Ethiopia re-enters the abyss of war Januuary 29, 2021 by Kjetil Tronvoll Last time Ethiopia descended into conflict, it took 17 years to emerge. Will Ethiopia’s new leaders learn from history? The Ethiopian federal government’s “law enforcement operation” in Tigray aimed to capture the rebellious rulers in the northern regional state. Thus far, however, the core leadership is at large, and the campaign has further exposed the country’s political fragility, pushing it into the abyss of a likely long- term war. Reports of military recruitment and reinforcements sent to the northern front to battle the rebels are again heard in Ethiopia, reminiscent of the recurring news headlines of the 1970s and 80s. With the Tigray war now in its third month, the contours of how a drawn-out conflict may evolve are emerging. Meanwhile, elsewhere in Ethiopia, other armed insurgencies are evolving. As conflict lines deepen, pressure increases on the state’s security forces and capacity. The surge in violence worsens the dire humanitarian situation across the country, weakens the economy, and diverts government attention, resources, and funding from economic development to warring. The Tigray war will therefore impact politics, social cohesion, and development all over the country, Just like the 1974-1991 Tigrayan struggle. The military campaign on Tigray will be remembered as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s “crossing the Rubicon” moment. No matter the outcome, or how long it will take to reach a victory or settlement, Ethiopia will likely never return to the status quo ante. Steps to war This war has been long in the making. For years, the cohesion within the ruling government coalition of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has withered, accentuated by the widespread disturbances during 2015-2018 instigated by the Qeerroo (Oromo) followed by the Fano (Amhara), youth protest movements. The youth protested against government abuse and maladministration, as well as TPLF dominance within the EPRDF. The Qeerroo demanded an ‘Oromo First’ policy, that the Oromo should exercise self-rule in Oromia and be the dominating force at the federal level, due to their demographic size. The internal power-struggle culminated with the ascent of Abiy to the helm in April 2018. Representing the Oromo faction of the coalition with the support of the Amhara party, Abiy’s rise undercut the longstanding Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominance of the EPRDF. In December 2019, initial tensions between the factions of Abiy’s EPRDF morphed to open hostility when he dissolved the coalition and crafted the Prosperity Party from its ashes. The TPLF leadership declared the dissolving of the EPRDF as illegal and regrouped in Tigray, where they started to design their own development policies and political visions of a Tigray “de facto state” with a looser relationship with the federal government. Subsequent attempts by, inter alia,religious leaders to pacify the increasing tensions failed. The decisive breach of relations between the federal government and Tigray’s rulers began with Addis Ababa’s decision to postpone the 2020 general elections due to the pandemic. TPLF, believing it was because Abiy feared losing at the polls, characterized the postponement beyond government term limits unconstitutional. Can Tigray’s election serve as a beacon of Ethiopian democracy? By Abreha Gebrearegawi Hagos The TPLF decided to proceed with elections in Tigray, which the federal government condemned as unconstitutional. Addis warned of sanctions and possible intervention if the regional poll went ahead. Tigray did not budge, however. During the 9 September elections, in my interviews with dozens of people from across the region, it was clear that for them, this was not an ‘ordinary election,’ but a referendum on their security and self- determination. In this respect, it was a plebiscite on TPLF’s role as the protector of Tigrayan people and the spirit of woyane (Tigrinya for ‘rebellion’)—the resistance against centralized rule and outsized outside influence on Tigray. Even local opposition members threw their support to the TPLF. One told me: “As the situation is, even I will vote for the TPLF. They are the only one who can offer us protection against the threats from the federal government. The way PM Abiy Ahmed has handled the issue has paradoxically made him the best campaign manager TPLF could have imagined.” In the aftermath of a TPLF landslide win, both governments denounced each other as unconstitutional, leading to the formal breach of political relations. From there, it was just a matter of time before the political conflict would explode into armed confrontation. Three-fronted offensive In mid-October, contacts in Amhara and Tigray observed deployment of federal and Amhara special forces on the southern and western borders of Tigray, apparently preparing to attack Tigray. The Amhara police commissioner later confirmed that federal and Amhara forces had planned the attack, but needed time to build sufficient military capacity to tackle the considerable Tigrayan security forces. Likewise, Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan recently confirmed that Abiy