The 1952 Steel Seizure Revisited: A Systematic Study in Presidential Decision Making Author(s): Chong-do Hah and Robert M. Lindquist Source: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 587-605 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2392025 Accessed: 26-02-2015 21:54 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Inc. and Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Administrative Science Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:54:11 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The 1952 Steel Seizure There is a paucity of conceptual approaches to and sys- Revisited: A Systematic tematic case studies of presidential decision making, especially in the area of domestic policy. The three mod- Study in Presidential els advanced by Graham T. Allison in Essence of Decision Decision Making are applied to the 1952 steel seizure to explain why Presi- dent Truman decided to seize the mills. In the first model Chong-do Hah and analysis, the steel seizure is explained as the action that Robert M. Lindquist maximized Truman's goal of maintaining steel produc- tion. In the second, it is interpreted in part as the result of the actions of governmental organizations that dealt with the dispute. In the third, it is explained as a makeshift compromise concocted under the pressure of an ap- proaching strike deadline. The Allison approach has some weaknesses, but is found to be useful for explaining pres- idential decisions. The limitations of presidential power in domestic decision making are noted.' The president of the United States has been called the most powerful person in the world. An individualin that position can destroy life on earth at the touch of a button. The presi- dent's decisions often affect all parts of the globe. As Harry Trumanonce said, "The Presidency of the United States of Americahas become the greatest and most importantoffice in the historyof the world" (Koenig,1964:7). There is, how- ever, a lack of systematic studies explainingpresidential deci- sions. Most studies of the president have been idiosyncratic biographiesor, on occasion, indepth personalityportraits, such as Burns's (1956) Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox or the Georges' (1956) Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Per- sonality Study. A more recent attempt to providea psychoanalyticalframework for analyzingpresidents was Barber's (1972) The Presidential Character. Predicting Per- formance in the White House. 2 Legalistictreatises on the powers and duties of the president have also been common, Corwin's (1957) The President: Office and Power perhaps being the most notable. Neustadt's (1960) PresidentialPow- er: The Politics of Leadership remains, of course, the classic work on the natureof presidentialpower. The only attempt to formulatea coherent frameworkfor analyzingpresidential decisions alone was Sorenson's (1963) Decision Making in the White House. Sorenson delineated a numberof limitationsthat restrictpresidential options and specified the majorforces affecting the context in which presidentialdecisions are made. In addition,he described an ideal eight-step process of presidentialdecision making. The only existing case studies of presidentialdecisions, such as Paige's (1968) The KoreanDecision or Allison's (197 1) Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1 dealt solely with foreign policy decisions. There are no de- The authors are grateful to Lawrence Uni- tailed, systematic explanationsof presidentialdecisions in versity for financial support in preparation domestic affairs.This study fills that gap by analyzingTru- of this study man's decision to seize the steel mills, answering the ques- 2 tion why, not how. The frameworkof analysis used is the See also Mazlish (1972), In Search of Nlxon series of conceptual models developed by Allisonin Essence of Decision, namely, Model 1, Model 11,and Model 111.3Allison, 3 however, did not claim that his models are models in the See Allison (1971) for a more complete strict sense of the term, but only loose conceptual exposition of the models, especially for how they were derived frameworks. December 1975, volume 20 587/AdministrativeScience Quarterly This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:54:11 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MODELS Allison's Model I takes as its basic unit of analysis gov- ernmentalaction as rationalchoice. The government be- comes a single analyticentity with its own set of goals, values, and objectives. Governmentalaction is merely their maximization.The process of explanationinvolves the follow- ing inference pattern:given a governmentalaction, there must have been a nationalgoal or objective which the action was intended to achieve. The method of explanationis a form of vicariousproblem solving in which analysts put themselves in the place of the government and derive the correct goals, alternatives,and consequences. Why did the United States impose a blockadeon Cubaduring the CubanMissile Crisis? Because it was the most rationalway of getting the Russians to remove the missiles. In Essence of Decision, the unitary actor is the government. In this study, the rationalunitary actor is the president. In Model 11the focus is on the inputs and outputs of govern- ment organizations,with the basic unit of analysis being gov- ernmentalaction as organizationaloutput. Leaders may de- cide, but the informationupon which they make their deci- sions is generated by, and their decisions are implemented through,a set of governmentalorganizations. To explaingov- ernmentalaction at a certaintime (t), the analyst should examine the organizationscomprising the government and their routines, programs,repertoires, and standardoperating procedures (SOPs) at time (t-1). The best predictionof the action of governmentalorganizations at time (t+1) becomes their routines, programs,repertoires, and SOPs at (t). The Model 11explanation of the United States blockadeof Cubain 1962, for example, focuses on the routines and processes of such Americangovernment organizationsas the CentralIntel- ligence Agency and the navy. In Model Ill government decisions are not rationalchoices but the result of the struggle between different actors in the government who have various preferences and values and varyingdegrees of power and competence. The basic unit of analysis is governmentalaction as politicalresultant. To ex- plaina decision, the Model Ill analyst recounts the game be- tween the decision-makingactors that resulted in the action in question; such a game consists of the action channel-a programmedmeans of governmentalaction on a specific issue-the playersand their positions and preferences, and the bargaining.Thus, in Model Ill terms, the decision to im- pose a blockade upon Cubain 1962 is explainedas the result of bargainingamong members of the White House Executive Committee (ExCom). STEEL SEIZURE BACKGROUND The 1952 steel seizure was a significantevent in the history of the presidency. It was one of the strongest assertions of the preeminence of presidentialauthority and the decision of the Supreme Courtinvalidating the seizure was, as Rexford Tugwell put, "perhapsthe most serious setback the Presi- dency has ever suffered" (Bernstein, 1967: 273). McConnell(1960) provideda comprehensive documentary account of many of the events leading up to the seizure in his 588/ASQ This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:54:11 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1952 Steel Seizure The Steel Seizure of 1952. Enarson(1955), a White House staff member at the time of the dispute, recounted the poli- tics of the steel seizure in his "The Politics of an Emergency Dispute." Neustadt (1960), also a White House aide during those months, summarizedthe events in PresidentialPower, analyzingthem in terms of his conception of the natureof presidentialpower. Stebbins (1971), in "Trumanand the Sei- zure of Steel: A Failurein Communication,"analyzed Tru- man's failureto win publicopinion to his side duringthe dispute. The legal implicationsof the steel seizure case and of the various battles in the districtcourt, appeals court, and Supreme Courthave been adequately handled by Westin (1958) in The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case, Bradford (1967) in The Steel Seizure Case, and countless articles in law journals.This study synthesizes elements of all these works to explainsystematically the seizure decision. The 1952 steel dispute had its roots in Truman'spartial mobilizationfor the KoreanWar. After the NorthKorean at- tack on June 25, 1950, Trumaninstituted a programof partial rearmament.Draft calls were increased, several reserve divi- sions were activated, and the defense budget was nearly doubled, risingfrom 8 percent of the GNP to 14 percent. In the Defense ProductionAct of July 1950,