THE GREAT REGIONAL AWAKENING: NEW DIRECTIONS RSA Annual Conference 2017, 4-7 June, Dublin, Ireland TOPIC AREA: Spatial Governance & Sustainable Development STRONG LOCALISM, WEAK REGIONALISM: THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF LEGA NORD GOVERNANCE OF THE VENETO REGION by PATRIZIA MESSINA (University of Padua) and FRED PAXTON (University of Vienna) ABSTRACT To explain the current distinctiveness of regional governance in Veneto, Italy, we must examine the particular mode of governance of the Lega Nord at regional and local government levels. Furthermore, we must trace its roots back to the (historical and contemporary) so-called ‘White’ political culture of the region, to explain the localist preferences evident in the Lega Nord governing style. This paper will demonstrate a continuity between certain traits that have characterized the White political culture, in particular its localism and anti-statism, and the typical values of the Lega Nord, which today translate into a hyper-localist government culture. This investigation of their local government practice, through analysis of mayor-issued emergency ordinances, reveals a combination of localism with concerns for public order and a markedly populist style in creating a sense of local crisis. The exercise of these characteristic localist traits at the regional level, while potentially an asset for the maintenance of local identity and autonomy, constitute a point of weakness by increasing administrative fragmentation and impeding progress in regional coordination. The analysis of the regional government strategy, or lack thereof, will be conducted using the programme documentation for regional development and EU Structural Fund policies. This multi- level analysis will help to explain the current absence of a real strategy for the regional development of Veneto, and will argue for the seriousness of this area of weakness amidst the intense demand for regional competitiveness in today’s global economy. Key words: regional planning, political cultures, populism CONTENTS 1. Introduction 2. The heritage of the White political culture of Veneto 3. Lega Nord local government in different local contexts of Veneto 4. Governing fragmentation: the regional government of the Lega Nord 5. Conclusion Bibliographical references STRONG LOCALISM, WEAK REGIONALISM: THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF LEGA NORD GOVERNANCE OF THE VENETO REGION 1. Introduction “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” Il Gattopardo, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (1958) The question of the impact made by populist radical right parties holding power is a still rare and a relatively under-studied phenomenon in Europe, but recent literature has demonstrated greater significance than previously thought (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015). The Lega Nord, being one of the most established of such parties having held positions of power at all levels of government in Italy, offers insights into the distinctive outcomes produced by their exercise of executive power. Furthermore, examining the particular mode of governance of the Lega Nord at both regional and local government levels enables an explanation of the current characteristics of regional governance in Veneto. To do so, we must first trace its roots back to the (historical and contemporary) so-called White political culture of the region, which aid the explanation of the localist preferences evident in the Lega Nord governing style. This paper will demonstrate a continuity between certain traits that have characterized the White local political culture, in particular its localism and anti- statism, and the typical values of the Lega Nord, which today translate into a hyper-localist government culture. The investigation of their local government practice, through analysis of mayor-issued emergency ordinances, reveals the combination of localism with concerns for public order and a markedly populist style in creating a sense of local crisis. The exercise of these characteristic localist traits at the regional level, while potentially an asset for the maintenance of local identity and autonomy, constitute a point of weakness by increasing administrative fragmentation and impeding progress in regional coordination. The analysis of the regional government strategy, or lack thereof, will be conducted using the programme documentation for regional development and EU Structural Fund policies. This multi-level analysis will help to explain the current absence of a real strategy for the regional development of Veneto, and will argue for the seriousness of this area of weakness amidst the intense demand for regional competitiveness in today’s global economy. 20/06/y 2 Patrizia Messina and Fred Paxton 2. The Heritage of the White Political Culture of Veneto 2.1 The origins of the local political culture in Veneto The Lega Nord has been the majority party of the Veneto regional government since 2010, however its presence as a party of local government began much earlier, following the crisis of the Christian Democrats (DC) and its fragmentation in the early 1990s. As many electoral analyses have demonstrated (Diamanti, Riccamboni 1992; Diamanti 1993; 1996; 2003; 2009), the electoral force of the Lega Nord comes from the small municipalities of the so-called urbanised and industrialised countryside of central Veneto, characterized by the strong presence of small-scale enterprises. This territory was previously a stronghold of the DC, governing the region throughout the post-war period until the 1990s. To better understand the characteristic traits of the Lega Nord in the Veneto context, it is very important therefore to begin with some distinctive features that have marked the history and development of the Italian north-east, of which the Veneto region is the centre. These elements are not only part of the heritage of the Lega Nord, but remain present today in the political culture and policy style of the party at both local and regional government levels. Above all, as Bagnasco (1977) and Trigilia (1986) have suggested, it is important to bear in mind the different conditions of territorial economic and political development in Italy, and to analyse the ‘Third Italy’ zone, that is north-east and central Italy. Both areas are characterized by the same development model, based on small- scale enterprises as is typical of the ‘Third Italy’1, but were historically led and governed at the local level by two ideologically opposed political forces: the DC and Catholic culture in the north-east (White zone) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and socialist-communist culture in the centre of the country (Red zone). A territorial political subculture presupposes (Trigilia 1986): a) A centre-periphery cleavage which gives rise to a strong local community. b) An associative network, locally diffuse and ideologically oriented (White or Red). c) A sense of belonging and identification with the local territory and its associative network. d) A local political system ‘hegemonized’ by a specific political party which is able to aggregate the different interests and represent them at central government level. 1 The ‘Third Italy’ zone is distinguished by a specific economic development that differs from the large-scale industry typical of the north-west (‘First Italy’) and from the subsidized development of the south (‘Second Italy’), (Bagnasco 1977). 20/06/y 3 Patrizia Messina and Fred Paxton The historical origins of the White and Red territorial political subcultures can be traced back to the agricultural crisis of the 1880s. In the White areas, typified by small peasant landowners and rural parish priests, the crisis was overcome with the support of the Catholic Church (Allum, 1984; 1985). In the Red areas, characterized by day-labourers and share-croppers, the crisis was instead overcome with the support of the Socialist Party and trade unions, with the Communist Party taking the place of the Socialists after leading the antifascist resistance (Caciagli 1987). The two zones have some elements in common: a centre-periphery cleavage intensified by weak Italian national integration, which helped the formation of strong local communities; a similar pattern of economic development: the small business model, which started in the 1960s and 1970s; and the presence of very strong local associative networks connected to the local governing party. However, there are more significant differences between the two zones due to the following factors: 1) The different ideological orientation which hegemonized the centre-periphery cleavage and defined the cultural identity of each territorial context: White- Catholic (North-East) or Red-Communist (Central). 2) The different kind of link with the dominant party: that is, an indirect political identity with the DC, but mediated by the Catholic world, versus a direct identification with the PCI and the left. 3) Different administrative practice in local government: in the White zone, the DC pursued non-interventionist policies, recognizing the hegemony of the Church in exchange for electoral support. This policy approach was suitable for the anti- statalist localism of the White area, but at the same time fostered aggregative political institutions (March and Olson 1989). In the Red zone, the PCI used public resources to guarantee the reproduction of political support. This kind of policy was suited to the municipal socialism of the Red area and, at the same time, produced integrative political institutions. 4) A different form of political