Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan June 2018 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $177,000 for the Fiscal Years 2018. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $165,000 in DoD labor. Generated on Jun 1, 2018 RefID: D-F54BED1 This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the seventh in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2018, through November 30, 2018. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 Section 1 – Strategy and Objectives ............................................................................................... 3 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ............................................................................................ 3 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 5 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission ............................................................................................. 7 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission ................................................................................... 8 1.5 Indicators of Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 17 Section 2 – Threat Assessment ..................................................................................................... 20 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 20 2.2 Current Security Conditions ................................................................................................ 22 2.3 Anticipated Security Conditions ......................................................................................... 33 Section 3 – Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ............................... 34 3.1 Strategy................................................................................................................................ 35 3.2 Budget ................................................................................................................................. 39 3.3 Force Size and Structure ..................................................................................................... 40 3.4 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 43 3.5 Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 48 Section 4 – Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army ...................................................... 49 4.1 Ministry of Defense ............................................................................................................. 49 4.2 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................ 65 Section 5 – Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police ....................................................... 86 5.1 Ministry of Interior .............................................................................................................. 86 5.2 Afghan National Police ..................................................................................................... 100 Section 6 – Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ................................. 107 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable .................................................................... 107 6.2 U.S. Contributions ............................................................................................................. 108 6.3 International Contributions ............................................................................................... 108 6.4 Afghan Government Contributions ................................................................................... 109 Annex A – Indicators of Effectiveness for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior ..................................................................................................................................................... 110 Annex B – Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 114 I This page left intentionally blank EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since President Trump announced the new U.S. strategy for South Asia on August 21, 2017, we have seen a shift in Afghanistan’s military and diplomatic efforts. Our announcement of a conditions-based strategy breathed new life into the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan government. The shift from a time-based to conditions-based approach also sowed new doubt in the Taliban, as fighters and leadership recognized that the United States is committed to Afghanistan and committed to transforming the ANDSF into a lethal force capable of defending its homeland. Our increased military pressure, the increased capacity of the ANDSF, and the renewed confidence of the Afghan government led President Ghani in February, at the second Kabul Peace Conference, to offer peace negotiations without preconditions to the Taliban. This unprecedented initiative opens the door for meaningful negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Afghan government now pursues a political settlement with the Taliban using a two-pronged approach that emphasizes increased military pressure in order to open the door for meaningful peace negotiations with reconcilable factions of the Taliban. The Afghan government is aware that the offer alone is not enough; it must be matched by a carefully crafted plan for negotiating peace, and a plan for reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghanistan’s civil society. During this reporting period, the ANDSF remained in control of all provincial capitals, quickly defeating the Taliban’s sole attempt to take control of the provincial capital of Farah in May. The mild winter allowed for sustained military pressure against insurgent and terrorist forces, and built positive momentum heading into the 2018 fighting season. Combined Afghan Special Security Force (ASSF) and conventional force operations demonstrated ANDSF growth and maturity that promise to translate into increased tactical and operational success on the battlefield. In February, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated Afghanistan as its main effort mission and allocated additional combat enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, attack aviation, fire support, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets to support ANDSF and coalition forces. These asset shifts do not represent a return to U.S.- led combat operations. Rather, the targeted investment of assets in Afghanistan was designed to dramatically increase the offensive capabilities of the ANDSF this fighting season. In February 2018, the Commander, Resolute Support (COMRS), shifted resources and personnel to improve the security of Kabul following a string of high-profile attacks (HPA) against Afghan civilians and government officials. The establishment of the Kabul Enhanced Security Zone (ESZ) improved intelligence sharing between the security ministries. In early 2018, the United States deployed the first Security Force Assistant Brigade (SFAB) to Afghanistan. The SFAB enables advising below the corps and zone levels, at the appropriate level of decision-making, and supplements an increasingly effective train, advise, and assist (TAA) model. The deployment of the SFAB makes it possible to utilize an increasing number of Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs) of advisors focused on improving ANDSF capability at the point of need. The SFAB also allows tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands to fill enduring and emergent capability gaps, particularly fires, ISR, and MEDEVAC. 1 During this reporting period, Afghanistan’s