HOW GREAT POWERS RULE: ORDER ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Yoav Gortzak, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2006 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Randall L. Schweller, Adviser Professor Richard K. Herrmann _______________________ Professor Alexander Thompson Adviser Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT The problem of international order stands at the heart of the study of international relations. Thus far, however, it has been portrayed primarily as a problem of emanating from the interactions among the most powerful states in the international system. Scholars of international relations have paid little attention to another dimension of this problem, that is, how dominant states impose their desired international order on weaker but recalcitrant states. Despite a scholarly consensus that hegemony is exercised primarily through the use of coercion and positive inducements, IR scholars have devoted little attention to how dominant states choose between these influence tools to impose their desired international order upon weak but recalcitrant states. This dissertation addresses this gap in the international relations literature by exploring the determinants of such choices. In doing so, it argues that in contrast to the commonly held view in the field, the interactions between the powerful and weak in the international system cannot simply be understood in terms of coercive capabilities, reputational considerations, or the domestic political costs and benefits facing policymakers of dominant states. Instead, this study argues that the conventional wisdom does not take sufficient account of the role of social conventions, such as norms and identities, in international order enforcement. ii By way of an examination of three in-depth cases studies drawn from the 19th Century Pax Britannica, and the post-Cold War period of American international dominance, this study shows that social conventions can help determine what constitute legitimate and illegitimate challenges to the established social order and what constitute appropriate responses to such deviations. Ultimately, however, the choice of enforcement strategies is a function of both social conventions and material constraints as the availability of coercive capabilities and domestic political constraints do limit the range of strategies that are available to policymakers seeking to enforce international order. iii FOR MY PARENTS, FOR MAYA, AND FOR EDAN iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS During the long process that ultimately produced this dissertation I was very fortunate to receive support and encouragement from a variety of individuals. At the Hebrew University, professor Yaakov Vertzberger was an outstanding and inspirational mentor. At the Ohio State University, I am indebted to my dissertation committee that guided and advised me. Alex Thompson and Rick Herrmann provided me with valuable insights, comments, and encouragement. No graduate student could wish for a better adviser than Randy Schweller, my dissertation chair. Over the last seven years Randy has been there for me as both an adviser and a friend, always readily accessible and exceedingly generous with advice and support. Other people at the Ohio State University made my years there enjoyable and rewarding both intellectually and socially. Professors Don Sylvan, Goldie Shabad, and Paul Beck were always there with friendly words of advice and encouragement. I also owe a lot to my fellow grad students in the department. I thank Eileen Braman, Bridget Coggins, Javonne Paul, Khalilah Brown-Dean, Sara Dunlap, Paul Fritz, Yoram Haftel, Jeff Martinson, Pat McDonald, Amy Oakes, Brent Strathman, and Kevin Sweeney for making a foreign student feel right at home in Columbus, Ohio. Bridget, Yoram, and Paul are deserving of particular praise. Bridget always opened up her home to me on my frequent and long visits to Columbus, Yoram was always there with sound advice, incisive comments and moral support. Without Paul, however, there is no doubt that my v dissertation would not have been finished at all. He did not only read everything I have ever written in graduate school and provide great insights and comments. He was also always there when I needed help to overcome assorted bureaucratic obstacles. Without such good friends, grad school would have been infinitely harder to bear. My debts of gratitude extend far beyond Columbus. In Seattle, I was lucky enough to find Elizabeth Kier, Jon Mercer, and Rob Farley who were always willing to discuss my work and who were generous with advice on all matters. Finally, this dissertation would not have been written without the love and support of my family. I am deeply grateful to my parents for supporting all my endeavors. Although my mother will unfortunately never get to read this dissertation, our many conversations over the years have done much to shape my thinking and writing. It is impossible to describe how much I miss her. Thankfully, I have been blessed with having another amazing woman in my life. Maya has gracefully endured my seven years of graduate school and has been a constant source of inspiration, love, and support. Last but certainly not least, I want to thank my son Edan. In the year since he was born, I published two articles and finished my dissertation. I can only wish that he will continue to have such a positive and profound impact on my productivity as he has on all other aspects of my life. vi VITA September 22, 1970 …………………….. Born – Amsterdam, Holland 1998 …………………………………... B.A. International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2001 …………………………………… M.A Political Science, The Ohio State University 2001 -2004 ………………………….. Instructor, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Yoav Gortzak, “How Great Powers Rule: Coercion and Positive Inducements in International Order Enforcement,” Security Studies 14, No.4 (Summer 2005). 2. Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, “Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, No.1 (Feb. 2005). FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………….ii Vita …………………………………………………………………………………….. iv List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………......viii List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………...ix Chapters: 1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………1 1.1 The question ………………………………………………………………... 1 1.2 The literature: the forgotten problem of international order enforcement …………………………………………… 3 1.2.1 The insignificance of asymmetric interactions ………………….. 6 1.2.2 The conventional wisdom: the heavy hand of hegemony? ………. 11 1.2.3 Alternative perspectives: domestic politics and social conventions ………………………………………………………13 1.3 Outline of the study ……………………………………………………… ...16 2. Capabilities, Domestic Politics, and Social Conventions ……………………….19 2.1 Costs, capabilities, and reputation: a realist explanation …………………...22 2.2 Domestic politics and international order enforcement …………………….30 2.3 Social conventions: norms, identities, and international order enforcement ………………………………………..34 2.3.1 Social conventions: preferences over outcomes and strategy ……..36 2.3.2 International norms and international order enforcement …………42 2.3.3 Identity and international order enforcement ……………………..44 2.4 Research design …………………………………………………………….50 2.4.1 Summary of hypotheses and observable implications ……………52 3. China challenges the Pax Britannica: the Napier ‘fizzle’ and the Opium war, 1834-1839 ……………………………………………………...60 3.1 The Pax Britannica …………………………………………………………..60 viii 3.2 Challenging the Pax Britannica: China and British trade …………………..63 3.3 The Realist perspective: geopolitics, relative capabilities, and reputation ………………………………………………………………67 3.3.1 Geopolitical considerations and the availability of coercive capabilities …………………………………………………….68 3.3.2 Perceptions of geopolitical threats ………………………………...74 3.3.3 Imperial overstretch ……………………………………………….77 3.3.4 Perceptions of relative capabilities ……………………………….79 3.3.5 Reputation ………………………………………………………...82 3.4 Domestic balance of power, interest groups, and the Opium war …………..83 3.5 Legitimacy and order enforcement ………………………………………….92 3.6. Conclusions ……………………………………………………………….108 4. From diplomatic isolation to positive inducements: the denuclearization of Ukraine ………………………………………………..113 4.1 The Pax Americana and the threat of nuclear proliferation ………………..113 4.2 Positive inducements and counterproliferation: Ukraine ………………….115 4.3 Realism: available capabilities and reputational considerations …………...116 4.3.1 First cut: peer competitors and simultaneous challenges ………...117 4.3.2 The menu of choice: coercion and counterproliferation …………120 4.3.3 Counterforce strategies ………………………………………….120 4.3.4 Countervalue strategies …………………………………………122 4.3.5 Economic coercion ………………………………………………123 4.3.6 The Availability of the counterforce option: requirements and forces ………………………………………………..124 4.3.6(1) The nuclear counterforce option …………...................124 4.3.6(2) Conventional counterforce ……………………………128 4.3.7 Countervalue strategies ………………………………………….131 4.3.8 Economic coercion ………………………………………………133 4.3.9 The realist model: conclusions ………………………………….134 4.4 Domestic politics and the denuclearization of Ukraine …………………...136 4.5 The sociological perspective: legitimate