The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Blitz (shortened from German 'Blitzkrieg', "lightning war") was the period of sustained strategic bombing of the The Blitz United Kingdom by Nazi Germany during the Second World Part of Second World War, Home Front War. Between 7 September 1940 and 21 May 1941 there were major aerial raids (attacks in which more than 100 tonnes of high explosives were dropped) on 16 British cities. Over a period of 267 days (almost 37 weeks), London was attacked 71 times, Birmingham, Liverpool and Plymouth eight times, Bristol six, Glasgow five, Southampton four, Portsmouth and Hull three, and there was also at least one large raid on another eight cities.[1] This was a result of a rapid escalation starting on 24 August 1940, when night bombers aiming for RAF airfields drifted off course and accidentally destroyed several London homes, killing civilians, combined with the UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill's immediate response The undamaged St Paul's Cathedral surrounded by smoke of bombing Berlin on the following night. and bombed-out buildings in December 1940 in the iconic St Paul's Survives photo Starting on 7 September 1940, London was bombed by the Date 7 September 1940 – 21 May 1941[1][a] [7] Luftwaffe for 57 consecutive nights. More than one (8 months, 1 week and 2 days) million London houses were destroyed or damaged, and more than 40,000 civilians were killed, almost half of them Location United Kingdom in London.[4] Ports and industrial centres outside London Result German strategic failure[3] were also heavily attacked. The major Atlantic sea port of Belligerents Liverpool was also heavily bombed, causing nearly 4,000 United Kingdom Germany deaths within the Merseyside area during the war.[8][9] The North Sea port of Hull, a convenient and easily found Commanders and leaders primary and secondary target for bombers unable to locate Winston Adolf Hitler [10] their primary targets, was subjected to 86 raids within the Churchill Hermann city boundaries during the war, with a conservative estimate Hugh Göring of 1200 civilians killed and 95% of its housing stock Dowding Hugo Sperrle destroyed or damaged.[11][12] Other ports including Bristol, Frederick Albert Cardiff, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, and Swansea were also targeted, as were the industrial cities of Pile Kesselring Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow, Manchester and Owen Tudor Hans Sheffield. Birmingham and Coventry were heavily targeted Boyd Jeschonnek because of the Spitfire and tank factories in Birmingham and Sir Leslie the many munitions factories in Coventry; the city centre of Gossage Coventry was almost completely destroyed. Casualties and losses The bombing did not achieve its intended goals of ~40,000[4]–43,000 3,363 aircrew demoralising the British into surrender or significantly civilians dead,[5] ~46,000 2,265 aircraft (Summer damaging their war economy.[13] The eight months of injured 1940 – May 1941)[6] 1 of 35 8/9/2014 4:29 PM The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz bombing never seriously hampered British production, and figures for wounded [14] the war industries continued to operate and expand. The possibly as high as Blitz did not facilitate Operation Sea Lion, the planned 139,000[5] German invasion of Britain. By May 1941 the threat of an invasion of Britain had passed, and Hitler's attention had turned to Operation Barbarossa in the East. In comparison to the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, the Blitz resulted in relatively few casualties; the British bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 alone inflicted about 42,000 civilian casualties, about the same as the entire Blitz. Several reasons have been suggested for the failure of the German air offensive. The Luftwaffe High Command (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, or OKL) failed to develop a coherent long-term strategy for destroying Britain's war industries, frequently switching from bombing one type of industry to another without exerting any sustained pressure on any one of them. Neither was the Luftwaffe equipped to carry out a long-term strategic air campaign, lacking among other things a heavy four-engined bomber, and its intelligence on British industry and capabilities was poor. All of these shortcomings denied the Luftwaffe the ability to make a strategic difference. 1 Background 1.1 The Luftwaffe and strategic bombing 1.2 Hitler, Göring and air power 1.3 Battle of Britain 1.4 Change in strategy 2 Civilian defensive measures 2.1 Physical protection 2.1.1 Prewar preparations and fears 2.1.2 Communal shelters 2.1.3 No collapse of morale 2.2 Civilian mobilisation 3 Pre-war RAF strategy for night defence 3.1 Dowding and his opponents 3.2 Defence by offence 4 Technological battle 4.1 German navigation techniques 4.2 British counter measures 5 First phase 5.1 Loge and Seeschlange 5.2 Improvements in British defences 6 Second phase 6.1 Night attacks 2 of 35 8/9/2014 4:29 PM The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz 6.2 Strategic or "terror" bombing 7 Final attacks 7.1 Directive 23: Göring and the Kriegsmarine 7.2 British ports 7.3 Potency of RAF night fighters 8 Aftermath and legacy 8.1 German losses 8.2 Effectiveness of bombing 8.3 RAF evaluation 8.4 Popular imagery and propaganda 8.5 Archive audio recordings 8.6 Use of bombsite rubble 8.7 Present-day 9 Tables 9.1 Bombing raid statistics 9.2 Sorties flown 10 See also 11 Notes 12 References 13 External links The Luftwaffe and strategic bombing In the 1920s and 1930s, air power theorists Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell espoused the idea that air forces could win wars by themselves, without a need for land and sea fighting.[15] It was thought there was no defence against air attack, particularly at night. Enemy industry, their seats of government, factories and communications could be destroyed, effectively taking away their means to resist. It was also thought the bombing of residential centres would cause a collapse of civilian will, which might have led to the collapse of production and civil life. Democracies, where the populace was allowed to show overt disapproval of the ruling government, were thought particularly vulnerable. This thinking was prevalent in both the RAF and United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) between the two World Wars. RAF Bomber Command's policy in particular would attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry.[16] Within the Luftwaffe, there was a more muted view of strategic bombing. The OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of enemy industries and or cities, and believed it could greatly affect the balance of power on the battlefield in Germany's favour by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale, but they did not believe that air power alone could be decisive. Contrary to popular belief, the Luftwaffe did not have a systematic policy of what became known as "terror bombing". Evidence suggests that the Luftwaffe did not adopt an 3 of 35 8/9/2014 4:29 PM The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz official bombing policy in which civilians became the primary target until 1942.[17] The vital industries and transportation centers that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. It could be claimed civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of attacking vital war industries—and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale—was ruled as acceptable.[18] Throughout the National Socialist era, until 1939, debate and discussion raged within German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment. Some argued along the lines of the British and Americans.[19] Walter Wever—the first Chief of the General Staff—championed strategic bombing and the building of appropriate aircraft for that purpose, although he emphasised the importance of aviation in operational and tactical terms. Wever outlined five key points to air strategy: 1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets. 2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces Walter Wever 3. To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e., armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations. 4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles 5. To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.[20] Wever argued that the Luftwaffe General Staff should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters. He argued they should be educated in grand strategy, war economics, armament production, and the mentality of potential opponents (also known as mirror imaging). Wever's vision was not realised; the General Staff studies in those subjects fell by the wayside, and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology, and operational planning, rather than on independent strategic air offensives.[21] In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash. The failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his immediate successors.