INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs Volume 1 – Overall Assessment Richard H. Van Atta, Project Leader and Michael J. Lippitz with Jasper C. Lupo Rob Mahoney Jack H. Nunn April 2003 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. IDA Paper P-3698 Log: H 03-000693 Copy This work was conducted under contract DASW01 98 C 0067, Task DA-6-2018, for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency. © 2003 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000. This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (Nov. 95). INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA Paper P-3698 Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs Volume 1 – Overall Assessment Richard H. Van Atta, Project Leader and Michael J. Lippitz with Jasper C. Lupo Rob Mahoney Jack H. Nunn PREFACE This report summarizes work performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in partial fulfillment of the task entitled “DARPA’s Role in Fostering a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).” It highlights the roles DARPA has played since the 1970s in developing and exploiting advanced technological systems to create fundamental warfighting advantages for US military forces. The study’s results and conclusions are contained in two volumes. Volume I, Overall Assessment, provides an overview of several DARPA program areas studied as part of this task and from these draws insights and “lessons learned” for DARPA management. Volume II, Detailed Assessments, documents the DARPA program areas with greater specificity. The authors wish to thank John Jennings of DARPA; Kent Carson of IDA; and Larry Lynn, former DARPA director, for their detailed review of prior drafts. The authors also benefited from access to past DARPA and US Department of Defense (DoD) leaders, who gave generously of their time and provided insights on problems and opportunities for DoD in developing and deploying novel capabilities. We wish to thank Joe Braddock, Malcolm Currie, Robert Fossum, George Heilmeier, Steven Lukasik, Robert Moore, William Perry, Henry Rowen, James Tegnelia, and numerous others. Of course, the conclusions of this study and any errors in representation of history are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of these contributors, the formal reviewers, or current DARPA or DoD management. iii This page intentionally left blank iv CONTENTS – VOLUME I Preface................................................................................................................ iii Summary ..........................................................................................................S-1 I. Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 A. Overview of DARPA................................................................................. 1 B. What Is the Emerging RMA? ..................................................................... 4 II. Conceiving Disruptive Capabilities ................................................................. 6 A. Strategic Challenges................................................................................... 6 B. DARPA Responses.................................................................................... 8 III. Implementing Disruptive Capabilities............................................................ 11 A. Stealth Combat Aircraft ........................................................................... 11 B. Standoff Precision Strike: Air Force and Army........................................ 15 C. Naval Stealth and Standoff Precision Strike.............................................. 26 1. Sea Shadow.......................................................................................... 27 2. Arsenal Ship ......................................................................................... 29 3. DD-21 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer .......................................................... 33 D. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance......................................... 35 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles .................................................................... 38 2. Satellites ............................................................................................... 49 IV. Conclusions.................................................................................................. 56 A. Insights from the Reviewed DARPA Programs ........................................ 56 B. Management Lessons............................................................................... 60 1. Vision................................................................................................... 60 2. Leadership ............................................................................................ 64 C. Looking to the Future.............................................................................. 71 Volume II is published as a separate document. v APPENDIXES A. References............................................................................................................. A-1 B. Glossary ................................................................................................................ B-1 FIGURES 1. DARPA’s Linkages with Outside Organizations ....................................................... 2 2. ASSAULT BREAKER Concept of Operation........................................................ 19 3. DARPA Smart Weapons Program Concept............................................................ 23 4. A Current Conception of Standoff Precision Strike................................................. 26 5. Sea Shadow Schematic........................................................................................... 28 6. DD-21 Operations.................................................................................................. 34 7. Risk Reduction Prototyping—A Link between DARPA Development and Service Experimentation and Acquisition ......................................................... 69 vi SUMMARY INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF DARPA AND THE RMA DARPA’s primary mission is to foster advanced technologies and systems that create “revolutionary” advantages for the US military. Consistent with this mission, DARPA is independent from the military Services and pursues generally higher-risk, higher-payoff research and development (R&D) projects. DARPA program managers are encouraged to challenge existing approaches to warfighting and to seek results rather than just explore ideas. Hence, in addition to supporting technology and component development, DARPA on occasion funds the integration of large-scale “systems of systems” in order to demonstrate “disruptive capabilities.” Disruptive capabilities are more than just new technologies; they are transformations in operations and strategy enabled by synergistic combinations of technologies. The combination of stealth, standoff precision strike, and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm is an example of a disruptive capability. It allowed the US to change the rules of conventional warfare in a manner that many consider to be the forefront of a broad “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) in which the ability to exercise military control is shifting from forces with the best or the most individual weapons systems toward forces with better information and greater ability to quickly plan, coordinate, and accurately attack. This report describes how certain DARPA-sponsored systems and demonstrations since the 1970s contributed to the development of disruptive capabilities in the areas of stealth, standoff precision strike, and advanced ISR and hence to an emerging RMA. (It does not assess in detail DARPA’s role in supporting development of generic technologies—most notably microelectronics, computing, networking, and other information technologies—that underlie these and other emerging disruptive capabilities.) It highlights management practices that facilitated the development and exploitation of these disruptive capabilities, specifically: • Investing in basic technologies that can lead to fundamental technical advantages • Building communities of change-state advocates S-1 • Defining strategic challenges in detail across multiple scenarios • Supporting the conceptual development of integrated, disruptive capabilities • Testing promising disruptive capabilities in large-scale, proof-of-concept demonstrations • Working with leadership from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to broker Service commitment to the implementation of particular disruptive capabilities CONCEIVING DISRUPTIVE CAPABILITIES DARPA’s contributions to the emerging RMA occurred in the context of a clear imperative at the end of the Vietnam War: defense of Western Europe. Warsaw Pact offensive forces in Europe had been significantly increased and improved. Soviet-designed integrated anti-aircraft systems were very effective against US-built jets in Vietnam and in the 1973