https://englishkyoto-seas.org/ Kusaka Wataru Rise of “Business-Friendly” Local Elite Rule in the Philippines: How the Valdezes Developed San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2021, pp. 223-253. (<Special issue>“Faces of Local Transformation: Policy Coalitions and Socio-economic Development in the Philippines,” edited by Takagi Yusuke) How to Cite: Kusaka, Wataru. Rise of “Business-Friendly” Local Elite Rule in the Philippines: How the Valdezes Developed San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In “Faces of Local Transformation: Policy Coalitions and Socio-economic Development in the Philippines,” edited by Takagi Yusuke, special issue, Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2021, pp. 223-253. Link to this article: https://englishkyoto-seas.org/2021/08/vol-10-no-2-kusaka-wataru/ View the table of contents for this issue: https://englishkyoto-seas.org/2021/08/vol-10-no-2-of-southeast-asian-studies/ Subscriptions: https://englishkyoto-seas.org/mailing-list/ For permissions, please send an e-mail to: english-editorial[at]cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2, September 2011 Rise of “Business-Friendly” Local Elite Rule in the Philippines: How the Valdezes Developed San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte Kusaka Wataru* This paper aims to explain why reform-oriented local politics has gained ground in the Philippines. It has been argued that local politics in the Philippines is charac- terized by dynastic elites who employ a patron–client relationship, exploitive rent- seeking, and coercion and violence. However, a more reform-oriented local politics has emerged in many parts of the country since around the 2000s. What is the driver for the rise of reform-oriented local politics? Does this form of politics weaken or strengthen the local political dynasties? This paper answers the first question by arguing that links between the global neoliberal economy and local policy entre- preneurs have facilitated the rise of reform-oriented and business-friendly local politics. For the second question, it claims that local elites who become success- ful policy entrepreneurs adopting the new business-friendly politics are likely to further entrench themselves and perpetuate their dynasty by utilizing private cap- ital investment. These arguments are based on the case of the Valdez family in the municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Keywords: local politics, business-friendly, good governance, rent-seeking, elite democracy, political economy, real estate business Introduction Researchers have observed that Philippine local politics is characterized by an “elite democracy” in which oligarchic elites monopolize political power by controlling poor constituents through clientelism coupled with coercion and violence; they also accumu- late wealth through exploitive rent-seeking. However, this traditional view cannot explain the rise of more reform-oriented local politics in which local elites seek good governance and local economic development. This paper aims to address two questions related to the change. * 日下 渉, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464-8601, Japan e-mail: [email protected] Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2021, pp. 223–253 DOI: 10.20495/seas.10.2_223 223 ©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University 224 Kusaka Wataru First, what is the driver for the rise of reform-oriented local politics? Previous studies have emphasized the importance of political leadership. Aser Javier (2002) attrib- utes the emergence of local governments’ public entrepreneurship to the initiative of local chief executives who make use of the opportunities and power given to them by decentralization, with case studies of Marikina City, the province of Bulacan, and the municipality of Irosin. Emma Porio (2012) also emphasizes the initiatives of city mayors in Metro Manila in implementing networked governance with NGOs and business groups, emphasizing discourses of participation, empowerment, capacity building, and consensus building to deliver better services to constituents in order to be competitive to demands for economic growth and social and environmental governance. Agarie Hideo (2017) reports that in General Santos City, a new reform-oriented politician emerged due to the initiative of NGOs, people’s associations, professionals, and civil servants’ trade unions. Ma. Regina M. Hechanova et al. (2017), examining eight reform-oriented local govern- ments—Albay Province, Bohol Province, Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Naga City, San Jose City (Nueva Ecija), Municipality of Dumingag (Zamboanga del Sur), and Munic- ipality of Upi (Maguindanao)—identify transformative leadership with visions, strategic programs and initiatives, and citizen engagement as drivers of change. Hara Tamiki (2019) demonstrates how a progressive political coalition composed of the Liberal Party and Akbayan defeated a political dynasty in Siquijor Province through “People Power volunteers” and bottom-up budgeting projects during the Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino administration. A quantitative study by a Japanese research team asserts that mayors who frequently meet their constituents and hold development councils are likely to achieve good performance (Kobayashi and Osaki 2019; Nishimura 2019). These explanations highlighting political leadership and initiative are convincing but, do not explain the structural factors that have allowed local elites to become more reform- oriented. This paper argues that economic liberalization and the global economy have created a new political arena in which the pursuit of enticing investments from the private sector through business-friendly politics has become more critical for local elites than adhering to traditional exploitive rent-seeking. In other words, the nexus between the changes in economic structure and initiatives of local “policy entrepreneurs” (Takagi 2021) has facilitated the rise of reform-oriented and business-friendly local politics. Second, do the new economic structure and the rise of reform-oriented local politics weaken or strengthen local political dynasties? To answer the question, it is important to note that local elites’ power bases have shifted from a reliance on landownership and state resources to private resources of investors. With this shift, local political dynasties may become less stable as the importance of monopoly over state resources decreases. Also, economic development can enable constituents become more independent from Rise of “Business-Friendly” Local Elite Rule in the Philippines 225 the local elites by providing them of new private resources. For instance, Raymund John P. Rosuelo (2017) clarifies that urbanization and influx of the middle class into gated subdivisions formed new local constituents, who eroded a political clan’s long-standing dominance in Cainta, Rizal. However, it is also possible for local political dynasties to utilize the flow of private capital to strengthen their power base; this is supported by case studies. Sakuma Miho (2012) notes the continued dynastic rule of the Osmeñas in Cebu City, who successfully created jobs and increased tax revenue by attracting foreign investment to the special economic zone of Cebu Bay reclaimed with official development assistance from Japan. Porio (2012) identifies the paradox that local governments with traditional leadership in Metro Manila tend to transform local governance to become more efficient, innovative, transparent, and accountable to the needs of their constituents in order to remain competitive. This study supports the latter scenario based on the case in Ilocos Norte, where I confirmed that local elites adopted the new mode of business-friendly governance and succeeded in enticing private capital investment to entrench themselves and perpetuate their dynasty. I also explore conditions that would frustrate the continuation of business- friendly elites’ rule and usher in more open and competitive local politics. For this research, I carried out a total of five field surveys lasting about two weeks between 2007 and 2018 in the municipality of San Nicolas and Laoag City, in the province of Ilocos Norte.1) I Changing Landscape of Political Economy I-1 Shifting of Local Elites’ Power Base Many studies have tried to identify the power bases of Filipino local elites who suc- cessfully captured the state and maintained their power for generations. The origin of traditional elites can be traced back to the early American colonial era, when emerging Filipino- Chinese mestizos purchased huge plantations from the departing Spanish reli- gious orders that accumulated lands to seek profits in the international cash crop market (Anderson 1988). The emerging elites entrenched themselves through the lucrative export of cash crops, mainly sugar, to the US market and through the monopolization of political positions through the electoral democracy installed by the American colonial government. Studies of rural local politics in the pre-martial law era emphasized elites’ landowner- 1) I am deeply grateful to Nagasaka Itaru, Ariel Tejada, and Mario Tejada for facilitating my research. 226 Kusaka Wataru ship and patron–client relationship with poor constituents as their power base (Lande 1965; Agpalo 1972). They discussed an urban setting, where a vast number of domestic migrants moved from rural areas and the land ownership was not concentrated; the emergence of “machine