/.,_,.I. _,A .. l(,. PROPOSE.D BASIC ESTIMATE ON I :1 'I I PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE I I "' I 0. s. s. I ----"'·--~--- -:·- --- DECLASSIFIED AuthorityAJAll)i~3:> , SECRET 1.- 0 , S • EJ • 1/5 Augm,t 28, 19 ~2 ON P~3YCHOLOGIC.AL ,,rAHFARE l! i !1 ::0 .g a Cl. C: @ aCl. 3 5' (D C :::, -- -- Q;- ~ 3 ~ A statement of the present psychological warfare situation is given, including an indication of the incentive, the objectives, and the formulation of the mit3sion. The means avaliable and oppor-ied necessary to a basic er3tirnate on psycho­ logical warfare arc0 reviewed. This review corrnists of a con- sideration of the general political, economic, psychological and informational factors involved and o.f the specific factors revealed in the anD1yfiis of this history, pre,rnnt policios, agencies and operations of the psyehological war.faro program of the Unit,:3d ,StateB, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The capabilitiet3 of Germany, Italy, and Japan in this sphere of warfare are analysed in the light of the sit­ uation vrhich confront,i& them and the: effects they desire. Various courses of action for the United States are pre::rnnted and analysed for their suitabilit~r, foJ.13ibility and acceptability for setting up an effectivo psychological war- fare organization. One course of action is chos(m for inunediate consider­ ation, and recommendations ar"a made 1.H:i to measures that should be undertaken to put this cour,rn of action into e.f.fect. ;u (D "Cl 8. C @ 0.. 0 "'3 5' BASIC ESTIMATE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (D ...,.,..___,_..-l"I'~••-·"--""""---.. ,,,~........... .....,,..,,___. __ ~~ C ::, Q. CONTEN'.lB ~ _... "'.._- ...-~ 3j CD 0.. ES TABLISHl\/lENT OF '.l:HE BASIS FOR SOLU'l'ION OF THE PROBrnM A. SUITABILITY . (1)-Sunimary of the present psychological warfare s:Ltuat.ion (2l Recognition of incentive (3 Assigned objectives (4 Formulation of the mission B FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY 'lnsurvey-of.the --;;M;··-;~j_lable and opposed (a) General factors (b) Specific factors 1, The United States 2~ 'Ihe Axis---Germany 3. The A:x:is--Italy 4. 1he A:x:is-~Japan (2) Survey of theatres for psychological warfare (.3) Conclus:tons a1:1 to relative effectiveness· IIa. CAPABILITIES OF '.rHE E:NEMY--GIGRMA.NY IIb 0 CAPABILITIES OF 'l'.l-IE ENEMY ..... ITALY Ile, CAPABILI1l'IES OF 'TIIE ENEMY--JAI¾N III. DETERMINATION OJ!' SUITA.Brn, FEASIBLE .1-~ND ACCEP'rABLE COURSES OF AC '.l'ION B ~ §JIBVEY. OF.J!OUHSJ~S •• OJi' ....AC'JJ,QN CT APJ:J.,1.Q~J'IQJLQJL.l~e..LEQR SUI'l:A.BI:J'.:.I'.J;X., .. Ii'EASifilJ:l'.ll AND_,.,....,,, ...AOOEPTABILI1X .._..... .. ,..... .... ,_ .. ,,,,..._.,,,., __ .....,_,._, . .,,, .. D. 1J;S, '.I'ING I-Di; 'I;AJ;NlW COURSES OF 1.Q.T)OJl ANALYSIS~-,........................... ___OF ....,.____ BETAINED - oounsE OF. .ACTION ~=·~ ;:o (D 'O 8. C iii 0. [ 5' IV. R:!~COMl\1IDNDNl7IONE.1 (D C ::, ,, Q. H 1\.NNEX u,~ =ii (D 0. .i\NNi;::)( B IT,\LI/,N PSYCI-IOLOGIC,\L '.'L:J1,F;,R~ itGENCIE:S ,,rm OPER,\.TIONS i\.NNSX C J.\P,\NT.£S:::: PSYCHOLOGICAL "'',,RF;Ju,~ ,i.GEtJCL~S ,\ND OViI:R1(['IONS ;\NNEX D A. SURV.;EY OF THI~ lNEMY 1 S PROBL3M B, }i;NEl\J!Y C.'.PABILITIES ANN:;~x E ( IT /,LY.) I.. SURVEY OF TILL ENEMY 1 S PROBLEM B. }i!NEMY C,.P i;,BILIT IES 1\NNEX F ( J /tP i,N) :\. SURVEY OF' TH;:D ENEM;[' S PROBLEM. B. ENEMY Ci.:,.Pi\BILI'rIES APPENDIX 'l'O 1\NNIDX F -..... ,\SViWT,S OF J.\.P1\Nli~SE f'.ROPAG,\ND/, '110 /JlGHIC/, SI!CY'!ING LACI{ OF INSIGHT INTO ,JlrERIC,\N RiI:1i.CTIONS. CHARTS 2. EXI~3'I'ING OitG./LNIZ//CIOJ>J OF AClE.N.CIEi3 CONCERNED ?1IrrH PSYCHOLOGIC,\L '.J/JlF/,m~ - UNI'rli:D S'I';,T}~S 3 • PO,S,'3IBLE ORG/,NIZ,'tTIOl\T FOR PffYCHOLOGlCi\L ~'li\RF ltR:;;; ( CORRESPONDING TO S.iLCOl\fD COlffWl'.; OF ;\CT ION) I+, PRINCIPAL PSYCHOLOGIC:JJ T'J/tHF;m;,; ;\G:;:;:;NCI3S--JAP,\N 5. PRINCIP :iL P,SYCHOLOGICAL ~'11',RF',\Ri~ 1°·.GENCr;,;s--IT J\LY ;o (D u a0. C 0 (D a0. BASIC ESTlM!.TE ON PSYCHOLOC\ICL.L WLRFLHE cl 5' 11 (D C i1 ::, ,,,I Q. I' en I' en'" ~ 11 (D 0. -0 (D I Q. en ( J.) §.tmll.TtsJ.XY pf,_, the_J2re sent .J?J312holor,ical .J:y§rf are .. .