CHAPTER FOUR POWER AND ACTIVITY IN EARLY MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY Tomas Ekenberg Si enim uoluit et non potuit, infi rmus est. Si potuit et noluit, inuidus est. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII Introduction Discussions about power in the early medieval period were in general provoked by certain theological concerns. It was held that the ulti- mate cause of all being and becoming is one unique, supremely good, supremely rational, and supremely powerful being. Th e world is created from absolutely nothing and is at all times sustained in its existence by God. Th e view had some attractive consequences as it ensures that the world is—ultimately, and whether we see it or not—orderly, intelligible in principle, and a good place. Th e view is however also accompanied by some very diffi cult puzzles, most notably a particularly knotty and metaphysically charged version of the problem of evil. In his Confessions, Augustine famously describes how his initial fail- ure to come to terms with Christian credos such as God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence against the background of his own experiences of a world abundant of imperfection long held him back and delayed his conversion. Apparently, his later encounter with Platonism led to an epiphany, and a Platonist approach to the problem of evil facilitated his wholehearted embrace of the faith. Th e details of the position arrived at are not however altogether clear from a philosophical point of view, and generations of thinkers would revisit the issues involved. Discussions about power (posse, potestas, potentia) in the early medi- eval period centred primarily on questions dealing with divine power, but questions about human powers, and the notion of power in itself, 90 tomas ekenberg were prompted by questions about the origin of evil, the nature of human free will, and the relation between free will and grace. In this paper, I will look primarily at three medieval thinkers, Peter Damian (c. 1007–1072), Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), and Peter Abelard (1079–1142). Th ese thinkers, working at a time when Aristotle’s works on physics and metaphysics had not yet been made available, inherited from Augustine and Boethius a certain action-theoretical understanding of power which plays a central role in their accounts of the powers of God and of human beings, and the connected issue of the nature of possibility. Peter Damian on divine power and will In his letter 119, De divina potentia, Peter Damian argues among other things that God can do at least some of those things he does not will (vult) to do. Th e occasion for the letter is a disagreement between Damian and Abbot Didier of Monte Cassino, to whom the letter is addressed. When discussing a passage of St. Jerome’s, where Jerome claims that God is unable to restore virginity in a woman that has lost it, Didier had been inclined to agree, while Damian thought such an inability would constitute an unacceptable limitation of divine omnipotence. Th e issue could be said to turn on a disagreement on the relative scope or extension of God’s will and God’s power. Didier had defended Jerome’s claim by arguing that the sole reason God cannot do it, is that he does not will to do it.1 Damian fi nds this view untenable, and thinks it leads to an absurd conclusion: I say, if God can do nothing he does not will to do, and he does nothing except what he wills, therefore, he can in no way do any of those things he does not do.2 Damian’s argument is not valid as it stands. If we treat the fi rst two clauses as premises, we get: (1) If God does not will to do x, then God cannot do x. 1 Peter Damian, De divina omnipotentia 596D–597A. 2 De divina omnipotentia 597A: “[S]i nichil, inquam, potest Deus [facere] eorum quae non vult; nichil autem, nisi quod vult, facit; ergo nichil omnino potest facere eorum quae non facit.” Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own..