PRUNTEi v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC. 15 Cite as 699 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2010) if those claims were being considered to An Order consistent with this Opinion will place in context plaintiff’s allegations of be issued this same day. discourteous treatment as a part of his SO ORDERED hostile work environment claim, that claim still would not survive. ‘‘Hostile work environment claims are , not meant to set a general code for the workplace; rather a workplace environ- ment becomes hostile ‘only when offensive conduct permeate[s] [the workplace] with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and Robert R. PRUNTE,i Plaintiff, insult that is sufficiently severe or perva- sive to alter the conditions of the victim’s v. employment.’ ’’ Ramey v. Potomac Elec. UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, Power Co., 468 F.Supp.2d 51, 58 n. 8 INC., et al., Defendants. (D.D.C.2006) (citing Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C.Cir.2002)). Plaintiff’s Civil Action No. 06–0480 (PLF). conclusory allegation about unspecified United States District Court, discourteous and abusive treatment does District of Columbia. not meet this standard, nor is there any basis to infer that any such treatment was March 29, 2010. motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory Background: Hip-hop music composer animus. See Badibanga v. Howard Univ. brought action against recording and pub- Hosp., 679 F.Supp.2d 99, 103–04 (D.D.C. lishing companies, alleging copyright in- 2010) (dismissing hostile work environment fringement. Following partial dismissal, claim because allegations did not show req- 484 F.Supp.2d 32, and stay of further dis- uisite level of severity); Hunter v. Clinton, covery, 563 F.Supp.2d 41, parties cross- 653 F.Supp.2d at 124–25. This claim moved for summary judgment. therefore is dismissed. See Middlebrooks Holding: The District Court, Paul L. v. Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, Friedman, J., held that composer’s songs, 671 F.Supp.2d 61, 63–64 (D.D.C.2009) (con- ‘‘Fire in the Hole,’’ ‘‘God, Pick Up the clusory statements regarding discrimina- Phone,’’ ‘‘I’m So High,’’ ‘‘Smoke, Drink, tion do not survive a motion to dismiss) Cuss, Fight,’’ ‘‘Kings in the City,’’ ‘‘We Got (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). It Poppin,’’ ‘‘Wish a Muthafugga Would,’’ ‘‘Stripper Girl,’’ ‘‘Slow Neck,’’ ‘‘Every- IV. CONCLUSION body’s Talkin’ ‘Bout Us,’’ ‘‘Shoot to Kill,’’ For the reasons stated above, the Court ‘‘I’m a Maniac,’’ ‘‘First Blood,’’ and ‘‘That’s will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss in What’s Up’’ did not contain any copyright- part and will deny it in part, and the Court able aspects. will grant plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion for Defendants’ motion granted. discovery in part and deny it in part. Dis- covery in this case will proceed, but will be limited to whether or not plaintiff exhaust- 1. Copyrights and Intellectual Property ed his claims regarding his formal repri- O51 mand on October 13, 1999 and the SEC’s To establish copyright infringement, alleged imposition of a curfew upon him. plaintiff must prove: (1) ownership of valid 16 699 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 8. Copyrights and Intellectual Property elements of work that are original. O53(1) 2. Copyrights and Intellectual Property One work is substantially similar to O53(1) another, as required to establish copyright To establish copying of original con- infringement, if ordinary reasonable per- stituent elements, plaintiff must show that: son would conclude that defendant unlaw- (1) defendant actually copied plaintiff’s fully appropriated plaintiff’s protectible ex- work, and (2) defendant’s work is substan- pression by taking material of substance tially similar to protectable elements of and value. plaintiff’s work. 9. Copyrights and Intellectual Property 3. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O53(1) O53(1) In determining whether work is sub- First step in substantial similarity in- stantially similar to another, as required to quiry requires identifying which aspects of establish copyright infringement, court or artist’s work, if any, are protectible by fact-finder must consider works as whole copyright, i.e., which aspects display au- as well as individual elements of works in thor’s stamp of originality. isolation, since protectible expression may 4. Copyrights and Intellectual Property arise through ways in which artists com- O36 bine unprotectable elements. Mere fact that book, play, or piece of 10. Copyrights and Intellectual Property music is copyrighted does not mean that O8 every part of it is protected. Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘Fire 5. Copyrights and Intellectual Property in the Hole,’’ did not contain any copy- O4.5, 12(2) rightable aspects that could be infringed Ideas and facts contained in copy- by defendants’ work, ‘‘Fire in Da Hole’’; righted works are not protected, even neither titles nor short, common phrases though creative expression of those ideas such as ‘‘fire in the hole’’ were protectible, or facts may be. and asserted theme of vengeful young peo- 6. Copyrights and Intellectual Property ple was an idea and unprotectable. