February 2007 www.asiapacific.ca Number 43 Armed Separatism and the 2004 Tsunami in Aceh By Arno Waizenegger * Executive Summary The Indonesian province of Aceh, situated on the suggest this rarely happens. The escalation in hostilities northern tip of the island of Sumatra, was the first and in Sri Lanka between that government and the Tamil most severely affected region hit by the tsunami that Tigers following the tsunami underscores this. In fact, devastated many countries around the Indian Ocean on rather than reconciliation, studies suggest that disasters December 26, 2004. Some 170,000 people in Aceh lost tend to foster conflict and that the effects of so-called their lives and economic loss was estimated as being “disaster-diplomacy” are rarely long-lasting. In this regard, equivalent to the the post-tsunami negotiated settlement of the secessionist annual GDP of conflict in Aceh has proven to be a rare example of the province. For success: the tsunami and recovery activities in the wake three decades of the disaster created a window of opportunity for a before the negotiated end to the separatist conflict between GAM tsunami hit, the and the Indonesian region had seen military. This paper conflict between maintains that a secessionist conditions for a movement — the negotiated Free Aceh Movement (GAM) — and the Indonesian settlement to the government, leading to widespread repression and human conflict were well rights abuses by the Indonesian military (TNI). In the advanced before the wake of the massive devastation of the tsunami, there undersea earthquake were hopes that the rescue and recovery effort would set off the disaster. It help bring an end to the hostilities and possibly restore explores the positive the dignity and self-rule first lost at the hands of the former political implications this disaster had for peace-building Dutch colonial rulers in the early 20th century. Although initiatives in Aceh, including the reaching of a disasters bring the potential for political transformation, Memorandum of Understanding for peace between the the few studies of the political impact of natural disasters Government of Indonesia and GAM. * Arno Waizenegger is an MA student in Geography, Cultural Anthropology and Indonesian Philology at the University of Cologne, Germany. He studied at the University of British Columbia on a DAAD scholarship and was a Junior Research Analyst for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada in 2006. A Hampton grant by UBC supported his research. This paper builds on 61 interviews conducted in English or Bahasa Indonesia in Aceh, Medan and Singapore in May and June 2006, on international and domestic media and policy reports, as well as on academic literature. ISSN 1481-0433 February 2007 False Promise of the Tsunami Disasters can have an impact on the most entrenched the tsunami. In light of continued bloodshed, and pointing conflicts. That was the hope for Aceh after the to the military background of the new President, critics devastating tsunami of December 26, 2004 hit Indonesia’s argued that “the chances for a just, peaceful, and northern-most province. For three decades before the redistributive solution to Aceh’s problems seem further disaster, the region had seen conflict between the away than ever.” secessionist the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. In fact many promises were made Their pessimism was a little premature. One month after in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, most notably the disaster, official negotiations began between the that of an immediate ceasefire. Following a unilateral government and GAM. Rather than a totally new commitment to a ceasefire by GAM on December 27, initiative, these negotiations flowed from secret talks the then-Chief of Staff of the Indonesian military (TNI), initiated during the previous year by the Indonesian Vice General Endriartono Sutarto, indicated that in order to President, Jusuf Kalla. Four days before the tsunami allow relief efforts to go ahead, the military would respond struck Aceh, former Finish president Martti Ahtisaari was in kind. Indonesian President Yudhoyono also called “on invited by Kalla and Finish businessman Juha Christensen those who are still fighting, to come out . let us use to facilitate negotiations, following an agreement for this historic moment to join and be united again.” further talks between the government and GAM However, the reality in the province was somewhat negotiators. Ahtisaari, the Chairman of the Finnish NGO different. Skirmishes between TNI and GAM continued Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), gained the approval as senior TNI officers in Aceh insisted that “calamity of the Sweden-based GAM leadership to mediate and will not be seen as a way for the military to suspend invited the two parties to Helsinki. While the January military operations against GAM . raids to quell negotiations focused on addressing the urgent needs of secessionists in Aceh will continue unless the President post-tsunami relief and reconstruction, a second round issues a decree to lift the civil