Courage and the Soul in Plato Helen Margaret Clare Mawby (0002542) Submitted for the degree: PhD Philosophy Department, Arts Faculty, Glasgow University January2006 © Helen Mawby Abstract In the Introduction I briefly lay out the history of the value terms that I will be consideringin my thesis and considerthe philosophical relevanceof the developmentof suchvalues in the 5t' century. The infiltration of modern ideasof morality into what was consideredto be good to the Greekshas a great influence on the literature and philosophy of this period. Plato prioritises thesequiet moral virtues, but also tries to hang on to some of what had come before, and thus facesdifficulties with his moral theory. I will show that couragepresents Plato with an acutedifficulty when attempting to develop a consistentethical theory. In Chapter 2I look at the Protagoras where the main issues about courage that Plato will continue to discuss throughout his life are introduced. The questions of the extent to which the virtues can be taught and the unity of the virtues are introduced early on. What follows is an attempt to explain and justify the Socratic idea that the virtues are co- dependent and that they all in some way boil down to knowledge. In Chapter 3 on the Laches I will show that the discussion focuses more particularly on the virtue of courage and is mostly a more sophisticated attempt to understand courage than the one presented in the Protagoras. The early dialogues are chiefly concerned with the Socratic idea that virtue is knowledge and my discussion in those chapters considers how well this theory works when related to courage. The role of fear in a definition of courage is not explicitly considered in these early works but it is clearly a fundamental part of any explanation of courage. The position Plato takes on fear in the early dialogues is not altered in any Laws significant way until we get to the -and even then not substantially enough - and so the inherent problems in this approach are continued into the middle period. In the following three chapters(4-6) 1 examinethe position taken in the Republic in detail, which I take to be more representativeof the Platonic rather than Socratic position. Plato's psychological model - which includesdirect influence from the lower soul - is a more reasonable interpretation of the internal workings of the agent than the simpler model in the early dialogues of the only direct motivator being beliefs or knowledge. This model supports the definitions given of the virtues in the Republic and thus Plato's ethical theory is presented more clearly than perhaps anywhere else in his corpus. The same problems face Plato in explaining courage though, in spite of his meticulous thesis, he still must explain how fear operates within his definition and I look at this in detail in Chapter 6 on the emotions. The chapter on the Laws considers the idea that some of the apparent differences between the Republic and the Laws are due to Plato's growing realisation that courage will not be assimilated into a unified ethical theory of the type that he wishes to propose. Plato takes the dramatic step of referring to the acts of mercenary soldiers as courageous and thus the issue of whether courage should always be considered a virtue arises. I consider what Christopher Bobonich has called the Dependency Thesis as an attempt to understand the relationship between these two apparently different types of courage. At the end of the Laws Plato seems more unsure about the position he should take on the unity of the virtues and how to explain the virtue of courage. As I will show over the next six chapters, courage presents a challenge that Plato is never quite able to meet, but the ways in which he fails to incorporate it into his ethical position provides illuminating discussion on the troubling quality of courage. I would like to thank my supervisor Richard Stalley for his continual support and insightful commentary, and the Arts and Humanities Research Board for the generous financial contribution. Many thanks as well to my wonderful husband Jim. Translations Unlessotherwise noted, the following translationsof Plato's dialogueshave beenused throughout': Apology, trans. G.M. A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works,Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. Crito, trans. G.M. A. Grube, Plato: CompleteWorks, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. Euthydemus, trans. Robin Waterfield, Early Socratic Dialogues, Plato, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987. Gorgias, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1994. Laches, trans. lain Lane, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987. The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Sounders, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970. Meno, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie, Protagoras and Meno, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956. Phaedo, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Plato: Complete Works, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, Plato: Complete Works, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1955. 11 have alteredthe translationsslightly when necessary. Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Courage and Hedonism in the Protagoras 7 Chapter 3: Courage in the Laches 39 Chapter 4: Republic I- The Soul 66 Chapter 5: Republic 2- Virtue 104 Chapter 6: Republic 3- The Emotions 127 Chapter 7: Courage in the Laws 145 Chapter 8: Conclusion 198 Bibliography 204 Chapter 1: Introduction In his influential book Merit and Responsibility A. W. H Adkins puts forward the thesis kalos, kakos that the important value terms in Greek times - those such as agathos, arete, influenced by When and aischron - were heavily the needs of the society. the most important quality in a man was that he could protect his dependents from the threat of death or servitude through warfare the agathoi were those who were able to do this. Thus the people depicted in Homer who are given the highest honours are the strong and powerful who are able to protect the weaker who depend on them. Adkins calls the virtues that were commended in heroes such as Achilles and Agamemnon competitive virtues. Adkins also says: Being the most powerful words of commendation used of a man, they [courage, successful leadership etc. ] imply the possession by anyone to whom they are applied of all the qualities most highly valued at any time by Greek society. In the 5`hcentury the meaning behind such value terms becomes much more muddled, perhaps due to the need for internal civic concord which relies more on justice and temperance than courage and skill in warfare. We start to see value terms occasionally being connected with characteristics that were not previously recognised as important. What Adkins calls the quiet virtues - as opposed to the competitive virtues of the into Homeric world - start to seep the works of dramatists such as Euripides, Sophocles and Aeschylus. For example in the Suppliants by Aeschylus we find him praising justice: Zeus thesethings, holds the balance, to kakoi their ... watchesover and assigning the unjust deeds,to the law abiding, their righteous deeds. And in the Ajax by Sophocles we find him commending temperance: ' A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, p. 31. 2 Aeschylus,Suppliants, 402, from Adkins' own translation in Merit and Responsibility. 3 The gods love men who are temperateand hate those who are kakoi. I do not mean to suggest that there are not examples of Homer or Hesiod praising justice or temperance, but that the occurrence is so infrequent as to be noticeable. Also the references to the warrior or king being agathos because they are brave and powerful are plentiful in those works. So when the writers of the 5th century start to praise these quiet virtues it is not that they have never been spoken of well before but that they are now given a stronger position in what makes a man agathos. This development towards the inclusion of quiet virtues into the concept of what makes a man good can be seen more explicitly in the works of Plato. In the Apology Socrates acts in a way that will have surprised his audience, and gives the first sign that in the work of Plato we will appreciate a more structured and analytical approach to this change in attitude. Socrates does not present himself to the court in the usual manner; he does not parade his friends and children around the court and make emotional appeals to the jury. In this way his approach to his defence would have been in contrast to the norm of the day. In another way, what Socrates does in court would not have seemed out of place to his audience even if what he said would have. It was common practice in Greece at this time to appeal for leniency on the grounds that you have been a valued citizen who has contributed to the life of the state. Socrates does make reference to what he has done for Athens, but does not do so as an emotional appeal but as an attempt to explain his lifestyle, and his value to his homeland.After the verdict of guilty is given Socratessays: I did not follow that path that would have made me of no use either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city's possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way.