GEORGE BUNN, FRITZ STEINHAUSLER, & LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA Report Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Terrorists and Theives Through Better Training GEORGE BUNN, FRITZ STEINHAUSLER, & LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA George Bunn, who served on the U.S. delegation that negotiated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is a Consulting Professor at the StanfordUniversity Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Fritz Steinhausler is a Professor of Physics and Biophysics at the University of Salzburg in Austria and a Visiting Professor at CISAC. Lyudmila Zaitseva is a Visiting Researcher at CISAC who is on the staff of the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan. All three work on the Stanford-CISAC project,“Strengthening Global Practices for Protecting Nuclear Material Against Theft and Sabotage.” he September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade THE NEED TO PROTECT NUCLEAR MATERIAL Center and the Pentagon have shown that well- AND FACILITIES Torganized global terrorist groups bent on causing National practices for what is called “physical protec- mass murder and destruction are no longer hypothetical. tion” of nuclear material vary widely.1 Some states have There can now be little doubt that if such terrorists could obligated themselves to apply International Atomic En- acquire weapons-usable nuclear material from thieves and ergy Agency (IAEA) recommendations for such protec- learn how to make nuclear weapons, they would employ tion, but others have only agreed to give consideration to them in their attention-seeking tactics. If they could learn those recommendations or have made no commitment at how to disperse highly radioactive materials across a city, all. Some have adopted domestic regulations with require- they would likely attempt that as well. Under these cir- ments as high or higher than these recommendations, but cumstances, measures to further strengthen the protec- others have adopted lower standards or none at all. 2 tion of nuclear materials and nuclear installations are urgently needed. Although the 182 non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear This report first reviews the need to strengthen protec- activities, these material accounting and inspection require- tion of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors against ter- ments are designed to prevent diversion of nuclear mate- rorists and thieves and then examines the need for better rial from peaceful uses to weapons production by persons training of those charged with protection responsibilities working for the country where the material is present. to meet this challenge. Our research suggests that secu- They are not designed to protect it from theft or sabotage rity practices vary significantly from country to country, by unauthorized persons. Inspectors from the IAEA imple- giving thieves and terrorists opportunities to steal nuclear menting NPT-mandated inspections check for the disap- material or to sabotage nuclear facilities in some coun- pearance of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear tries that they do not have in others. The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2001 1 GEORGE BUNN, FRITZ STEINHAUSLER, & LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA activities. It is not their job, however, to inspect the fences, rial, bomb building is within the capability of many coun- walls, locks, intruder sensors, alarm systems, or guard tries and even some well-organized terrorist groups – con- arrangements that an operator has provided to prevent ceivably including Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, which theft or sabotage by terrorists.3 has already attempted to acquire weapons-usable mate- 5 The urgent need for improved security for nuclear rial. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Energy has material and facilities has been recognized for Russia and concluded that, “controls on access to these materials is some other former Soviet republics and former Soviet al- the primary technical barrier to nuclear proliferation in the 6 lies. Over the last decade, strengthening this security has world today.” been the focus of major programs to improve material Second, weapons-usable materials are present in many protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) in these countries. The common weapons-usable nuclear materi- countries, programs underwritten with financial assistance als are plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU, that from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. is, uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope These efforts have been well studied but they have not U-235).7 According to the standards used by the IAEA, been the focus of attention in other settings around the 8 kilograms (kg) of plutonium or 25 kg of HEU are suffi- world.4 This report describes the global problem. It re- cient to manufacture a nuclear explosive. (A kilogram is flects our conclusions from our research that financial and 2.2 pounds.) At least twelve countries possess among them technical assistance are needed in