Ken Rutherford THE HAGUE AND OTTAWA CONVENTIONS: A MODEL FOR FUTURE WEAPON BAN REGIMES? 1 by Ken Rutherford Ken Rutherford is a University Fellow and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. “In the history of the world, it will be the first time, “I welcome you to this historic conference. For I think, that representatives of almost every civi- the first time, the majority of the nations of the lized country are seen to meet peacefully, without world will agree to ban a weapon which has been a dispute to settle, without complaints to be re- in military use by almost every country in the dressed, without any thought of personal advan- world.” tage, and this in the two-fold and liberal purpose Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, on the of perpetuating harmony and softening the evils occasion of the Treaty-Signing Conference for of war, or of regulating it for the day when it can- the Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, not be avoided.” December 3, 1997. President of the First Commission Plenary Meeting of the First Hague Peace Conference, May 26, 1899.2 ust as the 19th century closed similar processes: each lacked the ian effects of high levels of war. The with the 1899 First International support of many major state pow- Hague conventions augmented and JPeace Conference, held in The ers, each was negotiated by major- further codified and strengthened Hague, the Netherlands, calling for ity voting, and each was achieved in previous existing international hu- a ban on certain weapons, such as a very short time frame. manitarian law, while the declara- tions continued the disarmament dum dum bullets and chemical In a series of convention meetings process begun with the 1869 Decla- gases, so is the 20th century coming between May 18 and July 29, 1899, ration of St. Petersburg, which pro- to an end with the entering into force state delegates to the Hague Confer- hibited the use of certain projectiles of the Ottawa Treaty banning anti- ence negotiated three conventions 3 in wartime and was “the first formal personnel landmines. What is re- and three declarations that attempted agreement prohibiting the use of markable about the two agreements to alleviate the negative humanitar- is that they were created through certain weapons in war.”4 The three 36 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1999 Ken Rutherford Hague declarations banned the prac- signed by 122 states in December Ottawa characteristics to those of tice of dropping explosives from hot 1997. Currently more than 130 states other weapon prohibition regimes, air balloons, the use of chemical gas, have signed and more than 60 have such as the Biological Weapons and the use of dum dum bullets. ratified the treaty.8 It entered into Convention (BWC), the Chemical Today, the Hague declarations are force March 1, 1999, faster than any Weapons Convention (CWC), the considered customary international other major treaty in the world’s his- CCW, and the Treaty on the Non- law and as “such they are also bind- tory.9 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ing on states which are not formally Academics, diplomats, and non- (NPT). The eight similarities be- 5 parties to them.” governmental organization (NGO) tween the Hague and Ottawa regime The Ottawa Treaty development representatives call the Ottawa creation processes that this article process began during a meeting of Treaty’s genesis and negotiations an identifies are the following: the Review Conference of the 1980 innovative model for future multi- (1) The negotiations that created Convention on Certain Conven- lateral discussions.10 Even the Nobel both regimes were convened at tional Weapons (CCW, also known Committee recognized this unique the invitation of an international as the Inhumane Weapons Conven- coalition by awarding the Interna- political leader; tion), held in Geneva in early 1996. tional Campaign to Ban Landmines (2) Both regimes were negotiated At that time, Protocol II to the CCW (ICBL)11 and its coordinator Jody by majority voting procedures; was the only existing international Williams the 1997 Nobel Peace (3) Both regimes were established law regarding anti-personnel Prize, in part for helping to create a without verification measures; landmines.6 The review was origi- fresh form of diplomacy. (4) Both regimes were initiated for the broader purpose of a more nally called by the UN General As- Following a standard terminology sembly to explore other international peaceful international society; in International Relations, I refer to (5) Both regimes were negotiated legal mechanisms for controlling the the products of the Hague and Ot- use of landmines in order to reduce on a fast-track process; tawa processes as “regimes.” I use (6) Both regimes were opposed by harm to innocents during war