notified Khartoum in advance of the attack, asking Sudan to help “prevent any infiltration to add from Sudan by the TPLF fighters.” But Tigray would attack first. On the eve of 3 November, Tigray security forces, in cooperation with Tigrayan federal military officers, carried out what they called a “pre-emptive” strike against the Northern command of the federal army in Tigray. Tigray’s leaders claimedit was a legitimate exercise of self-defense against advancing enemy forces. Abiy’s government, however, considered it treason. Almost immediately, the ENDF and its allies launched a massive, three-pronged offensive against Tigray. Tens of thousands of federal troops, supplemented by Amhara militia and regional special forces, attacked Tigray’s west and south, while the Eritrean military swept in from the north. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian air force bombarded Tigrayan positions and cities. On the western frontline of the area known as Welkait, Amhara forces, backed by ENDF mechanized brigades, made rapid advances across the difficult-to-defend flat, lowland terrain. TPLF military sources, as well as civilians and staff in Amhara region hospitals treating inJured troops, told me that the attackers used an overwhelming “human wave” tactic, where hundreds of troops rushed head-on towards entrenched TDF positions, forcing Tigrayan forces to retreat to higher elevations. The fighting on the southern frontline of Raya proved to be a tougher challenge for the ENDF, as the escarpment provided better terrain for defensive positions. After assuming control of the lowlands, federal forces were soon bogged down in intense fighting when trying to advance into the Tigrayan highlands, leading to more mass fatalities. The third and perhaps most decisive front was to the north. Eritrea supported the Ethiopian offensive from day one by assisting the federal troops who fled the Tigrayan assault on the Northern Command, and by shelling the city of Humera on the western front. Soon, however, Asmara turned its military complex against its longtime foes. The causes and course of the Tigray conflict, according to Abiy Ahmed By Negash Haile Eritrean troops, together with Northern command units, battled the TDF at several points along the Eritrea-Tigray border. In the second week of November, Eritreans living in the border city of Senafe told me Eritrean forces were fighting TDF. Increasing evidence from international sources confirmed the Eritrean involvement, although Abiy has repeatedly denied this. Yet even his own military leadership later confirmed Eritrean participation. Tigray’s leaders claimed Eritreans also lost countless soldiers, but the onslaught and heavy shelling of cities forced Tigrayan forces to retreat from the urban areas along the main road towards Mekelle and mountainous central Tigray. Initially, Abiy believed the operation would be completed in a short time with the arrest of the top leadership. Still, it took three weeks of intense fighting, with likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, of fatalities, before the allied forces reached the outskirts of Mekelle, Tigray’s capital. In order to spare its destruction and heavy civilian losses, Tigray’s leadership left the city for the mountains together with their troops and other elites, allowing the ENDF to enter on 28 November when Abiy declared “mission accomplished.” Mission far from accomplished At that point, Abiy would make the world believe that everything was back to normal. An ‘interim government of Tigray’ of handpicked representatives was established and Abiy, asserted, ludicrously, that not a single civilian died in the capture of Tigray’s cities. The reality could not be more different: There have been mass atrocities against civilian and the war continues. Abiy has yet to achieve one of the publicly stated goals of the offensive: neutralizing the TPLF leadership to bring the whole Tigray region back under Addis Ababa’s sway. To be sure, Abiy has scored significant victories: his forces have captured prominent TPLF leaders, including Sebhat Nega, Abraham Tekeste and others, and killed founding members Seyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye. But most of the executive political and military leadership, including chairperson Debretsion Gebremichael, spokesperson Getachew Reda and the top military leaders, such as Tadesse Wereda and Tsadkan Gebretensae, is still at large. In a stark indicator of the ongoing struggle for territorial control and popular support, federal authorities have offered over a quarter million dollars for any information which could lead to their capture. Above all, the violence has not stopped. The TDF appear to be standing their ground in central Tigray, with TPLF-aligned media reportingtargeted attacks on the enemy. There are recent reports of clashes around Mekelle, particularly along its supply routes, against Eritrean forces in the northern part of the region, as well as on the western front around Dansha. The UN said that by 19 January, “active hostilities” continued across almost all of the region.
Details
-
File Typepdf
-
Upload Time-
-
Content LanguagesEnglish
-
Upload UserAnonymous/Not logged-in
-
File Pages8 Page
-
File Size-