4 THE JAIN–MIMAM. SA DEBATE ON OMNISCIENCE Olle Qvarnström Introduction A central theme of research within the history of religious philosophy has been the debate concerning reason and revelation, which had its roots in the Greco-Roman tradition on the one side, and the Judeo-Christian tradition on the other. Initiated in the second and third century of the common era by authors such as Celsos, Porphyrius and Emperor Julian,1 it came to dominate medieval scholasticism and was brought to the fore after the Renaissance as a result of the development of natural science and biblical criticism, among other things. Today, the debate has re-emerged, and grown in momentum as well as complexity, largely due to Islamic and Christian fundamentalism.2 The result, as one might expect, has been the production of a plethora of scholarly studies that have looked at the question of reason vs. revelation from numerous angles of vision.3 To date, however, judging from the content of these studies, the scholarly community has not adequately attended the fact that, in certain respects, a similar debate took place in India. This debate originated from a religious conflict that arose between the followers of the Vedic tradition, on the one hand, and those of various non-Vedic traditions, on the other. As with the debate in the West, the Indic controversy thus had a double heritage and stemmed from an irreconcilable antagonism between those who held that man was doomed to ignorance and thus fully dependent upon revelatory scripture and those who held that man was not only predetermined for knowledge, but capable of acquiring it through his own natural faculties. The controversy in India differed, however, in several respect from that in the West. One principal difference was that whereas the Western controversy consisted of an encounter between two fundamentally incompatible worldviews, and thus extended from radical opposition to attempts at reconciliation, the Indic controversy involved traditions that had mutually influenced one another and thus shared fundamental values, including a common cognitive universe and lingua franca.4 Moreover, the most ancient sciences in India – ritual science and linguistics (including grammar, semantics, phonetics and prosody) – as well as 89 OLLE QVARNSTRÖM geometry and mathematics were all intimately connected to the Vedic religion. Because of this, the Indic debate was not marked by the same opposition or need of synthesis. The central question at issue was similar to the one that many medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers grappled with relative to Greek philosophy: What constitutes the source of all knowledge? A set of truths, insights and injunctions that man acquires through non-human revelation; or, a set of truths, insights and injunctions that man acquires through his own natural faculties? Or phrased dif- ferently: Does man acquire valid knowledge by means of non-human revelation or is he capable of apprehending it directly by means of his own natural faculties? In terms of the Indian debate, this question concerned the very foundation of the Vedic and non-Vedic traditions and was largely responsible for the emergence of Brahmajical systematic theology as well as Buddhist and Jain logic and epis- temology. Ultimately, it came to revolve around the issue of omniscience (sarva- jñata). In contrast to the Western debate, however, those on the side of omniscience were not monotheists arguing the cause of an omniscient God in heaven, but Buddhist and Jain ‘atheists’ who were claiming the possibility of omniscience in human beings.5 The debate reached its height during the seventh and eighth centuries when the well-known MimaÅsa theologian, Kumarila,6 made a final effort to defend his Bhatta school from the epistemological critique of the Buddhists.7 In the words of Kumarila, although the MimaÅsa tradition had gradually descended into materialism (lokayata), through his efforts it would be restored to the path of orthodoxy (astikapatha) once again.8 Adopting his oppo- nents’ terminology, Kumarila thus contrasted the allegedly personal omniscience of the Buddha with the non-personal, that is, authorless (apauruseya), Veda.9 In contrast to the Jain tradition, but not unlike Christian, Muslim and Jewish ecclesiastics, Kumarila and the MimaÅsakas viewed man as intrinsically flawed, impaired by defects such as attachment, desire, etc., and thus incapable of distin- guishing between right and wrong, dharma and adharma. Only the Veda, con- sisting of words that were eternal (i.e. not created by a fallible author), could bridge the insurmountable gulf between man and the imperceptible reality of the Veda, thus informing him of his duties or dharma. Even religious traditions such as SaÅkhya and Yoga, which entertained identical doctrines to those of the Veda, were nonetheless deemed unauthoritative due to their human origin. Decried as ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’, they were said to provide merely ‘the appearance of dharma’ (dharmabhasa), and nothing more.10 This declaration, stemming from one of the most prominent thinkers of the