Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 274 | 26.06.2018 www.osw.waw.pl Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military Mateusz Chudziak Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been sub- ject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enor- mous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduc- tion of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule. However, due to the fact that the TSK are a highly complex structure and the political situation both in Turkey itself and in its neighbourhood is tense, the military needs to retain its signif- icance within the state system. Military actions are being carried out in northern Syria and in the south-eastern part of Turkey. In a situation of profound distrust between the political leadership and the military, the government is trying to impact the internal divisions within the TSK by favouring anti-Western, pro-Russian and nationalist groups. At the same time, it is consolidating the interior ministry’s structures, which could potentially defend it against an- other possible coup. It is also forming voluntary structures subordinated to it. This means that the process of the armed forces’ reconstruction and redefinition of their role in the system, alongside the ultimate creation of a new army, are markedly elevating the potential for inter- nal conflicts and translating into a weakening of Turkey’s institutional ties with the West by gradually weakening its involvement in NATO. The planned purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, which the government intends to use to defend itself against its own army, is another manifestation of this trend. TSK – the institutional core guardian of secularism’, the mantle which the of the Turkish Republic TSK have traditionally assumed in the Republic. Due to its strong Kemalist identity, the military The significance of the armed forces for the po- has traditionally gathered political, clerical and litical system of contemporary Turkey is deter- economic elites, as well as opinion-forming mined by the central role they have unceasingly groups around it. In this way it has served as played in the Turkish state since the first half of a keystone of the system as a whole, in which the 19th century. The issue is multifaceted and political hegemony (combined with an econom- cannot merely be reduced to the role of ‘the ic and cultural one) was held by elites stemming OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 275 1 from the period of the late Ottoman Empire1. continues to hold an important position in the It was because of this traditional position that Turkish political system. This position endures for most of Turkey’s history as a republic the mainly due to the army’s economic influence. TSK were not ancillary to the state – on the The main institution through which the TSK contrary, they took charge of the political class are pursuing their interests in this field is the (Turkish: vesayet sistemi). Whenever it was con- Armed Forces Retirement Fund (Ordu Yardım- sidered necessary, the military toppled the gov- laşma Kurumu – OYAK). This institution is inde- ernment (coup d’états in 1960 and 1980 and pendent of civilian leadership and in practice is forced resignations of entire governments in a powerful conglomerate that is exempt from 1971 and 1997), and changed the legal order taxes and controls almost all key sectors of the – for example, new constitutions were adopted economy3. in the wake of the coups in 1960 and 1980. Despite the fact that under AKP rule the posi- tion of the TSK is becoming ever weaker, the military maintains its traditional prestige, its Due to its strong Kemalist identity, the symbolic value and its social and economic in- military has traditionally gathered the fluence. It is also a palpable instrument in the country’s elites around it and consolidat- state’s domestic and foreign policy. Since the ed the system as a whole. mid-1980s, it has been involved in military ac- tion targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the south-eastern part of Turkey. This At present, the TSK remain a powerful institu- trend intensified when the war in Syria broke tional and bureaucratic machine – the combined out. Turkish troops have been involved in mil- land, air and naval forces have over 362 000 itary action under Operation Euphrates Shield soldiers2. In addition, the military police is more (since August 2016) and Operation Olive Branch than 150 000-strong and the reserve has almost (since January 2018). Due to permanent threats 380 000 soldiers. Due to the large number of to the Turkish state, both internal and external, TSK troops and their social power base, com- in a situation of tensions between the govern- posed mainly of families with military traditions ment and the military leadership the position of going back generations that are closely linked the military as an institution of key importance to traditional lay republican elites, the military for the Turkish state is maintained. 1 The so-called “White Turks”, i.e. Ottoman elites that 3 In 2009, OYAK had a stake in 60 companies and fully con- took part in the creation of the Republic and as secular trolled 29 companies. The total value of OYAK’s assets Kemalist elites held a dominant position in it until the was 28.3 billion Turkish liras (around US$ 18.8 billion). first two terms of AKP. Alternatively, they are referred to Its operates in sectors such as construction, finance, as society’s ‘centre’ and their roots can be traced to res- metallurgy, automotive production (it cooperates with idents of the Balkans and the Caucasus who were serv- Renault), IT and banking (outside Turkey). Ismet Akça, ants in the Ottoman state. They have cultural, economic Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present situa- and social capital and dominate society’s ‘periphery’, tion, Problems and Solutions, TESEV Publications, July mainly the religious peasant population of Anatolia. 2010, p. 10. Following the purges carried out as a re- Şerif Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turk- sult of the failed coup organised in July 2016, OYAK’s ish Politics?, “Daedalus”, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional business dealings remained practically unchanged. Societies (Winter, 1973), p. 169-190 and: Jenny White, Moreover, in the autumn of 2017 the fund’s executives Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton Uni- announced their plan to return to the Turkish banking versity Press, Princeton and Oxford 2014, p. 46-48. sector and continue its construction investments. See 2 The most recent information on the number of TSK’s Kerim Karakaya, Ercan Ersoy, Vernon Wessels, Turkey’s troops of all types was announced in February 2017. See Oyak Group Seeking Opportunity to Return to Banking, TSK’nın Şubat 2017 Personel Mevcutları, MSI Dergisi, “Bloomberg”, 2 October 2017; https://www.bloomberg. 1 February 2017; http://www.milscint.com/tr/tsknin-sub- com/news/articles/2017-10-02/turkey-s-oyak-evaluat- at-2017-personel-mevcutlari/ ing-opportunities-in-banking-sector-ceo OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 275 2 Organisational changes around TSK – were removed from the military, and more than the sine qua non of the construction 40 000 servicemen were expelled from the of- of a New Turkey ficers’ corps as a whole. More than 8 000 in- dividuals were arrested, including both officers The failed attempted coup of 15 July 2016 is the and soldiers, and civilian personnel7. These most important turning point in the process of measures were mainly intended to immediately institutional and social reconstruction of the eliminate people linked to the Gülen movement Turkish state. This reconstruction process is rev- or suspected of having such links8. olutionary in its nature and has been ongoing since 20024. The coup has been the most sig- nificant upheaval in Turkish politics since AKP All of the implemented changes have so- took power. It has also shown that the military lidified the civilian government’s formal is indeed the source of power that is able to at- control of the TSK in that they nullified tempt toppling President Erdoğan5. The failed the actual autonomy of the General Staff. attempt at overthrowing his rule has become a catalyst of the process that has been ongoing for years and whose aim is to permanently sub- However, actions of a fundamental nature ordinate the military to civilian government6. covered all formal relationships between the The state of emergency declared immediately government and TSK. The decrees issued by after the coup enabled the president to issue President Erdoğan in the autumn of 2016 and decrees and made it possible to launch actions at the beginning of 2017 have formed the le- intended mainly to eliminate the immediate gal basis for these actions. All of the imple- threat by expelling individuals linked to the mented changes have solidified the civilian Gülen movement from the military. Other ac- government’s formal control of the TSK in tions included system-wide measures leading that they eliminated the actual autonomy of to the ultimate formal subordination of the TSK the General Staff as an institution that central- to civilian government.