COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Political Science 7972 Prof Wm A Clark Thursdays 9:00-12:00 213 Stubbs Hall 210 Stubbs Hall [email protected] Fall 2013 COURSE DESCRIPTION This course is dedicated to the comparative analysis of political institutions, which in comparative politics are viewed as either formal rules or organizations. The primary orientation of the course material lies in state governmental institutions, although some social institutions will also be examined. The course focuses on what has come to be called the "new institutionalism," which adopts a more decidedly structural or state-centric approach to politics. It emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, and thus seeks to present a counterweight to the predominant view of politics as merely a reflection of the aggregation of individual preferences and behaviors. If it can be argued that individuals and institutions impact each other, the new institutionalism focuses primary attention on how relatively autonomous political institutions (i.e., rules and organizations) affect individual political behavior. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Each student’s semester grade will be determined on the basis of four tasks, detailed below. [1] Research paper: weighted at 35% of the course grade. This paper is to be modeled on a typical conference paper. The paper should focus on the downstream consequence(s) of a national or sub-national institutional variable; that is, it should adopt an institutional factor (or factors) as the independent variable(s). It should focus on any country other than the USA, and may adopt any traditional form of institutional analysis. It must be fully cited and written to professional standards. Topics must be cleared by the instructor. This paper is due no later than Friday, December 6. [2] Weekly reaction papers: weighted at a combined 35% of the course grade. In a maximum of three double-spaced typed pages each, these weekly papers should focus on issues of interest (problems, debates, inconsistencies, consequences, etc) that emerge from the week’s readings. Papers should be fully cited. Papers are due the morning of each seminar. [3] Discussion leadership: weighted at 10% of the course grade. Each student will lead the class discussion on a particular week’s readings during the first half of the relevant weekly seminar. Students will be permitted to express their preferences for a topic to lead; the mechanism for matching student preferences with topic allocations will be explained during the first session. [4] In-class performance: weighted at 20% of the course grade. Everyone is expected to come to class well prepared, and to have that preparation reflected in their contribution to seminar discussions. Attendance at each seminar is mandatory. TEXTS The following books are required for the course, and are available at the bookstore. Jan-Erik Lane & Svante Ersson (2000). The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes (London: Routledge). Arend Lijphart (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty- Six Countries, 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press). Giovanni Sartori (1996). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes , second edition (New York: New York University Press). Jose Antonio Cheibub (2006). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). David M. Farrell (2011). Electoral Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) Jennifer Gandhi (2008). Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). TOPICS AND SYLLABUS OF READINGS (1) Aug 29 INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE (2) Sept 5 THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: AN INTRODUCTION Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson (2000). The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes (London: Routledge): chapters 1 (“What is an Institution?”) and 2 (“Institutions and Interests”). Terry M. Moe (1990). "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 6 (special issue): 213-253. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996). “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies, vol. 64, no. 4: 936-957. Junko Kato (1996). “Institutions and Rationality in Politics: Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 26, no. 4: 553-582. E. M. Immergut (1998). “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics & Society, vol. 26, no. 1: 5-34. Daniel Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel (2003). “Institutionalism as a Methodology,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 15, no. 2: 123-144. (3) Sept 12 STATES & DEMOCRACIES I Charles Tilly (1985). “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” pp. 169-191 in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Charles Tilly (1992). "European Cities and States," pp. 38-66 in Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (London: Blackwell). J. P. Nettl (1968). “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics, vol. 20, no. 4: 559-592. Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950). “Another Theory of Democracy,” pp. 269-283 in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers). Hans Keman (2002). “Comparing Democracies: Theories and Evidence,” pp. 32-61 in Hans Keman, ed., Comparative Democratic Politics (London: Sage Publications). Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell (1994). “The Institutional Foundation of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 150, no. 1: 171-195. (4) Sept 19 STATES & DEMOCRACIES II Arend Lijphart (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press). (5) Sept 26 CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN Giovanni Sartori (1996). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes , second edition (New York: New York University Press). (6) Oct 3 PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: CRITIQUES Lane and Ersson, Op. cit., chapter 6 (“Presidential or Parliamentary Executives: Linz”). Juan J. Linz (1994). “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?,” pp. 3-87 in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart (1997). “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy,” Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 4: 449-471. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey (1992). “Criticisms of Presidentialism and Responses,” pp. 28-54 in Shugart and Carey (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (7) Oct 10 PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: RESPONSES Jose Antonio Cheibub (2006). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (8) Oct 17 PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS: BASICS Douglas Verney (1959). “Parliamentary Government,” pp. 17-38 in Douglas Verney, The Analysis of Political Systems (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Klaus von Beyme (2000). “The Parliamentarisation of Representative Government,” pp. 16-37 in Klaus von Beyme, Parliamentary Government (London: Macmillan). Alan Siaroff (2003). “Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” International Journal of Political Science, vol 24, no. 4: 445-464. Guy-Erik Isaksson (2001). “Parliamentary Government in Different Shapes,” West European Politics, vol. 24, no. 4: 40-54. Alastair Smith (2003). “Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments,” British Journal of Political Science, vol . 33, no 3: 397-418. John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker and Carola Moreno (2009). "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 42, no. 3: 327-359. (9) Oct 24 PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS: EXECUTIVES AND CABINETS Wolfgang C. Muller & Kaare Strom (2000). “Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction, pp. 1-31 in Muller & Strom, eds., Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Klaus von Beyme (2000). “The Role of the Head of State in Relation to Parliament and Government,” pp. 108-148 in Klaus von Beyme, Parliamentary Government (London: Macmillan). Bernard Grofman & Peter van Roozendaal (1997). “Modelling Cabinet Durability and Termination,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 3: 419-451. Kaare Strom, et al. (1994). “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 2: 303-335. Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom (1995). “Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections,” American Political Science Review, vol. 89, no. 3: 648-669. Christopher Kam and Indridi Indridason (2005). "The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems," Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 3: 327-364. (10) Oct 31 SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM Robert Elgie (2004). “Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations,” Political Studies Review, vol. 2, no. 3: 314-330. Robert Elgie (1999). “The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism,” pp. 1-21 in Robert Elgie, ed., Semi- Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Steven D. Roper (2002). “Are All Semi-Presidential Regimes the Same?: A Comparison of Premier- Presidential Regimes,” Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. 3: 253-272. Oleh