more countries than 180,000 kg of separated, civilian, weapons-usable pluto- those that have received it to date, that global standards nium (Belgium, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Ja- for physical protection are needed, and that, in particular, pan, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, the United better training is needed in many countries for those re- Kingdom and the United States). The amount of this ci- sponsible for nuclear material security. vilian plutonium is growing and, at the current rate of in- crease, in a few years, these stocks will surpass the It is worth reiterating the basic reason for the concern estimated 250,000 kg of plutonium in weapons or weap- about “loose nukes” in Russia and elsewhere. First, ob- ons reserves held by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states taining enough weapons-usable nuclear material to make (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the an explosive nuclear device is the greatest obstacle to United States), plus India, Israel and Pakistan.8 Accord- manufacturing these weapons. The designs of unsophis- ing to more recent data, the amount of separated com- ticated weapons (such as the Hiroshima bomb) are fairly mercial plutonium owned by just eight countries (Belgium, well known. Given the requisite weapons-usable mate- Table 1:Past, Current, and Projected Stockpiles of Weapon and Civilian Plutonium (in Metric Tons) 500 450 400 257 180 350 122 300 t 250 200 150 257 250 241 100 50 0 1990 1999 2010 Weapon Plutonium Separated Civilian Plutonium 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2001 GEORGE BUNN, FRITZ STEINHAUSLER, & LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA France, India, Japan, Germany, Russia, the United King- greater than the present total annual reprocessing capac- dom, and the United States) has already reached 210,000 ity. Assuming that some of the spent fuel to be generated kg.9 in the future will be reprocessed, the amount to be stored HEU is more widely spread around the world than plu- by the year 2010 is projected to be about 230,000 MT. tonium and often less well guarded. If it has not been Since the first large-scale repositories for final disposal of irradiated in a research reactor so long that its radioactiv- spent fuel are not expected to be in operation before then, ity makes it too hot to handle even for terrorists, it can be the indications are that on-site storage will be the primary made into an explosive nuclear device. According to IAEA option for a long time, each site making a potential target 15 estimates of August 2000, more than 2,772 kg of HEU for terrorist attack. exist in 170 operating research reactors in 43 countries, The IAEA recommends that, in addition to guarding sometimes in quantities at least the size of the critical mass nuclear material from theft, physical protection should be needed to make a nuclear explosive device. In addition, designed to prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities, such as there are 258 shut-down research reactors, many of which spent fuel storage pools and reactors.16 Current major have HEU that has not been returned to its supplier as terrorist threats to physical protection are probably first, originally intended and some of which did not operate long the use of stolen nuclear explosive materials against a va- enough to make their HEU too hot to handle. The IAEA riety of targets and, second, the attack by a truck bomb estimates that 28 developing countries have research re- or a terrorist-piloted jumbo jetliner against a nuclear reac- actors that use HEU and some of these probably have tor or spent fuel. 10 not-yet-irradiated HEU awaiting future use. The devastating consequences of nuclear-explosion ter- Security at many research reactors appears poorer than rorism can be visualized from the case of the “conven- that at nuclear power plants or weapons-complex facili- tional” terrorist bombing carried out at the World Trade ties.11 And that is true not only of the former Soviet Union Center in New York City in 1993. The easiest way to de- and Eastern Europe. For example, in 1998, members of a liver the nuclear bomb would probably be with a truck, smuggling ring were arrested in Italy in possession of non- the way the 1993 bomb was delivered, not by aircraft – weapons-usable uranium enriched to 19.9 percent that was though the September 11, 2001, commercial airliners with stolen some years earlier from a research reactor in the full fuel tanks destroyed all 110 stories of the twin build- Congo, where security conditions were described as ap- ings. In 1993, the conventional high-explosive truck bomb palling.12 Security at some U.S. and European Union re- inside the World Trade Center garage blew a large cavity search reactors has been criticized as lax.13 For example, through several floors above and below the bomb; the after the September 11 attacks, two individuals with false ceiling collapsed in the train-station located on the 4th level identities were allowed access to the research reactor fa- below grade; and the power plant for the entire complex cility in Petten, the Netherlands, and were not apprehended was knocked out.