EXPECTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM – SAVING US FROM ‘HELL’ Lieutenant-Colonel William Dymond JCSP 36 PCEMI 36 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2014 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2014 CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 36 – PCEMI 36 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE EXPECTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM – SAVING US FROM ‘HELL’ By Lieutenant-Colonel William Dymond “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par attending the Canadian Forces College un stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is exigences du cours. L'étude est un a scholastic document, and thus document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions, which the contient donc des faits et des opinions author alone considered appropriate que seul l'auteur considère appropriés and correct for the subject. It does not et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète necessarily reflect the policy or the pas nécessairement la politique ou opinion of any agency, including the l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y Government of Canada and the compris le gouvernement du Canada et Canadian Department of National le ministère de la Défense nationale du Defence. This paper may not be Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de released, quoted or copied, except with citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans the express permission of the Canadian la permission expresse du ministère de Department of National Defence.” la Défense nationale.” Word Count: 27, 880 Compte de mots : 27 880 Expectations of Security Council Reform – Saving us from ‘Hell’ By: LCol William Dymond ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ii Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv Introduction 1 Chapter 1. League of Nations – Establishment and Failure 9 Security Council – Chronology of Birth 11 Seeds that did not Germinate towards Security Council Formation 12 Seeds that Germinated towards Security Council Formation 14 Security Council – Structure and Working Procedures 18 2. Early Calls for Security Council Reform – The San Francisco Conference 24 Calls for Security Council Reform – The First Twenty Years 27 Calls for Security Council Reform – The Post Cold War Era 34 Examples of Advocacy for Security Council Reform 42 Other Examples of Advocacy for Security Council Reform 50 3. Reform – An Overarching Achievable Outcome 53 Expectations Management – The Devil in the Details 57 4. Conclusion 73 Bibliography 82 iii ABSTRACT The Security Council’s technical powers are exceptional. The Council’s aim is to maintain peace and security amongst the Great Powers themselves (the P5), and only then among others. In other words, the Council is meant to deter conflict on a global scale. In 1965, four non-permanent members were added to the Council. Reform advocacy has persisted ever since. Reform is expected to make the Council more representative, accountable, legitimate, democratic, transparent, efficient and fair. Proposals for reform are numerous. The most controversial is veto reform. A lack of consensus stagnates the reform movement. In spite of that stagnation, the Council has reformed itself and, by doing so, increased its effectiveness and decreased the Great Powers’ use of the veto. However, the P5’s attitude towards the veto in particular, and to reform more generally, remains unpredictable. P5 members will always ensure their political aspirations are met before supporting others’ resolutions. This has been and will always be the case. Without comprehensive veto reform, the P5 will continue to dominate the Council. Many of the reform movement’s expectations are, therefore, unrealistic. Rest assured, though, if history is any indicator, the P5 will continue to save us from ‘Hell.’ iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the writing of the paper and the development of its thesis, much advice and suggestions were provided to me by my academic advisor, Dr. Adam Chapnick, from the Canadian Forces College. That assistance is certainly acknowledged. Also, encouragement and patience provided to me during the many months of weekends, and nights, spent after work to research and then write this paper, from my wife Shirley Dymond, was equally important, and she too is acknowledged. 1 INTRODUCTION Upon the conclusion of World War I, to maintain the peace in Europe, and to prevent the occurrence of future wars, the United States of America (USA) President Woodrow Wilson advocated the creation of the League of Nations. Although his advocacy was silenced as a result of a stroke he had in October 1919, and the United States never joined the organization, on 10 January 1920 the League of Nations was established.1 Less than twenty years later, the onset of World War II clearly signalled that the League had failed to promote and maintain international peace and security. On 18 April 1946, the League of Nations convened its final session to dissolve itself, effective the following day.2 The League’s failure was attributed to at least two critical factors. It did not include representation from some of the world’s most powerful states, and it lacked universality of purpose to compel its members to use armed force to protect others from acts of aggression.3 1“Milestones: 1914-1920; The League of Nations, 1920,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian; available from http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league; Internet; accessed on 2 January 2014; and “League of Nations Photo Archives, Timeline, Chronology,” Indiana University Centre for the Study of Global Change; available from http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1919 htm; Internet; accessed 2 January 2014. 2The League Hands Over, Series of League of Nations Publications, General, 1946.1 (Geneva, Switzerland: 1946), 57, 93; and David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3. 3The League Hands Over, Series of League of Nations Publications…, 28, 29, 32, 33, 47, 50, 59, 111, 115; and Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 945-1955 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982), 10-11. 2 The League of Nations’ failure nonetheless facilitated the creation of the United Nations Organization (UN). Indeed, the League’s structure was leveraged as a blueprint for the UN’s. The origins of the UN can be traced back further to the early stages of World War II. In 1941, officials in the US State Department began to draft a preliminary blueprint of the future international organization. In December of that year, the United States officially joined the war and formed a military alliance of twenty-six nations to counter the Axis powers and fight until total victory had been achieved. Upon conclusion of the January 1942 Washington Conference, attended by the Allies, the alliance was named the ‘United Nations.’ The UN seed was planted.4 The UN Charter was affirmed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October of the same year. The UN’s executive committee, the Security Council, met shortly thereafter. Today, in 2014, the Security Council is the most powerful of the UN’s six principle organs. All UN members must comply with its decisions. As well, rulings of the International Court of Justice, another of the broader organization’s principal organs, are enforceable through the Council’s directed action. Moreover, since the UN Charter serves to establish norms in international law, Security Council decisions have concrete, legal implications. In short, the Council’s technical powers are exceptional.5 4Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 13; and Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World, The UN’s Roles in International Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8-9; and Evan Luard, The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1979), 14, 18. 5“UN Security Council,” Global Policy Forum, [Journal on-line]; available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html; Internet; accessed 31 December 2013; and Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 3; and Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury. United Nations, Divided World, 238, 256; and Lev Voronkov, “International Peace and Security: New Challenges to the UN,” in The United Nations in the New World Order: the World Organization at Fifty, ed. Dimitris Bourantonis and Jarrod Wiener, 1-18 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 1. 3 Akin to the aim of the League of Nations’ executive body during its existence, the formal aim of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security.6 That being said, for the Security Council’s permanent members, each of which has a veto over the majority of the body’s decisions, its aim is two tiered. First, for the five permanent member states (P5) it is paramount to maintain peace and security amongst themselves, and only then to maintain the peace and security of other nations.7 Calls for reform have existed since the UN’s establishment.8 Indeed, even before the Security Council’s inaugural session which was held in London, England on 17 January 1946, it was apparent that reform would be needed if the Security Council was to become an effective body for global governance.