David R. Stone. The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1918. Modern War Studies Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015. Illustrations. vii + 359 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-2095-1. Reviewed by Aleksandra Pomiecko Published on H-War (May, 2016) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) Throughout the years, and notably the last way. While Stone attributes Russia’s defeat in the two with the one hundredth anniversary of the war to both the viability of the social and econom‐ beginning of the First World War, scholarly de‐ ic system and the events at battle, he emphasizes bates focusing on the conflict have tended to cen‐ the latter. Nevertheless, by highlighting the mili‐ ter on the difficulties in providing an all-inclusive tary narrative in the Russian perspective, Stone account of the war. Christopher Clark’s ambitious equally contributes to our understanding of the work, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to social and economic system, as the causes of de‐ War in 1914 (2013), is one such example. Other feat were not mutually exclusive. studies have sought to ascribe blame to particular The notion of contingency is a consistent parties for the outbreak of the war. In The Rus‐ trope throughout the work. While some scholars sian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, (as Stone accurately states) see this as a potential‐ 1914-1917, David R. Stone’s goal is not to revolu‐ ly dangerous path toward counterfactual history, tionize our understanding of the war but rather to Stone does not abuse his emphasis on contingency flesh out the Russian perspective through a study but merely utilizes the idea as a way to explore of Russia’s experience on the battlefield. The different opportunities, angles, and perspectives. book’s focus on Russia certainly addresses one la‐ What we may call Russia’s “backwards” military, cuna in the historiographical feld, as coverage Stone perceives as one that was still in the process and literature of the eastern front lies in the shad‐ of rearmament and development. This leads to ow of its western counterpart. In fact, Norman the idea that had the war not begun as early as it Stone’s (unrelated to author in review) 1976 work, did, Russia’s military would have been better pre‐ The Eastern Front 1914-1917, continues to be one pared. Again, though playing with contingency of the few solid studies regarding this topic. Be‐ can be dangerous, Stone uses it to investigate vari‐ sides providing an updated and much-needed ac‐ ous issues further and in doing so, provides an in‐ count of the eastern front that incorporates a larg‐ teresting yet professional narrative. This is best er available pool of Russian sources, it is the ap‐ demonstrated through his focus on Russia, which proach taken by David Stone, both by focusing on he essentially does by comparing it and contextu‐ and contextualizing the Russian perspective, that alizing it with the other Central and Eastern Euro‐ contributes to the discussion in an interesting pean Empires at that time: the German, the Aus‐ H-Net Reviews tro-Hungarian, and the Ottoman. Rather than shortcomings were not any greater than those the looking at Russia vis-à-vis the more “modernized” other empires experienced. When looking at the and “industrialized” West, Stone offers a refresh‐ overall structure of command, we see that while ing and effective way of assessing Russia’s posi‐ the German one was organized and centralized, tion during the war, that is, in comparison to em‐ the Austrian was decentralized and unorganized, pires that were in many ways just as weak or just and suffered from ethnic divides. Russia’s was as strong. comparatively somewhere in between. The Russian experience is brought out simply The next four sections focus on the eastern yet effectively through the book’s organization. campaigns, respectively: Galicia (1914), Poland Focusing more than half of his work on the earlier (fall 1914), and the Masurian Lakes and the years of the war (1914-16), Stone highlights the Carpathians (winter 1914-15). Stone provides a time period that had more of an impact on Russia. discussion of the major obstacles for each party This is seen not only through the concentration of involved in the battles, the logic in each comman‐ campaigns fought but also through the literature der’s thinking, and the weaknesses and strengths published by Russians after the war, which high‐ of the warring armies. In the Russian case, there lighted both the strengths and weaknesses of the seems to be a repeated pattern: lack of good intel‐ Russian military, from a lack of good reconnais‐ ligence and information; lack of infrastructure, sance and intelligence to Aleksei Brusilov’s suc‐ which in turn affected communication and trans‐ cessful offensive in 1916. In general, each chapter portation; and timidity on behalf of some individ‐ begins with a brief narrative of the situation with‐ uals to pursue the enemy after a successful opera‐ in the Russian, as well as the German and Austro- tion. Stone then discusses the Great Retreat in Hungarian, Empire, as it relates to the topic in 1915, at which point the Russian army was essen‐ that section. tially driven East by the Germans, abandoning To begin his work, Stone offers a solid intro‐ about three hundred thousand square kilometers ductory chapter on the generally agreed-upon ori‐ (p. 146). While the chapter reflects the blowing gins of the war. While this part is not revelational loss to Russia, Stone argues for a German cyclical in any major way, it provides a good overview of movement eastward through the repeated the alliance system in 1914 and the ambitions and process of “preparation, attack, breakthrough, rivalries between states and coalitions, and con‐ pursuit, exhaustion, and recovery” (p. 147). This cludes with the July Crisis. Stone then follows deconstructed process exposes a more nuanced with a discussion of the Russian army, which in‐ and complex German victory and Russian defeat. cludes a section on its composition (mostly peas‐ One of the work’s most interesting and en‐ ants), the process of conscription, and the lack of riching parts is the discussion on the Caucasus education. While the Russian army was good at Campaign from 1914 to 1917. It is here that Stone maneuvering larger formations, the lack of educa‐ provides background of the Ottoman Empire’s po‐ tion and high peasant concentration resulted in a sition going into the war, while mentioning previ‐ shortage of trained and competent officers, as ous conflicts that affected the empire’s perfor‐ well as in soldiers who could not use machinery. mance and state of affairs. The geopolitical impor‐ Rather than ascribe the “backwards” label, as has tance of the region is contextualized through the been done when describing the Russian army, long-enduring Russo-Turkish struggle over con‐ Stone, while not necessarily denying it, decon‐ trol of the straits. Stone presents Russia’s involve‐ structs it and is able to explain the weaknesses. ment while comparing it with the Ottomans’ state That being said, he is also able to show that these of being at the time, using underdeveloped infra‐ 2 H-Net Reviews structure as well as long and treacherous moun‐ Romanian front. After Brusilov’s successes, Roma‐ tain frontiers to demonstrate the strengths and nia decided to join the Allied side with its army of weaknesses of both empires. The chapter con‐ half a million. Its main motivation was acquiring cludes with a discussion of the Armenian geno‐ Transylvania from a weakening Austro-Hungari‐ cide, the landing of the Anglo-French forces in an Empire. This effort was decidedly unsuccess‐ Gallipoli, and general Armenian sympathies for ful, as Romania became involved in a fght against the Russian Empire. Although underdeveloped, the Habsburg Empire in Transylvania as well as this part shows the imminent tie between military from the south with Bulgaria and German troops campaigns and instances of violence, which are under August von Mackensen. For Russia, Roma‐ not mutually exclusive. nia’s involvement resulted in more chaos, sacri‐ Stone then follows up with a discussion of fice, and defeat as its frontier stretched even more Russian society during war, in which he includes and it had to replenish and support the Romani‐ analysis of the effects of the Great Retreat, mani‐ ans. fested through an increasing number of deserters Stone’s work concludes with a chapter dis‐ and refugees, and an increase in anti-Semitism. cussing the “collapse” in 1917. It seeks to draw to‐ Stone continues by offering an assessment of the gether the political, diplomatic, and economic fac‐ economic situation, equally as dismal, seeing as tors to better synthesize Russia’s position in the Russia faced shortages as it relied on foreign com‐ war that year. The political narrative of the revo‐ panies that prioritized their own national quotas lution is, of course, not exhaustive and rather over exports. Stone then switches back to the stands out from the rest of the book’s military fo‐ front by focusing the next section on the Brusilov cus. Nevertheless, Stone demonstrates how the offensive. Its goal, as he clearly explains, was es‐ political processes and changes in Russia affected sentially to gauge the weak point within the op‐ and were also influenced by the military events posing army, by not concentrating large numbers and campaigns still occurring at this time. of troops at one point, but instead by dividing Overall, Stone presents a narrative that is in‐ them and attacking from different points. The ini‐ formative and interesting, by presenting informa‐ tial effect that Brusilov’s strategy had against the tion that is less known to those interested in the Austro-Hungarians was tremendous: as reinforce‐ First World War.