emergency.” In fact, of the peace talks on February 21-23, 2005 centred on Yudhoyono only did this officially months later, on May the initiation of a comprehensive peace process. Before 19, 2005. The President, however, issued a regulation this second meeting, GAM announced that the movement ordering the TNI and the Indonesian Police (Polri) to would set aside its demands for independence, supposedly continue operations to “restore safety in a more defensive under the indirect stipulation by Ahtisaari that continuing way.” But at the end of January 2005, the TNI Chief of talks would require that GAM drop this demand. As a Staff announced that the troops of the TNI had killed compromise between “special autonomy” and 208 GAM members in 86 incidents of armed conflict since “independence,” GAM suggested the concept of “self- APF Canada - Canada Asia Commentary No. 43 2 February 2007 government.” GAM’s concession greatly facilitated provincial entitlement to 70% of revenues from all current further discussion and prevented the talks from stalling and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural or breaking down.1 A second important element was the resources; judge all civilian crimes committed by military participation of the EU Council Secretariat and the personnel in civil courts in Aceh; and set up a truth and European Commission and their proposal to have an EU- reconciliation commission. The Aceh Monitoring Mission led monitoring mission as GAM did not appear to trust (AMM), comprising EU and ASEAN monitors, would monitoring only by ASEAN members – as initiated under oversee the implementation of the MoU. Three months earlier failed processes in 2000 and 2002. after the stipulated deadlines, and after several demonstrations in Banda Aceh, the Indonesian House of On July 17, 2005, the parties initialed a Memorandum of Representative endorsed the new Law on the Governing Understanding (MoU), which was officially signed on of Aceh. GAM and the politically close Aceh Referendum August 15, 2005. The impact of the tsunami was Information Center (SIRA) have indicated their rejection specifically recognized at two levels within the MoU: first, of the law which falls short of MoU guarantees, with the that “the parties are deeply convinced that only the cancellation of the judicial accountability of Indonesian peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the forces in Acehnese civil courts for human rights abuses; rebuilding of Aceh . to progress and succeed,” and the reduction of the revenue share from natural resources second, that “GAM will nominate representatives to from 70% to between 15% and 55%; and the imprecise participate fully at all levels in the commission established role of Indonesian forces remaining in Aceh. The to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction.” The MoU implementation of the Law on Governing Aceh fostered stipulated that GAM had to decommission 840 weapons among others the MoU-stipulation of local elections that and to demobilize its forces. Indonesia would have to were held on December 11, 2006. The result in the race withdraw all police except those carrying out normal for provincial governor revealed an unexpected landslide policing activities as well as TNI; grant a general amnesty victory by GAM’s spokesman, Irwandi Yusuf, and his for GAM prisoners; provide compensation for GAM; running mate Muhammad Nazar (head of SIRA). compensate the Acehnese population for the loss of Seemingly content with this outcome and confident in property and human rights abuses resulting from the the peace process, on December 15, 2006, the AMM conflict; rehabilitate GAM; change legislation to allow officially terminated its mission. for the formation of local political parties; ensure Peace in the Wake of Tsunami? “The tsunami produced an overwhelming moral, is that disasters open a window of opportunity for political political, economic, social imperative to end the conflict change, which could facilitate efforts for conflict . .I was criticized by those who did not see any prevention and peacemaking. The second argument is benefit from renewed talks with GAM. But I was that context matters. Not only are disasters political more concerned about the judgment of history for events, but they are also the product of, or happen within, missing this rare window of opportunity to resolve the the complex of politics. Natural disasters do not occur in conflict.” (President Yudhoyono, opening speech, historical vacuums: the vulnerability of populations and “Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year ecosystems reflect pre-disaster politics. The political After The Helsinki Accord” conference, August character of disasters is strongly situated within particular 14, 2006.) political, as well as cultural and economic contexts. Post- disaster political transformations would more often Disasters can influence the evolution of conflicts through represent an acceleration and amplification of pre-disaster direct and indirect factors operating at local, national and social and political dynamics than the “new departure” international levels.