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a). O12(2) Sequences of events that necessarily 11. Copyrights and Intellectual Property result from choice of setting or situations, O8 and stock themes or settings that often Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘God, arise in works of particular genre, are not Pick Up the Phone,’’ did not contain any protected under copyright laws. copyrightable aspects that could be in- 7. Copyrights and Intellectual Property fringed by defendants’ work, ‘‘Lord, Give O53(1) Me a Sign’’; concept of person reaching out Once unprotectable elements of copy- and asking for help or counsel from a god right are excluded, substantial similarity was precisely the type of broad, general inquiry involves determining whether al- concept not safeguarded by copyright, and legedly infringing work is substantially fact that composer invoked the concept of similar to protectible elements of plaintiff’s divine intervention in five syllables did not work. render that concept protectible. PRUNTEi v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC. 17 Cite as 699 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2010) 12. Copyrights and Intellectual Property 16. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O8 O8 Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘I’m Hip-hop music composer’s song, So High,’’ did not contain any copyrighta- ‘‘Wish a Muthafugga Would,’’ did not con- ble aspects that could be infringed by de- tain any copyrightable aspects that could fendants’ work, ‘‘So High’’; neither titles be infringed by defendants’ work, ‘‘The nor short phrases such as ‘‘so high,’’ were Heat’’; combination of speaker’s wish plus protectible, and lyrics using clich´ed lan- common swear word was a simple short guage, such as the equation of being high phrase and thus not protectible, and man- to touching the sky, were too trite to war- ner in which phrase was used in each song rant copyright protection. 37 C.F.R. was distinct. § 202.1(a). 17. Copyrights and Intellectual Property 13. Copyrights and Intellectual Property O8 O8 Hip-hop music composer’s song, Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘Stripper Girl,’’ did not contain any copy- ‘‘Smoke, Drink, Cuss, Fight,’’ did not con- rightable aspects that could be infringed tain any copyrightable aspects that could by defendants’ work, ‘‘I’m N Luv (Wit a be infringed by defendants’ works, ‘‘I Stripper)’’; composer had no protectible Smoke, I Drank,’’ and ‘‘By Myself’’; use interest in word ‘‘stripper’’ or idea of a words ‘‘smoke’’ and ‘‘drink,’’ whether to- narrator being in love with a stripper, and gether or separately, was not protectible similarities between the songs related sole- expression. ly to setting, strip club, stock themes of 14. Copyrights and Intellectual Property men enjoying watching strippers, and se- O8 quences of events, strippers dancing on Hip-hop music composer’s song, poles that necessarily result from choice of ‘‘Kings in the City,’’ did not contain any situation and part of a sc`ene `a faire that copyrightable aspects that could be in- did not enjoy copyright protection. fringed by defendants’ work, ‘‘I’m a King’’; 18. Copyrights and Intellectual Property concept of narrator who was popular and O8 vengeful toward his enemies was unpro- tectable idea, word ‘‘king’’ was itself unpro- Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘Slow tectable, and, aside from repeated use of Neck,’’ did not contain any copyrightable word ‘‘king,’’ lyrics of the two songs were aspects that could be infringed by defen- entirely different. dants’ work, ‘‘Slow Motion’’; singers’ pref- erence that sexual acts be ‘‘slow’’ was 15. Copyrights and Intellectual Property merely concept that could not be protected O8 by copyright. Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘We Got It Poppin,’’ did not contain any copy- 19. Copyrights and Intellectual Property rightable aspects that could be infringed O8 by defendants’ work, ‘‘Get It Poppin’’; ti- Hip-hop music composer’s song, ‘‘Ev- tles and common phrases such as ‘‘get it erybody’s Talkin’ ‘Bout Us,’’ did not con- poppin’’ were not protectible by copyright, tain any copyrightable aspects that could and neither was the idea of ‘‘girls getting be infringed by defendants’ work, ‘‘Talk promiscuous after hours’’ in a club. About Our Love’’; idea of two lovers decid- 18 699 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES ing to ignore gossip about them was not 24. Copyrights and Intellectual Property protectible, nor were short, common O8 phrases such as ‘‘just running their Hip-hop music composer’s song, mouths.’’ ‘‘That’s What’s Up’’ did not contain any copyrightable aspects that could be in- 20. Copyrights and Intellectual Property fringed by defendants’ work, ‘‘That What’s O8 Up’’; ‘‘that’s what’s up’’ was a common, Hip-hop music composer’s song, short phrase and so was not protectible.