einen erheblichen Teil zum Gelingen dieser Arbeit beigesteuert. Abschließend möchte ich meinen Freunden und meiner Familie danken: Meiner Rugbymannschaft des FT Adler Kiel, für den Ausgleich zum Unileben, sportliche Höhepunkte und Teamgeist; meinen Eltern und meinem Bruder, die immer an mich geglaubt haben und so ein starker Rückhalt sowohl in guten als auch in schlechten Zeiten waren; und Caro, die immer für mich da ist. Braunschweig, im Februar 2015 Laura Seide Contents Contents 1 Introduction 1 I Theory 7 2 Voting Behavior and Government Performance: A Literature Overview 9 3 Theory of Voting Behavior 15 4 Methodology 25 4.1 Estimation of Probabilistic Voter Models . 25 4.2 Analyzing Heterogeneity in Voting Behavior . 29 4.3 Equilibrium Conditions in Probabilistic Voter Models . 33 5 Theory and Derivation of Government Performance Indices 37 5.1 Modeling Voting Behavior . 37 5.1.1 The Voters . 37 5.1.2 Parties and the Government . 40 5.2 Government Performance Indices . 42 5.2.1 Government Accountability . 42 5.2.2 Government Capture . 43 II Empirical Application 47 6 Introduction of Case Study Countries 49 7 Ghana 53 7.1 From Independence to Democracy . 53 7.2 Literature Overview . 55 7.3 Data Description . 57 7.3.1 Sampling Procedure . 58 7.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables . 58 7.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior . 65 7.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model . 67 7.4.2 Heterogeneity . 72 7.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance . 78 7.5.1 Government Accountability . 78 7.5.2 Government Capture . 80 7.6 Summary . 83 i Contents 8 Senegal 85 8.1 From Independence to Democracy . 85 8.2 Literature Overview . 87 8.3 Data Description . 90 8.3.1 Sampling Procedure . 91 8.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables . 91 8.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior . 98 8.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model . 98 8.4.2 Heterogeneity . 102 8.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance . 107 8.5.1 Government Accountability . 108 8.5.2 Government Capture . 109 8.6 Summary . 113 9 Uganda 115 9.1 From Independence to Democracy . 115 9.2 Literature Overview . 118 9.3 Data Description . 119 9.3.1 Sampling Procedure . 120 9.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables . 120 9.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior . 127 9.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model . 129 9.4.2 Heterogeneity . 133 9.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance . 137 9.5.1 Government Accountability . 139 9.5.2 Government Capture . 141 9.6 Summary . 144 10 A Comparative Perspective 147 11 Conclusion 153 12 Zusammenfassung 159 A Terminology 181 B Voter Questionnaire Uganda 185 ii List of Figures List of Figures 1.1 Schematic representation of the outline of this thesis . .2 4.1 Graph of logit curve . 27 4.2 Global and local maxima . 35 6.1 Freedom House and Polity IV indices . 51 7.1 Administrative Regions in Ghana . 54 7.2 Voter positions in Ghana . 62 7.3 Party positions in Ghana . 63 7.4 Changing policy positions: weakvsstrongstate .......... 71 7.5 RI of non policy, policy and retrospective voting . 72 7.6 RI of non policy and policy voting in rural and urban areas . 73 7.7 RI of voting motives in latent classes . 77 7.8 Lorenz curve (left: ML - M6, right: LC - M2) . 80 7.9 Capture in Ghana . 81 7.10 Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior . 83 8.1 Administrative Regions in Senegal . 86 8.2 Voter positions in Senegal . 93 8.3 Party positions in Senegal . 95 8.4 Changing policy positions: agrvsind ................. 102 8.5 RI of non policy, policy and retrospective voting . 102 8.6 RI of non policy and policy voting in rural and urban areas . 103 8.7 RI of non policy and policy voting (latent class) . 105 8.8 RI of voting motives in latent classes . 107 8.9 Lorenz curve (left: ML - M7, right: LC) . 110 8.10 Capture indices (ML and LC model) . 111 8.11 Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior . 113 9.1 Map of Uganda . 116 9.2 Voter positions in Uganda . 124 9.3 Party positions in Uganda . 125 9.4 Changing policy positions: taxvsprotect .............. 133 9.5 RI of non policy and policy voting . 134 9.6 RI of policy and non policy voting in rural and urban areas . 135 9.7 RI of voting motives in latent classes . 139 9.8 Lorenz curve (left: ML - M7, right: LC - M2) . 141 9.9 Capture in Uganda . 142 9.10 Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior . 145 iii List of Tables List of Tables 4.1 Data format for the logit model . 27 7.1 Presidential election results from Ghana . 59 7.2 Description of survey data . 66 7.3 Voting motives in Ghana . 67 7.4 Estimation results of the multinomial logit model . 69 7.5 Comparison of different LC model specifications . 74 7.6 Latent class estimation results . 75 7.7 Descriptive statistics by latent classes . 76 7.8 Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis) . 79 8.1 Presidential election results from Senegal . 92 8.2 Description of survey data . 97 8.3 Results from different voter model specifications . 100 8.4 Latent class estimation results . 104 8.5 Descriptive statistics by latent classes . 106 8.6 Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis) . 109 9.1 Presidential election results from Uganda . 121 9.2 Description of survey data . 128 9.3 Voting motives in Uganda . 129 9.4 Estimation results of the multinomial logit model . 131 9.5 Comparison of different LC model specifications . 135 9.6 Latent class estimation results . 136 9.7 Descriptive statistics by latent classes . 138 9.8 Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis) . 140 10.1 Comparism of the results of Ghana, Senegal and Uganda . 148 A.1 Terminology of Chapter 3 . 181 A.2 Terminology of Chapter 4 . 182 A.3 Terminology of Chapter 5 . 183 v Chapter 1 Introduction During the Millennium Summit in 2000, all United Nations member states1 com- mitted to help achieve the so called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The participating countries agreed on achieving the eight main goals, which range from eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, to combat of HIV/AIDS, to the ensuring of environmental sustainability, until 2015. Especially the first MDG, eradicate ex- treme poverty and hunger, is intimately connected with economic development and increasing personal income, particularly in rural areas. These factors on the other hand go along with democratic development. It is a commonly accepted view that democracy when compared to other non-democratic systems is a superior political system promoting economic growth and well-being. However, controlling for demo- graphic and economic structures a large variance regarding policies, implied growth and well-being can be observed across democratic countries. Hence, the question arises how these differences across economically similar democratic countries can be explained. We assume that inefficient and biased policy outcomes that are often as- sociated with developing countries result because governments are facing incentive problems. A possible explanation for missing or suboptimal incentives, involves elec- tions and voting behavior. In political theory electoral competition is understood as a fundamental democratic mechanism to guarantee that governmental policies re- flect society’s interests. In reality, however, electoral competition is often restricted and hence, leads to biased policy outcomes. Basically, policy biases result from two major mechanisms: government capture and a lack of governmental accountabil- ity. The latter corresponds to the fact that elected politicians have not sufficient electoral incentives to implement policies benefiting socio-economic groups they are representing, but rather serve their self-interests, while the former corresponds to the fact that electoral competition is biased in favor of specific interests.