and in the term regime to refer to the cre- major powers; post-conflict societies. The CCW ation of normative behavioral stan- Review Conference negotiations (7) Both regimes were encour- dards regarding certain issues for aged and supported by public only considered restrictions on, not states to consider and hopefully fol- a prohibition of, the use of opinion and NGOs; and low.12 The norms established by the (8) Both regimes had clear, landmines. The delegates believed regimes imply prescriptive state- that by addressing issues of scope, simple, and consistent prohibi- ments of obligation and rules,13 tions. duration of unmarked mines, anti- which, in turn, provide universal detector mines, and transfer restric- norms of behavior for states to fol- My second, and more important, tions, they could reduce the gravity low.14 argument is that the Hague and Ot- of the landmine problem. tawa processes provide lessons for In this article I examine the dip- Since the issue of banning future negotiations. These processes lomatic processes that created the are in contrast to standard methods landmines could not get on the Hague and Ottawa regimes, making CCW agenda, Canada and other for negotiating multilateral regimes, two general arguments. First, I ar- which usually incorporate the fol- like-minded states, including Aus- gue that the Ottawa diplomacy pro- tria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, lowing features: cess is not as new as some have (1) Negotiations to create regimes Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland, thought. I suggest that eight of the called for the creation of a new re- convene at the initiation of inter- major Ottawa Treaty negotiating national organizations; gime to be negotiated outside the strategies are similar to those used CCW.7 The landmine ban negotia- (2) Regimes are negotiated by in developing the Hague Conference consensus methods; tions, more commonly known as declarations. To further highlight “the Ottawa process,” eventually (3) Regimes, especially those con- these similarities, I present several cerning arms control, have veri- culminated in the Ottawa Treaty out- tables that compare the Hague and lawing anti-personnel landmines fication measures; The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1999 37 Ken Rutherford (4) Regimes are initiated due to goal here is to maintain a narrow are initiated at the request of inter- state self-interest with respect to focus on the process of regime cre- national institutions rather than security; ation with respect to potential states (see Table 1). (5) Regimes are negotiated by a weapon bans. The Russian government had a long, slow process that may last history of calling international con- decades; HAGUE AND OTTAWA ferences dealing with weapons. In (6) Regimes are promoted and REGIME CREATION 1868 it called for a meeting in St. supported by major powers; STRATEGIES Petersburg to discuss the fundamen- (7) Participation in regime cre- In this section, I demonstrate tal rules of war, after it had heard ation is limited to states; and eight similarities between the Hague from its military leaders that explod- (8) Regimes usually have compli- and Ottawa negotiations, and discuss ing bullets were causing gratuitous cated and inconsistent rules that the degree to which they contrast and unnecessary suffering to sol- allow states wide interpretation with the negotiations on four other diers. The meeting produced the St. and flexibility. multilateral arms control regimes— Petersburg Declaration, which re- The Hague and Ottawa alterna- the NPT, BWC, CCW, and CWC. nounced “in case of war among tives to these strategies offer insights themselves, the employment by into the relative advantages and dis- (1) Call for Convention by an their military or naval troops of any advantages of different approaches Individual State Leader projectile of a weight below 400 to weapon restriction negotiations. grammes, which is either explosive The first similarity in the Hague or charged with fulminating or in- While this article examines the and Ottawa processes is that both flammable substances.”15 This dec- processes that led to the achievement began at the behest of a state leader. laration “formulated, both explicitly of the Hague and Ottawa regimes Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and For- and implicitly, the principles of dis- and the potential implications for eign Minister Lloyd Axworthy of tinction, military necessity and pre- future weapon prohibition regime Canada were the state leaders, each vention of unnecessary suffering.”16 construction, it does not seek to of whom had recently come to evaluate the contents or effective- power, who called for the Hague and Nearly 100 years later another in- ness of the Hague and Ottawa re- Ottawa negotiations, respectively.