Research, Advocacy & Public Policy-Making and Institute of Financial Economics Working Paper Series # 14 | March 2013 Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully-fledged Democracy March 2013 March Samir Makdisi and Youssef El-Khalil Working Paper Series # 14 Paper Working Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs American University of Beirut Research, Advocacy & Public Policy-Making and Institute of Financial Economics Working Paper Series # 14 | March 2013 Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully-fledged Research, Advocacy and Democracy Public Policy-making in the Arab World (RAPP) studies the effectiveness of think tanks and research policy institutes in influencing public policy in the region. It aims to establish a permanent network of self-financed think tanks and research centers across the Middle East that are better able to impact public policy in their respective countries. Rami G. Khouri IFI Director Dr. Karim Makdisi IFI Associate Director Dr. Hana G. El-Ghali Senior Program Coordinator Rabih Mahmassani Communications Manager 1 2 Donna Rajeh Designer Samir Makdisi and Youssef El-Khalil 1 American University of Beirut 2 Bank of Lebanon and American University of Beirut Acknowledgment A panel based on this publication was held at IFI on February 11, 2012 with Samir Makdisi, George Corm, Fadia Kiwan and Youssef El-Khalil and invited guests. Click here to see the video of the panel. Published by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut. This report can be obtained from the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs office at the American University of Beirut or can be downloaded from the following website: www.aub.edu.lb/ifi The views expressed in this document are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs or the American University of Beirut. Beirut, Janaury 2013 © all rights reserved 2 Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully-fledged Democracy Contents Acknowledgment .............................................................................................................2 I. Introductory overview: the underpinnings of Lebanon’s consociational model and its practical implications ...............................................................................................4 II. Historical politico-economic roots of independent Lebanon: preparing the ground for consociationalism: a brief review ............................................................7 III. Post-independence consociationalism: the politico-economic record up to 1975 9 IV. The fall into the abyss: the civil war period, 1975-1990 .........................................12 V. The post-1990 adjusted consociational system: flawed governance and development ...............................................................................................................14 A. Political developments ...................................................................................................................................................................14 B. Macro and socio-economic developments ........................................................................................................................16 C. Lebanon’s dilemma ............................................................................................................................................................................17 VI. Transiting to a fully-fledged democracy? ...............................................................18 Concluding remarks: a caveat .......................................................................................20 References .......................................................................................................................21 Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully-fledged Democracy 3 I. Introductory overview: the underpinnings of Lebanon’s consociational model and its practical implications Since independence in 1943 Lebanon’s political system has been based on a power sharing arrangement among its religious communities. Referred to as a consociational democracy, it was embedded in an unwritten national pact by the leaders of the independence movement which specified the division of parliamentary seats among the Christian and Muslim communities on the basis of a six to five ratio in favor of the Christian community.3 And while it also specified equal representation in cabinet posts and in appointments to major positions in the public sector, (with equal shares being assigned to the three major religious groups) the pact gave the Maronite community specific political privileges.4 In practice veto power by either of the two communities concerning approval of decisions on fundamental questions (e.g., declaration of war, international agreements, the electoral law, citizenship, and added later, administrative decentralization laws) was provided for by the requirement that such approval was subject to a majority vote of two thirds. On the eve of independence, the declared rationale for agreeing on this form of political consociational governance was that in heterogeneous societies such as Lebanon’s (and heterogeneity could be religious, linguistic, ethnic or a combination thereof) it tended to promote stability and democracy.5 In practice, Lebanon’s post-independence history attests to only a partial realization of the intended objectives of its political model. On the one hand Lebanon’s consociationalism did allow for a relatively high level of freedom of expression, trappings of modern democracies (parliamentary elections, multiple political parties) and the non-dominance of any one single group in running the affairs of the country as happened elsewhere in the Arab world at least until the Arab uprisings began to unfold in 20116. On the other hand, it did not ensure the envisioned political stability nor did it lead to the attainment of a mature democracy: the Lebanese sectarian consociational model emerged as a form of constrained democracy in that it did not provide for equal political rights among Lebanese religious communities and in consequence among Lebanese citizens. If one of the major objectives of political institutions in democratic countries is to permit peaceful national dialogue and a peaceful resolution of political questions, then Lebanon’s record in this regard is greatly wanting. Lebanese polity did not prevent the emergence of a long lasting and devastating civil war (1975-1990) nor the occurrence of several episodes of major political unrest and conflicts preceding it or subsequently in the post-civil war period (see below). Admittedly, the causes of the civil war cannot be attributed solely to the country’s political governance. Its outbreak was caused by a combination of domestic and external factors (for an analysis see Makdisi and Sadaka, 2005). Briefly, the domestic factor was directly related to the 3 The constitution of the newly-independent state guaranteed equal rights to all citizens. However, the national pact was based on Article 95, which specified that for a temporary but unspecified period, religious communities would be equitably represented in public employment and cabinet posts though the principle of equity was not defined. 4 Under the pact it was agreed that the president of the republic would be a Maronite, the speaker of the house a Shia, and the prime minister a Sunni. The office of the president carried with it substantial executive powers. For example, the president chaired the council of ministers and appointed the prime minister and cabinet members, albeit after due consultation with major political actors whose views could not be ignored. And the need to preserve the delicate sectarian balance, particularly between the three major religious groups, acted as a check on the powers of the presidency. Major amendments to both the electoral law and prerogatives of the president were introduced in 1989 (see below). Throughout, however, a finely tuned formula of cabinet representation among Lebanon’s various religions (with equal representation for the three major religious groups) has been applied. 5 In the literature consociationalism refers to elite cooperation to prevent deep social divisions from destabilizing democracy and provoking conflict. The elites seek to accommodate political conflicts through compromise or amicable agreement (mainly through defining the issue as a technical or economic problem rather than an ideological conflict). Characteristics of such democracies include grand coalitions and proportionality in the electoral system and in the distribution of public office and scarce resources. Also the elite of each social segment may have its sphere of influence, either territorially or in the form of policy areas. (The literature on consociationalism was launched by Lijphart (1969); for a review and critique see Andeweg (2000) and for an empirical investigation of its relationship to conflict see Binningsbo (2005). Andeweg notes that the main line of division in society is no longer between semi-permanent segments at the mass level but between elites and masses, and democracy may be served better by a relative emphasis on competition. 6 The widely cited Polity IV index ranks countries’ levels of