POLICY PAPER SERIES 11/2019 November 2019 THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER 1974 AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Andreas Theophanous 11/2019 October 2019 THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER 1974 AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Andreas Theophanous This paper will be published as a Policy Paper in the forthcoming issue of the Cyprus Review, Fall 2019, Volume 31, Issue 1. THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER 1974 AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 11/2019 Nicosia, October 2019 Copyright © Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia Press: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia Andreas Theophanous Professor Andreas Theophanous served as Economic Advisor to the President of the Republic of Cyprus from September 1990 to February 1993. He is the President of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and the Head of the Department of Politics and Governance of the University of Nicosia. He visited several universities and think-tanks as a Visiting Professor, Senior Fellow and/or Guest Speaker. Theophanous is the author of several books and many articles as well as policy papers. These focus on Cyprus, EU-Turkish relations, European integration, Eastern Mediterranean Affairs, issues of governance in biethnic and multiethnic societies, political economy and the Euro-debt crisis. THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER 1974 AND FUTURE PROSPECTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 6 Ι. FROM THE UNITARY STATE TO THE BIZONAL BICOMMUNAL FEDERATION ....................................................... 7 ΙΙ. FROM THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS TO THE ANNAN PLAN AND THE DAY AFTER ............................................................... 14 III. THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER 2008 AND THE COLLAPSE AT CRANS MONTANA ................................. 24 IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS .......................................... 32 V. POSTSCRIPT .......................................................................... 39 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................... INTRODUCTION On July 13 1974 the two constitutional experts Michael Dekleris and Orhan Aldıkactı from Greece and Turkey respectively, who have been supporting the enhanced intercommunal negotiations, reached a tentative agreement on the Cyprus problem.1 This was to be ratified on July 16 by Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash on behalf of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Community.2 However, the coup against President Makarios on July 15 by the Greek Junta and the subsequent Turkish invasion on July 20 changed drastically the overall political scene. Not surprisingly, the basis of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem changed from a unitary state to what eventually came to be known as a bizonal bicommunal federation. This paper assesses the results and repercussions of successive rounds of intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the UN since 1974.3 In addition, certain suggestions are made for the future. 1 See M. Dekleris, The Cyprus Question 1972-1974: The Last Opportunity (in Greek), Estia, Athens 1981, pp. 266-273 and M. Christodoulou, The Course of an Era: Greece, the Cypriot Leadership and the Cyprus Problem (in Greek), Ioannis Floros, Athens 1987, p. 623. 2 Ibid. 3 See also A. Theophanous, The Intercommunal Negotiations after 1974 - Results and Future Prospects, Policy Paper 7/2019, June 2019. This paper was firstly presented at the conference The Political History of the Republic of Cyprus organized by the School of Law, the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, the Cyprus Review and the Magazine Nea Estia, that took place at the University of Nicosia on October 12-13, 2018. 6 I. FROM THE UNITARY STATE TO THE BIZONAL INTERCOMMUNAL FEDERATION The 1960 constitution established in essence an administrative federation, based on consociational democracy without a geographical base.4 Cyprus was under the guardianship of three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, there was neither a common vision for the future nor a tradition of tolerance and a culture of political cooperation. At the same time there were systematic foreign interventions in the affairs of the newly founded island-state. Under these circumstances intercommunal strife erupted which culminated to a great crisis at the end of 1963 and subsequently.5 Following the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the state structure and the creation of enclaves the political scene changed drastically. President Makarios struggled for the continuity of the State and the legitimization of the Doctrine of Necessity. In essence, the Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964 was a victory for the Republic of Cyprus.6 Since then, Turkey has been trying to reverse this significant decision. With the rise of the Junta in Greece on April 21, 1967 and the crisis in Cyprus in November 1967, which led to the withdrawal of the Greek contingency force from Cyprus, Makarios adopted a new policy. The objective was not enosis anymore but a unitary state.7 Slowly but gradually there was progress in the intercommunal negotiations which started in 1968.8 4 See Republic of Cyprus, Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, PIO, Nicosia 1960 and S. Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1968, pp. 157-162. 5 For an interesting reading see S. Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, op. cit; B. O’Malley and I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London and New York 1999, pp. 87-100. 6 United Nations, S/RES/186, The Cyprus Question, 1964, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CY_640304_SCR186.pdf 7 M. Christodoulou, The Course of an Era: Greece, the Cypriot Leadership and the Cyprus Problem (in Greek), op. cit., pp. 515-516. 8 For this as well as for an interesting perspective of the entire period from 1960 to the immediate either math of the 1974 situation see Gl. Clerides, My Deposition (in Greek), vols. 1, 2, 3, and 4, Alitheia Press, Nicosia, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991. 7 On July 13, 1974, a plan for the solution of the Cyprus problem was tentatively finalized by Michael Dekleris and Orhan Aldikacti; this agreement was to be ratified by Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash on July 16, 1974.9 This agreement provided for a unitary state with elements of local and communal self-administration on issues of low politics.10 Nonetheless, Turkey was preparing its own action plan to take advantage of the clash between Makarios and the Junta. Following the coup against Makarios on July 15, 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus five days later, on July 20, “to reestablish the constitutional order and to protect the Turkish Cypriot community.” On July 22 there was a ceasefire, followed by the resignation of the putschist president Nicos Samson. Glafkos Clerides, who assumed duties of Acting President in accordance with the Constitution, suggested to the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash the return to the 1960 constitution. Denktash, however, in consultation with Ankara, stated that “it is too late.”11 At the conference in Geneva, on August 11-13, 1974, the Turkish side submitted two maps; in both cases 34% of the territory was to be under Turkish Cypriot administration.12 And in both cases the Greek Cypriots were expected to evacuate these territories. When the leader of the Greek Cypriot negotiating team, Acting President Glafkos Clerides, requested 36 hours to come to Cyprus for further consultations, Turkey refused. In the early hours of August 14, Turkey attacked Cyprus again by air, sea and land. With the new cease-fire on August 16 the situation had changed dramatically. Turkey had conquered 9 See footnote 1. 10 M. Dekleris, The Cyprus Question 1972-1974: The Last opportunity (in Greek), op. cit. 11 Gl. Clerides, My Deposition (in Greek), vol. 4, op. cit, pp. 38-39. 12 Ch. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, Verso, New York 1997; B. O’Malley and I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I.B. Tauris, London/New York 1999, pp. 187-221; V. Coufoudakis, International Aggression and Violations of Human Rights – The Case of Cyprus, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2008; Gl. Clerides, My Deposition (in Greek), vol. 4, op.cit. 8 about 37% of the island. In the process it committed ethnic cleansing and other atrocities. There were thousands of refugees, dead and missing. Furthermore, the economy of the country suffered a devastating below. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots were facing a tragedy of biblical proportions.13 On November 29-30, 1974, at the meeting in Athens between the Prime Minister Karamanlis and President Makarios in the presence of their closest associates, the discussion largely revolved around the options of a biregional and a multiregional intercommunal federation.14 Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7, 1974, and resumed his duties as President of the Republic. The debate in relation to the solution of the Cyprus problem continued. Gradually it was understood that the only way for the reestablishment of the unity of the country was a federal arrangement including the geographical dimension. The forces opposing federation did not offer a comprehensive alternative. On February 15, 1975, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in line with Ankara and with the full support of the Turkish Cypriots,