Brahmajical tradition, was the outcome of a long and complex historical devel- opment, originating with the religious polemics between Vedic and non-Vedic traditions as confirmed in the canonical scriptures of the Buddhists and Jains.11 But it was, above all, the critique leveled at Kumarila and his predecessors by the Buddhist philosophers, Dignaga and Dharmakirti, that constituted the primary impetus for Kumarila’s philosophical repudiation of the idea of an omniscient being in his Flokavarttika and Brhattika.12 The challenge of Jain philosophers 90 THE JAIN–MIMAM. SA DEBATE ON OMNISCIENCE both prior to and contemporary with Kumarila – philosophers such as Samantabhadra and Akalakka – are also thought to have played a significant role in compelling Kumarila to systematize and refine his arguments with respect to the doctrine of human omniscience.13 Along with their criticism of Brahmajical theology, the Buddhists and the Jains were occupied with composing texts which validated the omniscience of their respective founders and discussed the epistemology and structure of omniscience as well.14 The debate on human omniscience was related to the concept of dharma, in terms of its definition as well as the means by which it could be validated and known.15 According to Kumarila, mankind could receive valid instruction regarding right and wrong conduct only through the injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions ( pratisedha) of Vedic revelation,16 and not via perceptual or inferential proof. By definition, dharma was that which had the Veda as it sole authority17 and the Veda had been revealed neither by man nor a supreme God. It was beginningless (anadi), authorless (apauruseya), and of self-sufficient validity (svatahpramajya).18 In response to Kumarila, the eighth century Mahayana Buddhist philosopher, Fantaraksita,19 and his Fvetambara Jain colleague, Haribhadra,20 composed texts which sacrilegiously argued that man was already in possession of everything knowable, including dharma. It remained only for him to uncover the truth that resided within himself, thus realizing his inherent omniscience. The main arguments advanced by Haribhadra and Fantaraksita, in support of an omniscient being and in criticism of the Veda as an absolute authority, were later used by their respective co-religionists, such as Vidyananda (ninth century) and Ratnakirti (eleventh century), in an ongoing effort to refute Kumarila and the MimaÅsakas.21 Hence, in order to fully appreciate the arguments propounded by these later writers, it is first necessary to understand the philosophical and religious nuances of the original debate. Over the years we have seen the completion of a few extensive studies that systematically examine the Buddhist contribution to the debate on omniscience,22 most remarkably, the Jain contribution has more or less escaped the eye of historians of religion and Indologists alike.23 Consequently, no attempt has thus far been made to integrate the Buddhist and Jain doctrines of omniscience into a broader Indological religious and cultural context. The first major Fvetambara Jain response to Kumarila’s criticism of an omniscient being (sarvajña) appears to be the Fastravartasamuccaya and Sarvajñasiddhi of Haribhadra (eighth century).24 By undertaking an examination of the former text along with its professed autocommentary, the Dikprada, this article constitutes a small beginning step in the direction of such a comprehensive effort. The Fastravartasamuccaya or ‘Summary of the Main Topics of the Philosophical Treatises’ belongs to Haribhadra’s doxographical writings. These consist of texts that thematically describe the Jain faith in relation to that of dif- ferent opponents – be they philosophers, as in the Fastravartasamuccaya,25 or ordinary people, as in the Lokatattvanirjaya and Astakaprakaraja; or, deliver summaries of entire systems of philosophy, including his own, as in the 91 OLLE QVARNSTRÖM Saddarfanasamuccaya.26 In the Fastravartasamuccaya, Haribhadra puts himself in the vada-tradition (i.e. the tradition of debate), whereas in his Sarvajñasiddhi he argues with the MimaÅsakas from within the pramaja tradition of logic and epistemology.27 In what follows, I intend to paraphrase the relevant section in the Fastravartasamuccaya in light of the Dikprada, and thereafter comment upon some of its fundamental tenets. The Fastravartasamuccaya of Haribhadra (vv. 580–626) Haribhadra’s account of the Jain-MimaÅsa debate is organized in terms of two diametrically opposite propositions which bring the polemics to a close – one negating and the other affirming the existence of an omniscient being. The first proposition states that dharma and adharma can only be established on the basis of the tradition known as Veda. The second attributes the establishment of dharma and adharma to any person capable of directly perceiving objects residing beyond the reach of the senses (atindriyadarfin). The main narrative structure of the text may thus be divided into four parts, the first two consisting of the position of the proponent (purvapaksa) and the latter two, that of the opponent (uttarapaksa).