§itua·~.1&,:n. '"en ii; ~ 0. I :11 (a) The Axis countries, particuJ.arly Germany and Japan, 0 '' I,, s·0: (Cl ji en are effectively using organized pr:,ychological warfare 8, lj 5' (D 1., to demoralize z and mislead their eriem:i.es :i.n the '"g- ::, .I Em•opean, Near Eastern, North Lfrican, Far Eastern, ~ I and 1Jfostern Hemisphere theatres of war~ and in )> 0::,- i!I the countx·ies which they dominate~ especially <' 1, i ffi ;1 Europe and the Far Easti · 1; 2., to win the support of neutrals by propagandizing myths of invincibility, Crermany 1s 11 Now Order in Em•ope11 , Japan's 11 Greater E1:1r1t Lsia", ' , 3 411 to maintain the morale of the:l.r own armed forces and civilian populat:l.ons. confined its psychological wa:r.f;p,re chiefly to a les,s formnlized attempt to convince th0l peoples of neutral and occupled. countries of the certainty of a United Nations vieto:ry and to w:i.n their sympathy :for its I war and post.. wo.r aims~. Thero is little integration .I of jJ;~i present psychological warfare activities and little effort to gear them into tho strategy and tactics o:f miJ.:t tary opera tio:ns • - 3 - SECRET 1. subversive se1~vices engaged in sabotage, rumor- ~~-----·spre-ad-ing-_,--bt"-ir:,&P-Y,-8--tG ' ___ ___ _ ~-- 2'. combat psychological warfare services directly at­ tached to the armed .forces., which act under the theatre commander and are exemplified by the German Propaganda Companies. (c) intelligence services enga1;ed in accumulating informa­ tion by research and espionage on fundamental social ideological and leadership vulnerabiJ..iti(oS of enomy populations and on the current attitudes and morale of civilian and military groups, in addition to the usual mi1itary, naval, pol:i:Lical, and economic information. (4) Formulation of the mission To make analyses on which are based recommendations with respect to the proper functioning of ptiychological war­ fare waged by the United States, in order to assist in the attainment of tho objectives of tho ,Joint United States Chiefs of Staff. B. FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY ----.. ~~-------.. --~ ... (1) ~~~~ ..,~<:: moans avni1able ~£12.:?E.~2 (a) General facto:rs 1. Poli.tical factors Available Flexibility of a democratic Nimblmi.r~ss of policy provided by tho structure contralization and absolute control in a total:i.tar:i.an state A~liances based upon mutual aim and effort rather than 'rhe absolute cl.nd complete polHical upon opportunism. power of the ·totalitarian regimes. SECRE'r 2. Economics factors Resources and industrial and Resources, and industrial and transportation facilities of the transpor·\,a;tion----fae-i-1-:i:-Mee-ei'--tho United Nations. Axis and their occupied and satcll:i.te countries. Capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry in the Earlior achievement by the total­ United Statos. itarian states of a total and absolute economy. 3• Psychological factors (expanded in detail later) Greater solf-rc,liance engendel:'Gd Development of M.gh morale by in a democracy. totalitarian indoctrination and mi1itary success., and its Enthusiasm and dependability of maintenance by absolute political free and voluntary support for power. our war offort. Long pre-war period of training Prestige of the United States in and discipline_..., social and material things and the hope of economic as well as military. peoples abroad for assistance to come. Absolute control o.f the State over all channels of influence United States reputatfon in many upon the thoughts, opinions, and parts of the world for disinter­ actions of the people. estedness. The impetus derived from the 'I; ' I The spirit of protest and revolt revolutionary origin of the Axis I among the peoples oppressed by movements I: the Axis, I 4. Information and counter-information measures Potential development of agencies Total and absolute control of for the collection and analysis all sources and all dissemination of information. of information, Early and extensive development of a wide variety of intelli­ gence agencies, particularly in Germany and Japan. Early and elaborate development of espionage systems. (2916) l i I I DECLASSIFIED-~=,_ / Authority~~3 i ! I ;:o (D SECRJ~T u ... 5 ... 8. C iii 0. [ SC (D C :::, _______J_--11.nit.ed States Q. ~- (D a. History of psychological warfare in the United 0."" St':?c tes--~-------M- Psychological warfare of the:'J modern sort appeared in the first World War. American activities were organized as follows: i. General propaganda. This was carried on, in ___ ..,,_. ... --··- both the domestic and foreign fioJ.ds, by the ..,.._...---""""""---Committee on Public Information- (the Creel Committee). It propagandized through press servicfJS, films, and pamphlets. It was the sole agency operating for th~~ United States in the neutral and allied countries. American propaganda in the last War was <3xtremely effectiv(~ in attaining immediate objectives and played no inconsiderable part in the final collapse of the Central Powers. Non-fulfilment of tho promises implic:Lt in Wilson 1 s fourteen points and repudiation by the American people of the League of Nations did, however, undermine public confidence in America among both enemy and allied peoples and have seriously hand:1.capped us to this day, (2916) I .---...:-.-- ..