SCC Court File No.: 35918 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL) B E T W E E N: CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION/SOCIÉTÉ RADIO-CANADA Appellant – and – SODRAC 2003 Inc. and SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTION RIGHTS OF AUTHORS, COMPOSERS AND PUBLISHERS IN CANADA (SODRAC) INC. Respondents – and – CENTRE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY AND ARIEL KATZ, SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC, CANADIAN MUSICAL REPRODUCTION RIGHTS AGENCY LTD., CANADIAN MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF MUSIC PUBLISHERS, and MUSIC CANADA, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, CANADIAN COUNCIL OF MUSIC INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS, CANADIAN INDEPENDENT MUSIC ASSOCIATION AND L’ASSOCIATION QUÉBECOISE DE L'INDUSTRIE DU DISQUE, DU SPECTACLE ET DE LA VIDÉO Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC (CIPPIC) Jeremy de Beer David Fewer Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law 57 Louis Pasteur St. Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5 Tel: 613 562-5800 (ext.2558) Fax: 613 562-5417 [email protected] Counsel and Agent for the Intervener TO: THE REGISTRAR COPY TO: Me COLETTE MATTEAU Me FRÉDÉRICK LANGLOIS Matteau Poirier avocats inc. Deveau, Gagné, Lefebvre, Tremblay 353 Saint-Nicholas Street & associés, S.E.N.C.R.I. Suite 210 867 Saint-René Blvd. West Montréal, Québec H2Y 2P1 Suite 8 Gatineau, Québec J8T 7X6 Tel: 514 281-0033 Fax: 514 284-9328 Tel: 819 243-2616 Ext. 224 [email protected] Fax: 819 243-2641 [email protected] Counsel for the Respondents Agent for the Respondents AND TO: Me MAREK NITOSLAWSKI Me JAY KERR-WILSON Me JOANIE LAPALME Me AIDAN O’NEILL Me MICHAEL SHORTT Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, LLP Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, LLP 55 Metcalfe Street 800 Square Victoria Suite 1300 Suite 3700 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5 Montréal, Québec H4Z 1E9 Tel: 613 696-6884 Tel: 514 397-4335 Fax: 613 230-6423 Fax: 514 397-7600 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Agents for the Appellant Counsel for the Appellant AND TO: Me HOWARD P. KNOPF Macera & Jarzyna LLP 427 Laurier Avenue West Suite 1200 Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7Y2 Tel: 613 238-8173 Fax: 613 235-2508 [email protected] Counsel for the Interveners Center for Intellectual Property Policy and Ariel Katz AND TO: Me CASEY M. CHISICK Me JEFFREY W. BEEDELL Me PETER J. HENEIN Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Me ERIC MAYZEL 160 Elgin Street Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP Suite 2600, Stn. D Scotia Plaza Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 40 King Street West Suite 2100 Tel: 613 786-0171 Toronto, Ontario M5H 3C2 Fax: 613 788-3587 [email protected] Tel: 416 869-5403 Fax: 416 644-9326 Agent for the Interveners [email protected] Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency Ltdl., Canadian Music Counsel for the Interveners Publishers Association, and Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights International Confederation of Music Agency Ltdl., Canadian Music Publishers Publishers Association, and International Confederation of Music Publishers AND TO: Me BARRY B. SOOKMAN Me COLIN S. BAXTER Me DANIEL G.C. GLOVER Conway Baxter Wilson LLP Mc Carthy Tétrault LLP 1111, Prince of Wales Dr. TD Bank Tower Suite 401 66 Wellington Street West Ottawa, Ontario K2C 3T2 Suite 5300 Toronto, Ontario M5K 1E6 Tel: 613 780-2012 Fax: 613 688-0271 Tel: 416 601-7949 [email protected] Fax: 416 868-0673 [email protected] Agent for the Interveners Music Canada, International Counsel for the Interveners Federation of the Phonographic Music Canada, International Federation Industry, Canadian Council of Music of the Phonographic Industry, Canadian Industry Associations, Canadian Council of Music Industry Associations, Independent Music Association and Canadian Independent Music Association l’Association Québécoise de and l’Association Québécoise de l’Industrie du disque, du spectacle et l’Industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la de la vidéo. vidéo. i TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I. OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................1 PART II. POSITION ON APPELLANT’S QUESTIONS ..................................................2 PART III. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................2 A. The decision in Bishop v Stevens does not determine the outcome of this appeal...................2 1. Principles of statutory interpretation have changed since Bishop......................................3 2. The purposes of copyright law have been clarified since Bishop. .....................................3 3. Bishop does not support an unlimited interpretation of the right to reproduce..................5 B. The Act’s purposive balance inherently limits the scope of the reproduction right................6 1. A purposive interpretation of the reproduction right is necessary, not inappropriate........6 2. The principle guiding copyright law is balance, not bare value.........................................8 3. Balance requires a functional not formalistic application of technological neutrality.......8 C. The practical realities of digital technology limit the scope of the reproduction right. ..........9 PART IV. SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS ..............................................................................10 PART V. ORDER SOUGHT..............................................................................................10 PART VI. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. 11 PART VII. STATUTORY PROVISIONS ..........................................................................13 1 PART I. OVERVIEW 1. The Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) invites this Court to reaffirm two core values at the heart of Canadian copyright jurisprudence—purposive balance and pragmatic efficiency. These values shape the principle of technological neutrality, which helps guide the interpretation and application of the Copyright Act.1 2. This appeal turns on the meaning of the word “reproduce” in section 3 of the Act. Should “reproduce” be interpreted literally? Or should “reproduce” be interpreted purposively and pragmatically? CIPPIC supports a purposive and pragmatic interpretation. 3. A purposive and pragmatic interpretation of the reproduction right suggests it does not encompass literally all copying. Affirming that principle is not judicial activism; it is a common sense and technologically neutral application of Parliamentary intent. Parliament did not strike a balance by enacting literally limitless rights only to claw them back with various technical exceptions elsewhere in the Act. Parliament’s balance is also embedded in the inherently limited scope of the rights granted. 4. Twenty-five years ago, in the case of Bishop v Stevens, this Court was “not convinced that there is any reason to depart from the literal readings of s. 3(1)(d) and the introductory paragraph to s. 3(1).”2 Today, the purposive and pragmatic reasons to depart from a literal interpretation are much clearer. 5. Since the turn of the 21st century, this Court has consistently emphasized balance and efficiency in its interpretations of the Act.3 Interpreted purposively, section 3 cannot give copyright holders the right to control literally every digital copy of a work, however ephemeral or de minimus. Common sense and case law reinforce the inherent limitations in copyright’s scope. In a digital environment, where countless ephemeral copies are inevitably required even to access a work, a literal interpretation of the reproduction right would be unsustainable. 6. Parliament has occasionally caught up with new technology and enacted specific provisions that provide greater certainty about the limits of reproduction rights. Technological neutrality, however, helps courts future-proof the law by interpreting copyright’s scope based on fundamental principles, not the technical 1 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42. 2 Bishop v Stevens, [1990] 2 SCR 467 at 484 [Bishop], Respondents’ Book of Authorities (“RBA”) at Tab 4. 3 Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 at paras 30-31 [Théberge], Appellant’s Book of Authorities (“ABA”) at Tab 24; see also cases cited infra at paras 16, 36. 2 or political circumstances of the day. To protect the public interest, CIPPIC endorses Professor Craig’s persuasive analysis of technological neutrality: “its justification is found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the copyright system,”4 she writes. Technological neutrality “must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm.”5 PART II. POSITION ON APPELLANT’S QUESTIONS 7. The intervener submits: A. The decision in Bishop v Stevens does not determine the outcome of this appeal. B. The Act’s purposive balance inherently limits the scope of the reproduction right. C. The practical realities of digital technology limit the scope of the reproduction right. 8. CIPPIC invites this Court to consider its submissions in deciding the Appellant’s first question on appeal, which is whether a technologically neutral interpretation of the Copyright Act requires licenses for “broadcast-incidental copies.”6 While CIPPIC submits that not all copies of